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Chapter 1
Abstract
This thesis is composed of three distinct but related essays. The rst es-
say studies the role of the size of the economy in mitigating the impact of
public sector corruption on economic development. The analysis is based on
a dynamic general equilibrium model in which growth occurs endogenously
through the invention and manufacture of new intermediate goods that are
used in the production of output. Potential innovators decide to enter the
market considering the fraction of future prots that may be lost to corrup-
tion. We nd that depending on the number of times bribes are demanded,
the size of the economy may be an important factor in determining the e¤ects
of corruption on innovation and economic growth.
The second essay presents an occupational choice model in which a house-
hold can choose either formal or informal entrepreneurship or at the subsis-
tence livelihood. Credit market constraints and initial wealth conditions
(bequest) determine an agents occupational choice. Corruption arises when
bureaucrats exchange investment permits for bribes. Corruption worsens
credit market constraints. Equilibrium with corruption is characterised by
an increase (decrease) in informal (formal) entrepreneurship and a decrease in
formal entrepreneurship wealth. Since corruption-induced credit constrained
households choose informal entrepreneurship as opposed to subsistence liveli-
hood income in the formal sector, the informal economy is shown to mitigate
the extent of income inequality.
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The third essay explains the role of bureaucratic corruption in under-
mining public service delivery, public nance, and economic development
through incentivising tax evasion. The analysis is based on a dynamic gen-
eral equilibrium model in which a taxable household observes the quality of
public services and decides whether or not to full his tax obligation. Bu-
reaucratic corruption compromises the quality of public services such that a
taxable household develops incentives to evade tax payment. We show that
corruption-induced tax evasion increases the likelihood of a budget decit,
renders tax payable increase counter-productive, and aggravates the negative
e¤ect of bureaucratic corruption on economic development.
JEL Classications: 011; 041; 031; I32; E26; E62; D73
Key words: Economic development; growth; innovation; inequality; in-
formal economy; scal policy; corruption.
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Chapter 2
Background
2.1 Introduction
This thesis makes a contribution towards the macroeconomic literature on
the relevance of the quality of governance to fostering economic develop-
ment. Specically, the thesis uses the dynamic general equilibrium technique
to explore how bureaucratic corruption a¤ects: economic growth, income in-
equality, scal consolidation, tax evasion, and economic development. In the
process the thesis answers the following questions: 1) what role does the size
of the economy play in mitigating the impact of corruption on innovation
and economic growth? 2) Does the existence of multiple bribes account for
the non-linear relationship between corruption and economic growth given
the size of the economy? 3) Does the informal sector mitigate the extent
of income inequality in a corruption riddled economy? 4) What role does
corruption play in the interaction between the quality of public services, tax
evasion, and scal consolidation? 5) What role does corruption play in the
interaction between the quality of public services, tax evasion, and economic
development?
The analysis shows that: 1) indeed the size of the economy mitigates the
impact of corruption on innovation and economic growth. However when
corruption is characterised by multiple bribe payments, irrespective of the
size of the economy both innovation and economic growth are compromised;
1
2) the existence of the informal sector mitigates the extent of income in-
equality in an economy characterised by corruption. The model implies that
institutional restructuring with the aim of alleviating the informal sector
while not putting in place income safety nets would increase the extent of
income inequality; 3) corruption through reducing the quality of public ser-
vices incentivises tax payers to evade taxes. Corruption-induced tax evasion
constrains a countrys revenue ow thereby increasing the likelihood of a s-
cal decit. Attempts to eliminate the scal decit through increasing the tax
payable are counter-productive as the policy incentivises more tax evasion.
The existence of corruption-induced tax evasion restricts the government to
cutting back the quantity of public services and thus public expenditure as
to reduce the scal decit. The study shows that cutting back the quantity
of public services has two conicting outcomes: a) it aggravates underdevel-
opment through compromising productivity; and b) it potentially initiates
an economys transition from underdevelopment to a higher level of economic
development through disincentivising corruptible bureaucrats from engaging
in corruption since the available loot is now smaller.
Note that the governance of any country involves four pillars, that is; the
executive, legislature, bureaucrats, and citizens interacting to deliver public
services. The interaction of those pillars of governance determines the nature
of corruption. Corruption typically involves the abuse of o¢ ce by either the
executive or legislature or the bureaucrat in a way that is not consistent
with the generally acceptable rules and regulations to enhance self-interest.
As such corruption can be categorised as grand, bureaucratic/petty, and
legislative, (Jain, 2001).
Grand corruption involves the abuse of public o¢ ce by the executive for
private gain as opposed to the interest of the general public or electorate.
The executive are typically political entrepreneurs whose choice of public
policy and/or resource allocation is aimed at maximising their probability
of re-election. As such they are bound to inuence the allocation of public
investment or public policy towards a certain constituency to earn politi-
cal mileage irrespective of the potential viability of the investment or policy
distortions, (Jain, 2001; and Rose-Ackerman, 2002). The existence of a con-
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stituency that benets from the executives corruption-induced public policy
or investment decision makes grand corruption cumbersome to detect unless
bribes have been paid, (Jain, 2001). Examples of grand corruption include;
theft of approximately $5 billion from the Democratic republic of Congo trea-
sury by Mobutu Sese Seko while Mohamed Suharto and Ferdinand Marcos
are believed to have diverted twice and seven times more respectively, (Svens-
son, 2005). Also in 2008 the Prime Minister of Tanzania Edward Lowassa
resigned upon being accused of inuencing the awarding of an electricity sup-
ply contract to an incompetent US based electricity company that cost the
Tanzanian government $140,000 per day and yet the generators arrived late
besides being functionally ine¢ cient, (Kenny and Soreide, 2008).
Bureaucratic corruption involves bureaucrats undertaking public deci-
sions to maximise their own private interests as opposed to the terms of
reference assigned to them by the executive, (Mauro,1995). Bureaucrats are
typically hired by the executive to deliver public services to the electorate.
This could involve; tax audit and collection, health inspection of private
and public production facilities, and inspection of manufacturing plants and
factories regarding waste management and phytosanitary standards. In un-
dertaking those activities bureaucrats either issue certicates of inspection
or give a notice of closure of the facility or could caution the management
of a facility. With such discretionary power and in return for bribes, bu-
reaucrats can collude with private sector players. Collusion could result in
under-declared taxes or health, safety and environmental standards being
hardly met by the facilities, (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; and Brunetti and
Weder, 2003). Besides bureaucrats could extort money from the citizens
by exploiting their discretionary power. For example, a tax auditor could
misrepresent a tax payers tax liability with the intention of negotiating for
a bribe, (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; and Brunetti and Weder, 2003). Also
bureaucrats could as well simply embezzle funds meant for public invest-
ment. For instance, Reinnikka and Svensson (2004) show evidence where
less than 30% of budgetary allocations was received by primary schools in
Uganda with the other proportion being siphoned by district public o¢ cials.
Equally Olken (2006) shows evidence where on average at least 18% of rice
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unaccounted for in a government rice distribution program in Indonesia.
Legislative corruption involves the legislature or parliament being com-
promised in a way that makes public interest secondary. The legislature is
typically involved in the design of policies and laws in a country. The poli-
cies and laws under normal circumstances are aimed at the protection of
public interest. However, where laws and policies are not in the interest of
citizens but rather benet the legislature then corruption could potentially
arise. Besides the legislature could be compromised in such a way that it
acts in the interest of the executive as opposed to the interest of the general
public. Also in economies where lobby groups have signicant power, it is
often the case that they may arm-twist legislative policy decisions in their
favour as opposed to the public good.
Having characterised the di¤erent kinds of corruption, it is imperative to
highlight how corruption can be measured.
2.1.1 Measurement of corruption
Given its clandestine nature, corruption is di¢ cult to measure (Kaufmann
et al. 2006). Lately however, various corruption perception indices have
been developed these include Corruption Perception Index (CPI), the Inter-
national Country Risk Guide (ICRG) corruption index, and the Control of
Corruption Index (CCI) compiled and published by Transparency Interna-
tional (TI), the Political Risk Services (PRS) Group, and the World Bank
respectively. These capture the perceptions of private sector individuals,
donor agencies, and public o¢ cials about the incidence of corruption in a
given country. The ICRG index captures the possibility that public o¢ cials
will seek for underhand payments in the execution of their duties. The TI
index is based on an ordinal ranking of 12 institutions in a country from
which the extent of corruption can be established. The Control of Corrup-
tion index is a ranking across countries about di¤erent corruption indicators,
(Svensson, 2005).
In as much as success has been attained in measuring corruption using
perception indices, critiques have argued that corruption estimates are vague
4
and not objective since they are based on subjective perceptions. The crit-
icism of the non-objectivity of corruption indices is however weak since the
indices have been shown to be highly correlated with each other and across
time (Triesmann, 2000). Svensson (2005) shows that the CCI (from 2002)
and the CPI (from 2003) have a correlation coe¢ cient of 0.97. Also ICRG
index (from 2001) and the CPI have a correlation coe¢ cient of 0.75. Thus
given the high level of correlation between the di¤erent corruption indices it
is indicative that they measure the same phenomenon corruption.
Besides, surveys about the incidence of corruption have increasingly be-
come specic for example, . . . 1) When rms in your industry do business
with the government, how much of the contract value must they o¤er in ad-
ditional payments to secure the contract?; 2) On average, what percentage
of annual revenues do rms like yours typically pay in uno¢ cial payments to
public o¢ cials?. . . (Kaufmann et al. 2006). Therefore the argument that
the corruption estimates are vague is equally nullied.
In addition to the perception indices, the incidence of corruption can be
estimated through reviewing public projects to establish value for money.
It is possible to nd out whether a particular project was corruption free
or not (Jain, 2001). For example Ferraz and Finan (2008) show evidence of
audited books of accounts of municipalities in Brazil to identify incidences of
corruption. Equally, Olken (2009) used the same technique to establish public
expenditure leakages in road construction projects in Indonesia. However,
while the rst method of collecting information regarding corruption allows
for panel and cross-country analysis the second is project specic, (Kaufmann
et al. 2006).
2.1.2 Causes of corruption
Jain (2001) attributes the existence of corruption to discretionary power,
economic rents, income from corruption, corruption deterrents, legitimate
income or fair wages, strength of political institutions, moral and political
values of society and the penalties for corruption. These are discussed below.
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Discretionary power
Discretionary power captures the ability of the executive, legislature and bu-
reaucrats to independently inuence public policy and resource allocation
decisions. Typically, the executive has discretionary power over economic
policy making while legislators have discretionary power over the setting of
laws and policies that structure the actions of the executive and bureaucrats.
Corruption would arise when in the execution of their roles both the exec-
utive and legislators act in self-interest. In economies where executive and
legislative roles are elective, engagement in grand and legislative corruption
depends on the extent to which the electorate can monitor the activities
of the executive and the legislature. Where the electorate have a voice of
presence then the ability of the legislature and executive to engage in cor-
rupt acts would be compromised since there is an apparent risk of not being
re-elected. Besley (2006) argues that with increased information about pub-
lic policy and resource allocation decisions, the electorate are empowered to
keep an eye on politicians and hold them accountable. In support of the
preceding argument, Ferraz and Finan (2008) use a natural experiment in
Brazilian Municipalities in which they show evidence of corruption exposure
negatively a¤ecting electoral outcomes of incumbents. The result is however
contingent upon free press since it allows information about detected inci-
dences of corruption upon audits to widely trickle down to the electorate,
(Ferraz and Finan, 2008).
With regard to bureaucrats, their discretionary power is derived from
the terms of reference assigned to them by the executive. Their terms of
reference could spell out implementation of rules and regulations and man-
aging public nance. The rules and regulations could include; price controls,
government subsidies, tax exemptions, environmental levies, import quotas,
and exchange rate controls. Bureaucrats could exploit these rules and regu-
lations to seek for bribe income. For example, a public health o¢ cial might
allow a restaurant to continue its operations even when its a public health
risk or an environmental o¢ cial might overlook the environmental hazards
associated with a factorys poor waste disposal in return for a bribe or a tax
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administrator negotiating for bribe income from a private agent in return
for undervaluation of the private agents tax liability, (Bliss and Di Tella,
1997). Svensson (2003) shows evidence of rules and regulations empowering
bureaucrats to seek for bribes in a cross-sectional study of Ugandan rms.
Also, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) report that during the communist Russian
regime, to make a foreign investment in a Russian company involved making
bureaucratic payments to various government agencies for example, the min-
istries of Finance and Industry, the Central Bank, and the Foreign Investment
O¢ ce among others.
The decision to engage in bureaucratic corruption partly depends on the
quality of monitoring technology that the executive employs to detect misde-
meanour. Besides, where the terms of reference are characterised by ambigu-
ity, bureaucrats might potentially exploit the opportunity to enhance their
corruption returns. In a nutshell, whether its the environment authority
o¢ cial or the health o¢ cial or even the tax o¢ cial, their discretionary power
is enshrined in the terms of reference as assigned by the executive.
However, not all incidences of corruption are attributed to the manipula-
tion of terms of reference assigned to bureaucrats or legislature or even the
executive but rather the incentive for private agents to maximise economic
rents. For instance private agents might inuence legislatures or politicians
to establish public infrastructure in the midst of their property. This could
be aimed at giving the property more value. For example if one deals in real
estate and government extends electricity, water, roads and schools to an
area in which their property is located, the value of their property is bound
to increase. Jain (2001) argues that whether or not such public investments
are corruption free depends on;
1) Absence of clandestine payments to the public o¢ cial.
2) The decision undertaken by the public o¢ cial is an outcome of
competition.
3) Both the public o¢ cial and the private agent do not benet from
each others income.
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Norms and values of society
Di¤erent societies have di¤erent norms and values as such what is acceptable
in one society might be deemed mist in another. In the spirit of Andvig
and Moene (1990) and Tanzi (1995), corruption is more likely to ourish in
an economy where public o¢ cials are generally perceived as corrupt. This
is because the more corrupt public o¢ cials there are, the less likely one
would be caught engaging in a corrupt activity. On the contrary, where
corruption is not ingrained among public o¢ cials the risk of being caught and
reprimanded when corrupt is high; under such circumstances public o¢ cials
would be hesitant to engage in corrupt activities. The importance of norms
and values of society is further emphasised by Fisman and Miguel (2007) in
their study of the parking behaviour of the United Nations diplomats in New
York City to understand the e¤ect of cultural norms and legal enforcement
in controlling corruption. Using New York City as a natural experiment,
diplomats from countries with low levels of corruption were less likely to
behave corruptly (unpaid parking violations) unlike those from high corrupt
countries in an environment of no enforcement. Specically, going from a
highly corrupt country like Nigeria to a less corrupt country like Norway
is associated with approximately an 80% reduction in the average rate of
unpaid parking violations or parking violations corruption measure. This
result signals persistence of country anti-corruption norms. However, upon
the removal of diplomatic immunity on tra¢ c o¤ences for at least 3 unpaid
parking violations, parking violations dropped by approximately 98% in 2002.
Thus both cultural norms and enforcement are instrumental in the ght
against corruption.
Furthermore, overtime the frequency of unpaid violations among diplo-
mats increased by 8.4 percent for each additional month that the diplomat
lived in New York City. This perhaps shows that diplomats are more in-
clined not to pay parking violations as they learn about the realities of their
diplomatic immunity. The increase in unpaid parking violation is more pro-
nounced among diplomats from less corrupt countries. This signals a drop
in attachment to home country anti-corruption norms the longer a diplomat
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lived in New York. Note that these results hold only for the pre-enforcement
period. Thus the norms and values of a society are instrumental in deter-
mining the corruption outcomes of public o¢ cials.
Legitimate and fair wages
Mauro (1997) argues that when wages in the public service are lower than
those in the private sector, public o¢ cials have an incentive to trade their
discretionary power for more income. This is particularly so when the loss
in income upon being detected is low. In support of the preceding analysis,
Goel and Nelson (1998) avail empirical evidence using data from the United
States in which they show that corruption and wages are inversely related.
Even among developing and low income OECD countries there is evidence
of an inverse relationship between corruption and wages (Van Rijckegem and
Weder, 2001). Implicitly, a country may not have to adjust policies relating
to transparency and accountability to ght corruption in the event wages are
increased signicantly, (Van Rijckegem and Weder, 2001). However Di Tella
and Schargrodsky (2003) are sceptical about the initial studies that found an
inverse relationship between corruption and wages. They argue that there is
a possibility of; data on wages and corruption referring to di¤erent groups
of people as a result of data aggregation at the country level, and omit-
ted variable bias yet variables such as monitoring intensity and culture are
important in the interaction between corruption and wages. Inspite of the
criticism however, Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2003) in a study of corrup-
tion in hospital procurement in the City of Buenos Aires, Argentina, equally
nd evidence of an inverse relationship between corruption and wages given
an e¢ cient monitoring or auditing process. Besides the Di Tella and Schar-
grodsky (2003) nding is consistent with the Becker-Stigler hypothesis to the
extent that the incidence of corruption is decreasing with increasing wages
on condition that the monitoring or auditing process is e¢ cient.
In societies where wages are deemed to be fair, corruption is bound to be
frowned upon. As such being caught in a corruption scandal breeds ostracism
and berating, (Chand and Moene, 1997). While in societies where wages are
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signicantly low corruption is bound to ourish and accepted, (Tanzi, 1994).
Free press and Judiciary
In societies where press freedom is acceptable corruption levels are low.
Brunetti and Weder (2003) in a cross country analysis show that corrup-
tion is inversely related to press freedom. This is because press freedom acts
as a platform upon which citizens can report extortive bureaucrats. Besides
in the spirit of Besley (2006), increased information access increases the citi-
zens voice for more accountable leadership from both the executive and the
legislature. Furthermore, even where both the citizen and bureaucrat col-
lude to the extent that none of them has an incentive to reveal their illegal
action, free press would allow for investigative journalism to unbundle such
acts (Brunetti and Weder, 2003). The importance of free press in ghting
corruption is highlighted by Ferraz and Finan (2008) who show evidence of
corruption exposure negatively a¤ecting electoral outcomes of incumbents in
Brazilian municipalities.
The signicance of an independent judicial system is to allow thorough
investigation and prosecution of the corrupt public o¢ cials. Otherwise where
the outcome of the courts can be predetermined implies that corrupt o¢ cials
have the ability to go scot-free. This is because under such an environment
corrupt o¢ cials can inuence judicial processes. In support of the preceding
argument, Van Aaken et al. (2008) show evidence in which corruption is
inversely related to the independence of prosecutors. Besides, while it is
important to have courts at arms length from public o¢ cials it is of much
great signicance to have the police to be morally upright and equipped to
undertake investigations. This is because where the police investigation unit
can easily be corrupted implies that weak evidence against the corrupt will
be presented before courts reducing the likelihood of a fair trial. Thus, both
press and judicial freedom are drivers of a public o¢ cials decision to engage
in corruption.
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Penalties for corruption
The decision to undertake a corrupt activity involves a public o¢ cial weighing
returns against costs. Where the return to engaging in corruption is greater
than the cost, then a public o¢ cial will engage in corruption. Therefore,
tampering with the penalty rate has the potential to inuence the public
o¢ cials decision to engage in corruption. However, while increasing the
penalty rate increases the cost of corruption, it might actually precipitate the
demand for a higher level of bribe income from the public o¢ cial (Mookherjee
and Png, 1995). As such Mookherjee and Png (1995) argue that to rid
the bureaucracy of accepting bribes, the penalty has to be su¢ ciently large
thereby hindering the ability of bribe-giver to engage in bribe payment.
Economic rents
Economic rents refer to the income in excess of the next possible opportu-
nity. The existence of economic rents has the potential to incentivise public
o¢ cials to prot from it. For example public o¢ cials could restrict entry of
new rms into a market in return for a bribe or simply by way of extortion.
In support of this thesis, Ades and Di Tella (1999) show evidence of an in-
verse relationship between corruption and the competitiveness of a country.
They argue that high competition among rms implies less economic rents
and hence reduced ability to pay bribes. Which also implies that the public
o¢ cials incentive to engage in corruption is reduced since the costs of cor-
ruption remain unchanged and yet bribe income is lower due to increased
competition among rms. On the contrary lower competition among rms
implies high economic rents hence increased ability to pay bribes.
2.1.3 Corruption and economic development
The interaction between corruption and economic development has been
characterised by two diverging views. On one hand, Bailey (1966), Hunt-
ington (1968), Le¤ (1964), Leys (1965), Lien (1986), and Lui (1985) through
casual observation and theoretical analysis argue that corruption aides eco-
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nomic development through greasing bureaucratic e¢ ciency. For instance in
an environment of price controls, while a honest bureaucrat would imple-
ment such a policy disincentive to production, a corrupt bureaucrat would
instead sabotage the policy thereby creating incentives for more production
and as such increasing consumer welfare1 (Aidt, 2009). Empirical evidence
has since supported the greasing e¤ect of corruption in bureaucratic e¢ ciency
(Meon and Weil, 2010, and Wedeman, 2002). However, Myrdal (1968) and
Aidt (2009) argue that bureaucratic rigidities could endogenously increase
as bureaucrats seek to increase bureaucratic income thus corruption is not
e¢ ciency enhancing. Furthermore, the existence of corruption may lead to
resources being shifted away from the most e¢ cient project for as long as the
sought after project ensures utmost secrecy for corrupt activities (Shleifer
and Vishny, 1993; and Jain, 2001). In the process the quality and quantity
of government services are compromised leading to lower factor productivity
in the economy. Consequently wages become lower implying reduced savings
which inhibits the capital transmission mechanism. Inhibition of the capital
transmission mechanism compromises the economic growth potential of an
economy (Freille et al. 2007). Empirically, Ades and Di Tella (1997), Mauro
(1995) and Meon and Sekkat (2005) argue in support of corruption being
deleterious to bureaucratic e¢ ciency and hence inhibiting economic growth.
There has been a growth in macroeconomic research using the dynamic
general equilibrium technique to analyse di¤erent issues so as to understand
the interaction between corruption and economic development. Among these
are; Blackburn et al. (2006), Blackburn et al. (2011), Blackburn and Forgues-
Puccio (2007, 2009), Erlich and Lui (1999) and Sarte (2000). This thesis
equally adopts the dynamic general equilibrium technique to analyse the
following issues;
1) What role does the size of the economy play in mitigating the
impact of corruption on innovation and economic growth?
2) Does the existence of multiple bribe payments account for the non-
linear relationship between corruption and economic growth given the size of
1Huntington (1968) refers to that kind of behaviour by bureaucrats as personalised
de-regulation
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the economy?
3) Does the informal sector mitigate the extent of income inequality
in a corruption riddled economy?
4) What role does corruption play in the interaction between the qual-
ity of public services, tax evasion, and scal consolidation?
5) What role does corruption play in the interaction between the qual-
ity of public services, tax evasion, and economic development?
In addressing the issues above, the analysis is based on bureaucratic cor-
ruption. The issues are presented in three essays. The rst essay address
issues one and two, the second essay addressissue three and nally the third
essay addressissues four and ve.
The rst essay analyses the interaction between corruption and economic
development given an economys size. Specically the essay shows how the
size of the economy mitigates the e¤ect of corruption on innovation and
economic growth. The essay also shows that when corruption is charac-
terised by multiple bribe payments, both innovation and economic growth
are compromised irrespective of the economys size. The motivation for this
essay is based on empirical observations by Rock and Bonnet (2004) that
small (large) corrupt economies are characterised by poor quality of gover-
nance and low levels of economic growth trap (sustained levels of economic
growth). Furthermore, the economies of scale attributed to a large econ-
omy are compromised when the economy is characterised by a weak and
fragmented government where corruption networks are uncoordinated with
each one of them seeking to maximise their bribe income. Cognizant of the
aforementioned empirical ndings, this essay lls the theoretical gap in lit-
erature about how the size of the economy mitigates the e¤ect of corruption
on economic growth. The essay adopts a dynamic general equilibrium model
with an expanding variety of intermediate goods used in the production of
the nal good. Intermediate goods enhance e¢ ciency in the production of
the nal good hence generating endogenous growth. Intermediate goods
are produced through research and development. Intermediate goods are
produced under monopolistic competition while the nal good is produced
under perfect competition. The existence of monopolistic prots incentivises
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bureaucrats to seek for bribes period after period from intermediate goods
producers. The analysis is undertaken under conditions of a small and large
economy. Besides the size of the economy (small or large), we also consider
conditions where the intermediate input producer: 1) pays a bribe ounce
with certainty; and 2) pays bribes multiple times. Consistent with empirical
evidence the model implies that: 1) the size of the economy mitigates the
e¤ect of corruption on innovation and economic growth; and 2) the size of the
economy does not matter when corruption is associated with multiple bribe
payments, under such circumstances corruption compromises innovation and
economic growth.
The second essay analyses the interaction between corruption, income
inequality and economic development. The essay shows that by corruption
increasing the size of the informal sector, the informal sector mitigates the ex-
tent of income inequality. The study is motivated by Dobson and Ramlogan-
Dobson (2012a), Dobson and Ramlogan-Dobson (2012b) and Kar and Saha
(2012) empirical investigations which show that in economies with increas-
ingly higher levels of informality, the e¤ect of corruption on income inequality
is dampened. This essay theoretically accounts for the trade-o¤ between cor-
ruption and income inequality. The essay adopts an occupational choice
model in which households can between formal entrepreneurship, informal
entrepreneurship and subsistence livelihood. The essay assumes that bu-
reaucrats demand for bribes from formal entrepreneurs in return for licenses.
The e¤ect of corruption is to increase the cost of formal entrepreneurship.
As a result it increases the incentive compatible level of wealth upon which
households can acquire credit. Equilibrium with corruption is characterised
by an increase (decrease) in informal (formal) entrepreneurship and a de-
crease in formal entrepreneurship wealth. Since corruption-induced credit
constrained households inevitably choose informal entrepreneurship as op-
posed to subsistence livelihood, the informal economy is shown to mitigate
the e¤ect of corruption on income inequality and poverty. The analysis is
consistent with empirical evidence and it implies that e¤orts to alleviate in-
formality should be accompanied with safety nets to facilitate the transition
of households into the formal economy otherwise income inequality could
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potentially increase.
The third essay analyses the interaction between corruption, tax eva-
sion, scal consolidation and economic development. The essay is motivated
by empirical evidence which shows that the quality of public services and
economic growth are both decreasing in the level of corruption (Tanzi and
Davoodi, 1997). Furthermore empirical evidence shows that tax payers have
an incentive to evade taxes when they perceive the quality of services to be
poor (Alm and McClellan, 2012; Frey and Torgler, 2007; and Hanousek and
Palda, 2004). Also, empirical evidence shows that corruption-induced tax
evasion compromises scal consolidation. For instance, Katsios (2006) shows
that the lack of success in the governments stabilisation and management of
the economy can potentially be explained by tax evasion. Also, Matsaganis
and Leventi (2013) show that the Greek governments e¤ort to restructure
Personal Income Tax and at the same time introducing solidarity contribu-
tions and emergency taxes in order to cure the scal instability was partly
weakened by tax evasion. The lower income tax collections partly o¤set the
benets attained from other scal policies such as pension and public sec-
tor pay reductions among others, (Matsaganis and Leventi, 2013). Bravely,
Mehir et al. (2010) argue that if Greece was able to improve its direct tax
revenue collection from 7.9% as a percentage of GDP to the average Euro-
pean Union average of 13.4% as a percentage of GDP, the scal decit would
have been history by 2007. To therefore attain the primary surplus eliminat-
ing tax evasion is of paramount importance (Mehir et al. 2010). Using the
dynamic general equilibrium technique, this essay theoretically accounts for
the preceding empirical evidence. The analysis is based on a social contract
between government and households. Households pay taxes to Government
in return for public services. The government hires bureaucrats to deliver
public services. Because of information asymmetry some bureaucrats em-
bezzle public funds by delivering poor quality public services while quoting
prices for high quality expensive public services. Since households can observe
the quality of public services, poor quality public services incentivise taxable
households to evade tax. Consistent with empirical evidence, the essay shows
that corruption-induced tax evasion increases the likelihood of a scal decit,
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renders tax payable increase counter-productive, and aggravates the negative
e¤ect of bureaucratic corruption on economic development. Also, this essay
highlights that where a low incidence of corruption is accompanied with lower
quantity of public services, there is a likelihood of an economy breaking the
poverty trap and transiting to a higher economic development path.
After the three essays, the nal chapter avails nal remarks about cor-
ruption and economic development while highlighting avenues for further
research.
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Chapter 3
Does size matter? Scale and
Corruption
3.1 Introduction
The negative link between public sector corruption and economic growth has
been widely explored since the seminal contribution of Mauro (1995). There
is a consensus in the literature that graft undermines economic progress.
This consensus is based on several studies that lend support to this result
(e.g., Aidt 2009; Gyimah-Brempong 2003; Keefer and Knack 1997; Knack
and Keefer 1995; Li et al. 2000; Méon and Sekkat, 2005; Mo 2001). There is
also evidence, however, that some countries have grown at impressive rates
regardless of exhibiting high levels of corruption. The best example of this is
what Wedeman (2002) has labelled the East Asian Paradox. Countries such
as China, Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand grew very rapidly during
the 1980s and 1990s in spite of exhibiting high levels of corruption. Recent
examples of this may be Brazil and India. One possible explanation for
this phenomenon is related with the speed moneyhypothesis. This theory
postulates that corruption can be viewed as greasing the wheelsof a slow
and cumbersome bureaucracy. Other, less conventional explanation, is linked
with what we can call corruption mitigants, i.e., specic factors that may
diminish the impact of corruption on economic development. This paper is
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related with this second explanation.
We argue that the size of the economy is one of the factors that may
mitigate the impact of corruption on growth. Firms that have access to large
markets are able to operate on a larger scale and hence generate larger prof-
its. Higher prots mean that the average rm can a¤ord to have an outside
option. This situation strengthens the bargaining power of rms when nego-
tiating with corrupt public o¢ cials. Higher bargaining power results in lower
bribes and a lower impact of corruption on the growth rate of the economy.
In contrast, in small economies the average rm is constrained by the size
of the market and is not able to generate large enough prots to absorb, for
instance, the costs of relocation. In such economies, rms have low bargain-
ing power and are at the mercy of bureaucrats. In line with the existing
literature, we also show how multiple bribe payments can have devastating
e¤ects by creating disincentives to enter the market even in large economies.
In the rest of this section we discuss the literatures on the speed money
hypothesis and on corruption mitigants, and elaborate on our proposal.
3.1.1 The Speed Money Hypothesis
The speed money hypothesis is an application of the second best theory. It
views bribes and kickbacks as convenient devices for overcoming institutional
obstacles. According to their proponents, corruption may enhance e¢ ciency
by greasingthe bureaucratic rigidities that characterise a cumbersome in-
stitutional framework. A more e¢ cient bureaucracy may potentially have a
positive impact on investment and growth.1
This theory gained prominence in the 1960s with the works of Le¤ (1964),
Leys (1965) and Bailey (1966). These studies were mainly theoretical and
based on casual observations. Le¤ (1964) stresses that corruption works as
a hedging mechanism to reduce the losses associated with bad economic
policies. Even though a government may be acting to promote development,
it is not guaranteed that its policies will be well designed and implemented.
1As Huntington (1968, p. 386) puts it: In terms of economic growth, the only thing
worse than a society with a rigid, overcentralised, dishonest bureaucracy is one with a
rigid, overcentralised, honest bureaucracy.
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Terrible mistakes have been made in the past and the cost and time of revert-
ing damaging policies is considerably high. Leys (1965) and Bailey (1966)
point out that corruption may act as an incentive to attract talented indi-
viduals that otherwise would not have opted for a career in the public sector.
Leys (1965) also argues that corruption mitigates bureaucratic sluggishness
by speeding up the process of starting a new rm.
In the 1980s a second wave of works by Lui (1985), Beck and Maher (1986)
and Lien (1986) explored the e¢ ciency enhancing properties of corruption,
or at least, the conditions under which corruption is e¢ ciency equivalent to
a competitive mechanism. Lui (1985) by using a non-cooperative game with
incomplete information shows that corruption can improve e¢ ciency in a
queue by allowing those with a higher opportunity cost to pay to save time.
The argument is based on the notion that time has a di¤erent valuation for
each individual. Those who face a large opportunity cost of time are able to
pay higher bribes than those to whom time has a low value. Bribery then can
be e¢ ciency enhancing by minimising the average value of time costs of the
queue. Beck and Maher (1986) also use a non-cooperative game with incom-
plete information to demonstrate that there is an isomorphism between the
outcomes of bribery and competitive bidding in the process of governmental
acquisitions of goods and services. They show that under both mechanisms,
the same rm (the one with the lowest costs and consequently the highest
margin to bribe) wins the contract and the government pays the same net-
of-bribes purchase price. After using two di¤erent model specications, Lien
(1986) conrms the ndings of Beck and Maher (1986) and concludes that
competitive bribery in comparison with competitive bidding produces no loss
of e¢ ciency in the allocation of resources.
The arguments in favour of the speed money hypothesis are very con-
vincing. However, they have been challenged conceptually and empirically.2
From a conceptual point of view there are two main problems with the speed
money hypothesis. First, even though bribery may accelerate an individual
transaction with a particular o¢ cial, both the total size of bribes and the
2Méon and Sekkat (2005) and Meon and Weill (2010) o¤er excellent surveys on this
debate.
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number of corrupt transactions may increase producing a net loss in e¢ -
ciency. Second, bureaucrats may intentionally create delays (red tape) to
extract bribes. As a result, bribes may not be seen as mitigating the e¤ects
of red tape. On the contrary, bribes may exist due to articially created
bureaucratic delays (Myrdal, 1968; Kurer,1993). From an empirical point
of view there is little support for the speed money hypothesis. Ades and
Di Tella (1997), Mauro (1995) and Méon and Sekkat (2005) report a nega-
tive correlation between growth and corruption which is particularly strong
in samples of countries with high levels of red tape. In addition, Kaufman
and Wei (2000) report that the time spent negotiating with bureaucrats is
increasing in the amount of bribes that are paid. In a new critical survey
of the literature, Aidt (2009) re-tests the grease the wheels hypothesisand
nds that the evidence that supports this theory is weak. It is not only until
very recently that Méon and Weill (2010) found empirical support for the
speed money hypothesis from an e¢ ciency point of view. Using a measure
of aggregate e¢ ciency the authors present evidence that corruption is less
harmful to e¢ ciency in countries with poor institutions. Furthermore, they
report that corruption may be even e¢ ciency-enhancing in countries with
extremely weak institutions.3
3.1.2 Corruption Mitigants
The literature on the factors that may mitigate the growth-retarding e¤ects
of corruption is still under development. One of the rst corruption mitigants
that can be identied in the literature is predictability. Wei (1997), using an
indicator of corruption-induced uncertainty from the 1997 Global Competi-
tiveness Report, nds that higher uncertainty about bribe payments reduces
foreign direct investment. Uncertainty about bribe payments may create a
situation in which two countries with similar perceived levels of corruption
3The work of Méndez and Sepúlveda (2006) also may lend support to this theory from
a growth perspective. They nd a non-monotonic relationship between corruption and
growth in countries with high degree of political freedom. They report that corruption
can be growth enhancing at low levels of development and growth-deterrent at high levels
of development. Although their results have been challenged by Aidt et al. (2008).
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can end up having completely di¤erent levels of foreign direct investment.
It is expected that foreign investors will be asked to pay bribes in corrupt
economies. In some countries, however, investors receive the goods and ser-
vices they are paying for and no further bribes are requested. Whilst in
other countries there is no guarantee that the goods and services will be de-
livered at all, and as a result, additional bribes will have to be paid. Campos
et al. (1999) extended Weis work by investigating the impact of the pre-
dictability of corruption on investment and growth. Using the same indicator
of corruption-induced uncertainty they nd that investment and growth are
higher in countries in which corruption is more predictable.
Another factor that has received attention in the literature is the or-
ganisation of corruption. In their seminal contribution Shleifer and Vishny
(1993) argue that the way in which bureaucrats organise themselves a¤ect
the impact of corruption on the provision of governmental goods. In order
to conduct business, rms may need a set of di¤erent goods supplied by bu-
reaucrats with monopoly power over the provision of these goods (licenses,
permits, certicates, etc.) In addition, these goods and services may be pro-
vided by di¤erent corrupt governmental agencies and may be complements
to each other. If rms have to deal with disorganised bureaucrats acting as
independent monopolists, then each of them will seek to maximise his own
individual bribe income without taking into account the negative e¤ects of
their actions on the bribe income of others. This e¤ect arises since the de-
mand for a bribe by one bureaucrat in exchange for his own governmental
good imposes an externality on other bureaucrats by reducing the demand for
their governmental goods. In contrast, if bureaucrats are organised and act as
a joint monopoly, then they will maximise their total bribe income internal-
ising the externalities. The implication of this is that a centralised network
of corruption can lead to a lower level of bribe payments, a greater provi-
sion of governmental goods and services and to a smaller scale of distortions
than would arise under a decentralised network of corruption. Blackburn and
Forgues-Puccio (2009) seeking to explain the East Asian Paradox incorpo-
rated these ideas into a dynamic general equilibrium model to illustrate that
corruption has a lower impact on innovation and growth when corruption is
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organised than when it is disorganised.
Finally, Fisman and Gatti (2006) propose another factor that may miti-
gate the impact of graft. They report that the deadweight loss of corruption
seems to be lower in countries with institutions that limit bargaining fric-
tions allowing for a more e¢ cient bribe negotiation. The authors use a sim-
ple model in which rms and bureaucrats negotiate the payment of bribes
to avoid regulations. They assume bargaining frictions and a rm-specic
exposure to bureaucratic hassle. Under these assumptions they show that
bribes are an increasing function of the time spent negotiating with public of-
cials. In their model a higher degree of bargaining frictions strengthens this
result. Furthermore, using the World Banks World Business Environment
Survey they nd that factors that may reduce negotiation frictions, like the
formality of the legal system, mitigate the e¤ects of corruption on economic
growth.
3.1.3 This Paper
We study the role of the size of the economy in mitigating the impact of
corruption on economic growth. The analysis is based on a dynamic general
equilibrium model with an expanding variety of intermediate inputs that are
used in the production of output. We assume monopolistic competition in the
intermediate goods sector. Hence innovation in this economy is motivated by
the existence of positive prots in the manufacture of inputs. These prots
may be exploited by corrupt bureaucrats that will ask for bribes under the
threat of closing down businesses if not paid. In contrast we assume perfect
competition in the production of the nal good. As a result in equilibrium
prots are zero in the nal goods sector and there are no bribe opportunities.
We assume that potential manufacturers of intermediate goods decide to
enter the market by considering the value of the future bribes that may
have to pay once they are operating. Assuming a xed cost of nancing
relocation we show that in large economies rms generate large enough prots
to a¤ord relocation. This situation improves the bargaining power of rms
when negotiating for bribes.
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Our analysis is based on the empirical evidence reported by Svensson
(2003) and Rock and Bonnet (2004). Svensson (2003) using a unique dataset
on bribe payments by rms in Uganda nds that: (1) not all rms pay bribes
and (2) the size of bribes depend on the rms bargaining power. This hetero-
geneity in bribe payments reported by rms o¤er evidence that bureaucrats
can charge di¤erent bribes to di¤erent rms. The bargaining power of rms
is related with the rms outside option: the ability to relocate, or move to
a di¤erent activity that requires less contact with bureaucrats. Rock and
Bonnet (2004) show that the impact of corruption on investment and growth
is lower in the more populous economies. Looking at the impressive growth
rates of large countries renowned for their levels of corruption one tends to
challenge the view that corruption is detrimental to development. Using
population as a measure of size like in Rock and Bonnet (2004), casual ob-
servation tell us that there are many relatively large corrupt countries that
have achieved, and are achieving, long periods of sustained economic growth
like China, Brazil, India and Mexico. In contrast, small corrupt countries
seemed to be trapped by poor quality governance. In spite of this, Rock and
Bonnet (2004) nd that even in large economies the benets of scale may
quickly dilute depending on the way in which corruption networks are or-
ganised. In countries with weak and fragmented governments with multiple
and uncoordinated corruption networks, multiple bribe payments may o¤set
the benets of having access to larger markets. A typical example of this
is Nigeria. A large economy in which corruption is associated with multiple
bribe payments. We account for this observation in our model by analysing
the impact of multiple bribe payments on the rms decision to enter the
market.
The theoretical research on corruption at the macroeconomic level has
focused on explaining the negative e¤ects of graft on economic progress.
Seminal papers in this area are Ehrlich and Lui (1999), Rivera-Batiz (2001)
and Sarte (2000). Blackburn et al. (2006) show how bureaucratic corruption
and economic development may interact with each other producing threshold
e¤ects and multiple (history dependant) equilibria. Blackburn and Forgues-
Puccio (2007) report analogous results together with showing how corruption
30
can a¤ect inequality by distorting redistributive policy. Apart from Ehrlich
and Lui (1999) and Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio (2009) who discuss the im-
pact of di¤erent bureaucratic structures on economic performance, no other
macroeconomic study has focused on the factors that may lessen the impact
of corruption. As far as we know, we are the rst ones to propose a theory
to explain the role of the size of the economy in determining the impact of
corruption on economic growth.
Our paper is also related to the work of Desmet and Parente (2010) in
terms of highlighting the importance of the size of the economy. They show
that in large economies competition and innovation are greater. They argue
that this is the case because in economies with large populations, or open
to international trade, the price elasticity of demand tends to be higher due
to greater competition. Hence, rms have to sell more products to remain
in the market; and by selling more, rms are also able to amortise the xed
cost of innovation over a larger number of products.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we de-
scribe the model. In Section 3 we solve for the general equilibrium. In Section
4 we discuss the impact of scale on the relationship between corruption and
growth. In Section 5 we discuss the impact of multiple bribe payments. In
Section 6 we present our concluding remarks.
3.2 The Model
We consider a small open economy populated by two-period-lived agents be-
longing to overlapping generations of dynastic families. Agents of each gen-
eration are divided into two groups: private citizens (households) and pub-
lic servants (bureaucrats). Households are di¤erentiated further into skilled
and unskilled workers and supply labour inelastically to rms. Bureaucrats
work for the government. We assume a xed population of unskilled work-
ers equal to L > 1, and we normalise the population of skilled workers and
bureaucrats to 1.4 There are two sectors in the economy: a nal output
4We abstain from introducing issues related to occupational choice by assuming that
individuals are separated at birth by some random process. We simplify the analysis in
31
sector and an intermediate input sector. A single consumption good is pro-
duced in the nal output sector. A variety of intermediate (non-tradable)
goods are designed and manufactured in the intermediate input sector. At
any point in time, t, there is a xed unit mass of nal output rms, an
endogenously-determined number, Mt, of existing intermediate input rms
and an endogenously-determined number, Nt, of potentially new intermedi-
ate input rms. Intermediate inputs are indexed by i 2 (0;Mt). Research
and development increases the number of intermediate goods increasing the
e¢ ciency in output production generating endogenous growth. All markets
are perfectly competitive, except the market for intermediate inputs in which
we assume monopolistic competition.
As in Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio (2009) our focus lies on the produc-
tion side of the economy. This means that apart from the corrupt activities
of public o¢ cials, the behaviour of agents is not essential and can be ignored
when discussing the growth rate of the economy. In what follows, our de-
scription of the model proceeds by focusing exclusively on the behaviour of
rms.
3.2.1 Final Output Producers
Following Romer (1990), we assume that the representative producer of nal
output combines Lt units of unskilled labour with Xt(i) units of interme-
diate good i to produce Yt units of consumption good using the following
technology:
Yt = AL
1 
t
Z Mt
0
Xt(i)
di; (3.1)
(A > 0;  2 (0; 1)). The nal output manufacturer pays workers the wage
rate Wt and each intermediate input producer the price Pt(i). The prot
this manner to avoid experiencing changes in the size of the bureaucracy and hence on the
level of corruption. This assumption has been has been widely used in the macroeconomic
literature of corruption. See for example the works of Blackburn et al. (2006); Blackburn
and Forgues-Puccio (2007, 2009), Rivera-Batiz (2001) and Sarte (2000).
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maximisation conditions allow us to express the factor demands as follows:
Lt =
(1  )Yt
Wt
(3.2)
Xt(i) =

A
Pt (i)
 1
1 
Lt (3.3)
By inspecting expressions (3.2) and (3.3) we can appreciate that the de-
mand for unskilled labour and intermediate input i are inversely related to
their prices. In addition, expression (3.3) reveals that the demand for each
intermediate input is increasing on the use of unskilled labour.
3.2.2 Intermediate Input Producers
An intermediate good is created through a process of research and develop-
ment. We assume that any rm which innovates has a perpetual monopoly
right over the manufacture and sale of its new product.5 In this kind of
environment the incentive to undertake research and development is always
present given that a rm that successfully innovates can expect to prot from
its creation indenitely.
Innovation is a risky activity and the jth research rm interested in cre-
ating a new intermediate good succeeds with probability q 2 (0; 1). As in
Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio (2009) we assume that the probability of suc-
ceeding in innovation is a function of the number of e¢ ciency units of skilled
labour that is used in research, et(j) = Ht(j)Mt. We denote by Ht(j) the
number of skilled labour employed by the jth research rm and the stock of
disembodied knowledge is approximated by the existent number of interme-
diate goods, Mt. As a result, the probability of successful innovation is given
by q(et(j)): We assume that this function satises the following properties:
(1) q0() > 0 and q00() < 0 (concavity); (2) q(0)  0 and limet(j)!1 q()  1
(boundedness); and (3) et(j)q0() < q() (elasticity less than one). Property
5To simplify the model we assume that the same rm that innovates produces the inter-
mediate good. Equivalently, we could have assumed separate sectors in which innovators
sell their designs to manufacturers but this scenario would only complicate the analysis.
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number (1) captures the idea of diminishing returns to research, or "crowd-
ing" (i.e., doubling research input not necessarily result in doubling research
output, some research output may be redundant).6 Property number (2)
simply guarantees that the probability of success in innovation is between 0
and 1. Finally, property number (3) ensures the existence of a unique equi-
librium with a positive level of innovation.7 Apart from the risk involved in
innovation, we assume that the cost of designing a new intermediate good,
	, is proportional to the extra output that would be created by the new
variety. Hence, 	 =  Y t
Mt
, where  > 0.8
We assume an economy in which bureaucratic corruption is the norm and
the probability of detection tends to zero. In this economy prot generating
rms may be required to pay bribes to bureaucrats regularly to obtain cer-
ticates and services. In other words, rms producing intermediate inputs
are harassedevery period by bureaucrats with the power to shut down their
operations if they refuse to pay. This assumption is supported by Reinikka
and Svensson (1999) that nd evidence that rms are required to pay bribes
on a regular basis and not only at entry level.9 Let t(j) be the per-period
operating prot that the rm could earn from selling a new intermediate
good. Then, bt (j) are the per-period bribe that the rm has to pay to con-
tinue in operation. Considering that the wage rate for skilled labour is given
by WHt it follows that the expected payo¤ from innovation is
Vt(j) = q(et(j))
1X
=1
(1 + r)  (t+ (j)  bt+ (j))  W
H
t
Mt
et(j) 	: (3.4)
The rm maximises (3.4) by choosing a level of skilled labour input, Ht(j)
6As in other studies (e.g., Blackburn and Hung 1998; Blackburn et al. 2000; Jones
1995a; Stokey 1995), we use this property for its plausibility and intuition.
7If q0(0) is nite, property number (3) is necessarily satised.
8These type of models are criticised because they exhibit a scale e¤ect by construction.
As in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), we correct this anomaly by assuming that the cost
of designing a new intermediate good is proportional to the extra output generated by
the innovation
9We could assume as in Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio (2009) that intemediate input
producers also have to pay bribes to start operations. However, this assumption is not
crucial for our analysis and will only complicate the algebra.
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such that
Mtq
0(et(j))
1X
=1
(1 + r)  (t+ (j)  bt+ (j)) = WHt : (3.5)
In addition, we assume monopolistic competition among intermediate input
producers. Hence each jth research rm by taking into account the demand
for its product maximises its operating prots, t(j) by choosing the price
Pt(j) at which it will sell its intermediate good. Assuming that it costs one
unit of output to produce one unit of intermediate good, operating prots are
given by t(j) = [Pt(j) 1]Xt(j) and hence the optimal price is the following:
Pt(j) = P =
1

: (3.6)
3.2.3 Bargaining for Bribes
Firms are proportionally distributed among bureaucrats. Since we normalise
the populations of bureaucrats to one, each bureaucrat is in charge of over-
seeing Mt rms. Bribe income is given by Bt = Mtbt. Bureaucrats negotiate
the bribe payment with the rms in each period. We further assume that
rms that decide to move face a xed cost of nancing relocation, c, in each
period.10 This assumption is in line with existing empirical evidence. Pen-
nings and Sleuwaegen (2000) nd a positive e¤ect of protability on the rms
relocation decision and Brouwer et al. (2004) nd that rms that operate
in larger markets exhibit a higher frequency of relocation.11 In addition,
we assume that rms that move face lower prots in the alternative loca-
tion. Per-period operating prots in the new location are equal to a fraction
 2

c
t(j)
; 1

of per-period operating prots generated in the current loca-
10We can think of nancing the high cost of relocation by borrowing the funds in the
form of a perpetuity that will have to be honoured period after period.
11Assuming xed costs of relocation is the simplest way to model a situation in which
larger rms face a lower relative cost of relocation. Alternatively, we could assume a
relocation cost function that is increasing on prots but at a diminishing rate. Although,
this would only complicate the algebra without adding any new insights to our results.
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tion.12 It follows that the Nash bargaining maximisation problem in each
period is given by the following expression:
Max
bt2R+
[bt(j)]
 [(t(j)  bt(j))  (t(j)  c)]1  ; (3.7)
where  2 (0; 1) is the bureaucrats bargaining power and (1  ) the rms
equivalent. In the rst square bracket of expression (3.7) we can appreciate
that the agreement payo¤ for the bureaucrat is equal to the bribe. We
assume that the disagreement value for the bureaucrat is equal to zero. In the
second square bracket of expression (3.7) we can see that the agreement payo¤
for the rm is the prot net of the bribe payment while the disagreement
value is the prot in another location net of relocation costs. Solving the
maximisation problem we nd that the equilibrium bribe is given by bNEt (j) =
 [(1  ) t(j) + c]. Re-arranging this result we can express the equilibrium
bribe as a fraction of the rms operating prot:
bNEt (j) = 

(1  ) + c
t(j)

t(j) =  (t(j))t(j); (3.8)
where  (t(j)) = 
h
(1  ) + c
t(j)
i
.13 We dene  (t(j)) as the e¤ective
bargaining power of bureaucrats and it provides a measure of the fraction
of prot that is lost to corruption in every period. By analogy 1   (t(j))
is the e¤ective bargaining power of rms. Notice that 1    (t(j)) is an
increasing function of operating prot. In other words, the higher is the
operating prot generated by a rm, the higher is its e¤ective bargaining
power when negotiating with bureaucrats.
12If   ct(j) then prots at the alternative location will be less or equal to zero. In this
case the rm will not have an outside option.
13It is important to highlight that 
h
(1  ) + ct(j)
i
2 (0; 1) given that  2 (0; 1) andh
(1  ) + ct(j)
i
2

c
t(j)
; 1

. Remember that  2

c
t(j)
; 1

, thus
  + ct(j)  < 1:
36
3.3 General Equilibrium
The solution to the model is symmetric by virtue of (3.6) which shows that
the price of each intermediate good is identical and constant period after
period. Using the equilibrium condition in the market for unskilled labour,
Lt = L, it follows from (3.1), (3.2) and (3.3) that
Yt = AL
1 XMt; (3.9)
Wt =
(1  )Yt
L
; (3.10)
Xt(i) = X =
 
2A
 1
1  L: (3.11)
Notice from expressions (3.9) and (3.10) that both the nal output and wages
of unskilled labour grow at the same rate as the number of intermediate
goods. Furthermore, we can appreciate from (3.11) that the demand for
each and every intermediate good is the same and constant through time.
A further implication of (3.11) is that the operating prot of intermediate
input rms and bribe payments to bureaucrats are also identical and constant
over time,
t(j) =  = (P   1)X =

1  

 
2A
 1
1  L; (3.12)
bt (j) = b = : (3.13)
Given the above, we can compute the present value of the net of bribes op-
erating prot in the following way
P1
=1(1+r)
  (t+ (j)  bt+ (j)) = (1 )r .
In addition, free entry into the research and development sector will drive the
expected net payo¤ in (3.4) to zero. Using the expected payo¤ maximising
value of wages for skilled labour in (3.5), we nd that each research rm
uses the same xed amount of e¢ ciency units of skilled labour, et(j) = e, as
determined by
[q(e)  eq0(e)] (1  )  = r	: (3.14)
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Alternatively, using (3.12) and considering that14 	 =  Yt
Mt
we can re-write
the previous expression as:
[q(e)  eq0(e)] (1  ) = r 
(1  ): (3.15)
From (3.15) we can deduce the following15:
Lemma 1 Given that lime!0[q() eq0()] (1  ) < r (1 ) , 9 an e = "() >
0 such that "0() > 0.
Proof. Dene Q(e) = q() eq0(). Since Q0() =  eq00() > 0, then provided
that lime!0Q() (1  ) < r (1 ) , 9 a unique value of e > 0 that satises
Q(e) (1  ) = r 
(1 ) . Hence e = "(), where "
0() = Q(e)
Q0()(1 ) > 0.
Thus, we can express the equilibrium level of e¢ ciency units of skilled labour,
e, as an increasing function of the bureaucrats e¤ective bargaining power, .
We still need to incorporate the equilibrium in the market for skilled workers.
Once again due to symmetry all research rms use the same amount of skilled
workers, Ht(j) = Ht. In equilibrium, the demand for skilled workers is
equal the supply for skilled workers, NtHt = 1 so that e = MtNt . Taking into
account that the term [q()   eq0()] in (3.15) is an increasing function of e
or, equivalently, a decreasing function of Nt, we can study what happens
with the number of new intermediate input producers Nt when we are not
in equilibrium. If [q()   eq0()] (1  ) > r 
(1 ) , the existence of positive
prots would be an incentive for more rms to enter the market, implying
14In conjuction with footnote 9, by including the cost of innovation which is represented
by 	 =  YtMt , we are attempting to eliminate the scale e¤ect. Specically, by subsistituting 
1 

  
2A
 1
1  L for  and A
1
1 
2
1 LMt for Yt in equation (3.14) L cancels out on
either sides of equation (3.14). In doing so, the scale e¤ect is netted out in the spirit of
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004). In essence the entry condition into innovation at this
point is free of scale e¤ects.
15Lemma 1 and its subsequent implications is developed from Blackburn and Forgues-
Puccio (2009). In Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio (2009) the e¢ ciency units of skilled
labour are a function of the amount of bribe paid. In this paper however, the e¢ ciency
units of skilled labour are a function of the bureaucrats e¤ective bargaining power. Across
the two papers, the e¢ ciency units of skilled labour is increasing in both variables.
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that Nt would increase until (3.15) holds with equality. Alternatively, if
[q()   eq0()] (1  ) < r 
(1 ) the prospect of negative prots would be an
incentive for rms to leave the market. As a result, Nt would fall until (3.15)
held with equality.
An important implication of equation (3.15) is that the equilibrium num-
ber of new rms engaging in research and development is higher in a non-
corrupt economy than in a corrupt economy. In the absence of corruption
 = 0, which means that intermediate input producers retain the totality of
their operating prots. Given that the term r 
(1 ) is constant, e will have
to fall, or alternatively Nt will have to increase until [q()  eq0()] = r (1 ) .
Hence, the number of new intermediate input producers is higher in a non-
corrupt than in a corrupt economy.
In equilibrium, the number of new intermediate goods, Nt grows at the
same rate as Mt given that e is a constant. In the same way the wages of
skilled labour also grow at the same rate since (3.5) yields Mtq0(e)
(1 )
r
=
Wt:
Finally we need to determine the equilibrium growth rate of the economy.
Research rms work independently, hence the ow of new intermediate inputs
is given byMt+1 Mt = q()Nt. Dening the growth rate of new intermediate
inputs as gt =
Mt+1 Mt
Mt
and using the fact that e = Mt
Nt
, then it follows that
gt = g =
q(e)
e
 g(e); (3.16)
where e is determined by equation (3.15). Notice that the growth rate of
the economy is a decreasing function of e given that g0() = eq0() q()
e2
<
0.16 Alternatively, since e is a decreasing function of Nt, g is an increasing
function of Nt. In other words, the growth rate of the economy is higher when
innovation is higher. The channel by which corruption reduces economic
growth is innovation. As we showed earlier the higher are bribes the lower is
innovation. The relationship between corruption and innovation has recently
been investigated empirically. Anokhin and Shulze (2009) using longitudinal
16Notice that g is also the growth rate for all other (non-stationary) variables. In the
absence of any transitional dynamics, the economy evolves over time along a balanced
growth path with an increasing number of rms engaged in research and development.
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data for 64 countries nd evidence that countries that are more successful
in controlling corruption exhibit higher levels of innovation. Mahagaonkar
(2010) using data for African rms from the World Banks Enterprise Survey
nds a strong and signicant negative link between corruption and product
innovation.
3.4 Scale, Corruption and Growth
After fully specifying the model we study in this section the role of the size
of the economy in explaining the impact of corruption on growth. We use
population as a measure of scale. Total population in our model is given
by the sum of the populations of bureaucrats and workers. The size of the
bureaucracy is not relevant provided we assume that there are fewer civil
servants than rms. In the same way, due to our assumption about the
probability of succeeding in innovation, it follows trivially that the larger is
the population of skilled workers, the higher is the probability of succeeding in
innovation, and the higher is the growth rate of the economy. Thus, we adopt
the number of workers in the nal output sector as our population measure
to explore how the size of an economy a¤ects the link between bureaucratic
malfeasance and economic progress.
Proposition 1 Bureaucrats have higher e¤ective bargaining power in a small
than in a large corrupt economy.
Proof. Dene Ls and Ll as the populations of a small and a large economy
respectively, where Ls < Ll. From (12) we have that  (L) and 0 () = 
1 


(2A)
1
1  > 0 then it follows that  (Ls) < (Ll): In addition, since
 () and 0 () =  c=2 < 0 it follows that  ( (Ls)) >     Ll.
By inspecting equation (3.11) we can appreciate that the demand for inter-
mediate goods is greater in more populated economies. Given the symmetry
of the model in large economies all intermediate input rms operate at a
larger scale and generate higher prots. Firms that generate large prots
are in a better position to relocate and this strengthens their position when
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negotiating for bribes. From the point of view of the bureaucrats, if they deal
with rms that serve larger markets, they will inevitably have lower e¤ective
bargaining power.
Proposition 2 Growth is lower in a small than in a large corrupt economy.
Proof. Using Lemma 1 dene es = "( ( (Ls))) and el = "(
 

 
Ll

).
From Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 it follows that es > el. Given that by
(3.16) g (e) and g0() = eq0() q()
e2
< 0 it follows that g (es) < g
 
el

.
This result is intimately related with the rms e¤ective bargaining power.
In small economies the cost of relocation as a proportion of operating prot
is higher than in large economies. This situation weakens the rms posi-
tion when bargaining with bureaucrats and implies that a larger fraction of
operating prot may be lost to corruption. The total number of research
rms is smaller and each rm uses a higher level of e¢ ciency units of skilled
labour, e. The implications of this is that under the presence of corruption,
innovation and growth is lower in a small than in a large economy. In other
words, less research rms will be willing to create new intermediate goods in
small corrupt economies resulting in lower innovation and growth.
3.5 The Role of multiple bribe payments
We have been assuming so far that intermediate input producers negotiate
and pay a bribe only once in each period. Now we turn our attention to the
case in which bureaucrats may ask for additional bribes. This situation is not
rare and has been modelled by Choi and Thum (2004). In economies in which
corruption is chaotic the payment of a bribe does not guarantee the delivery
of a service, certicate or permit. Bureaucrats can always create additional
regulations with the single purpose to extract further bribes. Hence, an
existent intermediate input producer may end up negotiating bribes several
times in each period.
In section 3 we found that in the general equilibrium rms producing
intermediate goods exhibit an identical and constant operating prot over
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time. In addition, we found that bribe payments may be expressed as a
fraction of prots. Hence, if bureaucrats ask for bribes only in one occasion
in each period, the net of bribes operating prot (per period) was found to be
  b = (1 ). This result follows from the Nash bargaining maximisation
problem presented in expression (3.7). We can extend the analysis to allow
for the negotiation of additional bribes. We start by writing down the Nash
bargaining maximisation problem for a rm when a second bribe is required
in each period. The Nash bargaining maximisation problem is now:
Max
b22R+
[b2]
 [((   b1)  b2)  (   c)]1  ; (3.17)
notice that b1has already been paid, thus it has to be deducted from operating
prot. The equilibrium second bribe is given by bNE2 =  [(1  )  + c] b1.
Re-arranging this result and taking into account that b1 = 

(1  ) + c


 =
, the second bribe as a fraction of operating prot is given by the following
expression b2 = (1  ) . Repeating the same procedure we can nd the
equilibrium values for further possible bribe payments as b3 = (1  )2 ,
b4 = (1  )3 , and so on and so forth. If we denote as bn the nth bribe that
has to be negotiated in each period. The net of bribes per-period operating
prot when bribes are solicited in S occasions is given by:
  
SX
n=1
bn =
"
1  
 
1  (1  )S

!#
: (3.18)
From (3.18) it follows that the associated present value of the net of bribes
operating prot is given by
h
1  

1 (1 )S

i
=r. Assuming that with a
probability p rms will have to pay bribes on S > 1 occasions in each period
and with probability (1  p) they pay a bribe only once, we can write down
the entry condition to the research and development sector as follows:
[q(e)  eq0(e)]
(
1  
"
p
 
1  (1  )S

!
+ (1  p)
#)
=
r 
(1  ) (3.19)
Equation (3.19) is a more general entry condition that also incorporates
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multiple bribe payments. If we assume that p = 0, then rms know with
certainty that bureaucrats will ask for bribes only once in each period and
(3.19) becomes equation (3.15). Conversely if p = 1, rms pay additional
bribes in S > 1 occasions in each period.17
Proposition 3 An increase in the probability of facing additional bribes re-
duces growth.
Proof. Dene b (p) =  hp1 (1 )S


+ (1  p)
i
where b0 () = 1 (1 )S

  1

> 0 . Using lemma 1 we can dene e = "
b (p)  E (p). Hence E 0 () =
"0 () b0 () > 0. Given that by (3.16) we have that g (e), we can write the
equilibrium growth rate as g =  (E (p))    (p) where 0 () = eq0() q()
e2
< 0.
Hence,  0 () = 0 ()E 0 () < 0.
From the proof, if the probability of paying multiple bribes in each period
is considerably high, there will be few research rms each employing a large
number of research input, e. Resulting in a low growth rate for the economy.
An inspection of equation (3.19) and Proposition 3s proof reveals that the
e¤ect of a high probability of facing additional bribes is stronger in small
than in large economies. Notice that b () is increasing in the bureaucrats
e¤ective bargaining power, . In spite of this, even in a large economy a
high p may cancel out and more than o¤set the higher e¤ective bargaining
power of rms. A large corrupt economy in which rms face a high proba-
bility of paying additional bribes may end up being comparable to a small
corrupt economy in which the probability of additional payments to bureau-
crats tends to zero. This result is consistent with empirical evidence in which
Rock and Bonnet (2004) highlight that the existence of multiple and unco-
ordinated coorruption networks have the potential to o¤set the mitigating
e¤ect of the size of economy on impact of corruption on economic growth.
17Notice that if S = 1 then

1 (1 )S


= 1 and if S ! 1 then

1 (1 )S


= 1 .
Hence

1 (1 )S


2  1; 1, implying that the higher is the number of additional bribes
the higher the fraction of prots that is lost to corruption.
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3.6 Conclusions
Entrepreneurship is at the centre of the process of development. The rate at
which entrepreneurs generate new ideas is fundamental for economic progress.
In corrupt economies rms face bureaucratic obstacles on a day to day basis
that can only be ameliorated by the regular negotiation and payment of
bribes. In spite of this, rms in certain countries seem to be in a better
position to bargain with corrupt public o¢ cials than in others. We argue
in this paper that the size of the economy plays an important role in this
negotiation process and ultimately on the impact of corruption on innovation
and growth. In particular, the average rm in a large economy operates at
a larger scale thereby generating larger prots. Firms that generate larger
prots are in a better bargaining position with bureaucrats. As a result bribes
as a fraction of prots are lower and innovation and growth are higher.
In this paper we have also highlighted that size is not everything. We
showed how a high probability of multiple bribe payments may reduce the
incentives to enter the market. Firms may not nd attractive entering a
market in which there is a high probability of multiple bribe payments. As
a result the positive e¤ects of size may be reduced, or even totally canceled
out.
Like in many other analyses we have taken as given that corruption exists
in the economy. It was not our intention to explain why corruption arises
and how the incidence of corruption may change when other aspects of the
economy evolve. In contrast, we focus on trying to understand why corrup-
tion may be more damaging in some countries than in others. An important
question that did not receive much attention in the literature so far.
One implication of our analysis is that policy makers in small corrupt
economies face a greater challenge than their counterparts in large economies.
This is because the average rm in a small corrupt economy may have very
little bargaining power with bureaucrats and the stagnation we observe in
some of these economies may be the result of powerful civil servants su¤o-
cating entrepreneurship.
The other implication of our analysis is that independently of the size
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of the economy, under conditions of multiple bribe payments, entrepreneurs
may not have any incentives to enter the market and may prefer to take their
business somewhere else where bribes are payable perhaps ounce.
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Chapter 4
Is the Informal Sector a window
of hope? Corruption, Income
Inequality and Informal Sector
4.1 Introduction
The overarching goal among development oriented agencies is poverty reduc-
tion. The extent and speed of poverty reduction is partly hinged on an econ-
omy attaining a sustainable and robust economic growth and partly hinged on
how income is distributed across households (Ravallion 1997)1. Theoretical
evidence shows that income distribution is relevant because income inequal-
ity inhibits and distorts optimal investment in human and physical capital
leading to low productivity2. Also, income inequality leads to social and po-
litical distress resulting in an uncertain investment climate3. By inhibiting
and distorting optimal investment in human and physical capital and gener-
ating investment uncertainty, income inequality reduces an economys growth
potential. The inverse relationship between growth and inequality seems to
1At any positive rate of growth, the higher the initial inequality, the lower the rate at
which income-poverty falls. . . .Ravallion (1997:7).
2Galor and Zeira (1993); Banerjee and Newman (1993); Person and Tabellini (1994);
Alesina and Rodrik (1994); Galor and Moav (2006); and Galor, Moav and Vollrath (2006).
3Alesina and Perotti (1996); Bourguignon and Verdier (2000); and Gradstein (2007).
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be robust among developing economies4. The reduction in the economys
growth potential constrains the extent and speed in which poverty can be
reduced5.
The sustainability of a robust level of economic growth over time de-
pends partly on the existence of a competitive investment climate. However,
developing countries are characterised by a less competitive investment cli-
mate because of missing markets which propagate corruption (Acemoglu and
Verdier, 1998). Corruption which we dene as the misuse of public o¢ ce for
private gain has generally been argued to inhibit economic growth through
distorting optimal investment allocation6. Bribe extortion increases formal
entrepreneurial investment costs leading to a reduction in returns to formal
sector investment. The increase in formal sector investment costs crowds out
some entrepreneurs in preference for informal entrepreneurship as they seek
to evade the brazen bureaucratic machinery7. There is a general consen-
sus that corruption partly accounts for the existence of the informal sector
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Kaufmann, 1997; Shleifer, 1997; Johnson, Kauf-
mann and Zoido-Lobaton, 1998; and Friedman, Johnson, Kaufmann and
Zoido-Lobaton, 2000).
The entrepreneurial choice of entry into the informal sector has impli-
cations on household income distribution. By shutting down business, for-
mal entrepreneurs may be condemned to income inferior employment in the
formal labour market (Paulson and Townsend, 2004). However, entry into
informal entrepreneurship may ensure a level of income greater than wage
income although typically less than income in formal entrepreneurship. In
4Barro (2000) and Easterly (2007).
5Galor and Zeira (1993), Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Person and Tabellini (1994),
Alesina and Perotti (1996), Bourguignon and Verdier (2002), and Gradstein (2007).
6Mauro (1995), Knack and Keefer (1995), Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999)
and Gyimah-Brempong (2002)
7The informal sector includes all economic activities that under normal circumstances
would be captured in national accounts however, for reasons such as avoiding bureau-
cratic rigidities, high tax burden and corruption, entrepreneurs opt to go underground,
(Schneider, 2012). The size of the informal sector is considerably signicant. For instance,
between the period 1999 and 2006/2007 the average size of the informal sector was es-
timated to be 34.5% of o¢ cial GDP among 162 countries. Over the same period, the
average size of the informal sector was 17.8% and 35.7% of the o¢ cial GDP among OECD
and 88 developing countries respectively (Schneider, Buehn and Montenegro, 2010).
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essence, the entrepreneurial choice of entry into the informal sector may mit-
igate the extent of income inequality attributed to corruption. Dobson and
Ramlogan-Dobson (2012a), Dobson and Ramlogan-Dobson (2012b) and Kar
and Saha (2012) provide empirical evidence that the e¤ect of corruption on
income inequality is dampened in economies with high levels of informality.
This paper is a theoretical macroeconomic attempt to characterise the in-
come inequality implications of a households occupational behavioural pat-
tern in an environment of corruption. Specically, we show that the choice
of entry into the informal sector o¤ers a window of hope to households by
availing them an alternative source of income as opposed to a potentially
inferior subsistence livelihood.
Since the informal sector mitigates the negative e¤ect of corruption on
income inequality, it implicitly reduces the distortionary e¤ect of income in-
equality on economic growth and economic development. Policy wise, this
paper implies that e¤orts to reduce the size of the informal sector should en-
sure that safety nets are in place to ensure a smooth transition of households
into the formal sector otherwise income inequality is bound to increase.
In what follows we present a review of the literature on corruption, infor-
mality and income inequality where we explicitly state the relevance of our
research while at the same time positioning it within the related literature.
4.1.1 Corruption and the informal sector
Corruption arises due to the delegation of authority from government to
bureaucrats to implement and enforce regulations aimed at abating poten-
tial externalities arising from entrepreneurial activities. Such entrepreneurial
activities include: exploitation of labour, y-by-night entrepreneurship, low
quality products and pollution. The restriction of such entrepreneurial activ-
ities is aimed at improving social welfare (Djankov et al. 2001). However, the
inability of the government to fully monitor bureaucratic behaviour breeds
corruption as bureaucrats exploit their power to extort bribes from entre-
preneurs. This could be through restricting entry into a particular sector in
order to maximise their corruptible income by collaborating with incumbent
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rms. Or through bureaucratic rigidities such as delaying the issuance of in-
vestment permits with the intention of incentivising an entrepreneur to pay a
bribe in order to fasten the bureaucratic process. Besides entry costs, entre-
preneurs might have to live up with signicant costs of formality such as red
tape and bribe payments as they could be required to renew their trading or
investment licenses, pay import taxes, and transfer property among others.
Bribe payments a¤ect directly entrepreneurial returns, while red tape af-
fects them indirectly through wastage of productive time. As such, some en-
trepreneurs might nd it desirable to operate in the informal sector.8 Loayza
(1996) in a study of Latin American economies shows that a robust and less
burdensome institutional framework reduces the size of the informal sector.
Specically, a standard deviation improvement in the strength and e¢ ciency
of the institutional framework is associated with 0.42 standard deviation de-
crease in the size of the informal sector. Similarly, Friedman et al. (2000)
using the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) corruption index shows
that irrespective of a countrys level of economic activity as proxied by GDP
per capita, a one-point improvement in the corruption index is associated
with a 9.7% reduction in the size of the informal sector. Finally, in a study
of 49 countries in Latin America, former Soviet Union and the OECD, John-
son et al. (1998) show that a one-point improvement in the Transparency
International (TI) corruption index is associated with a 5.1% reduction in
the informal economy. Equally, using the Global Competitiveness Survey
proxy for bribery, a one-point improvement in the index implies an 8% re-
duction in the informal sector, (Johnson et al. 1998). Clearly, irrespective
of an economys level of economic activity and the kind of corruption index
used, the size of the informal sector is increasing in the level of corruption.
In a theoretical account of the interaction between corruption, growth and
informality, Sarte (2000) argues that as bureaucrats seek to maximise rents,
they would have an incentive to restrict the number of economic units or rms
in the formal sector. This implies that agents that would have operated in
8Refer to Loayza (1996) for an explicit discussion on the costs to an economic unit
for going informal. These among others include the inability to fully utilise the judiciary,
inaccessibility to capital markets, and inability to enjoy economies of scale.
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the formal sector in a free entry environment are condemned to the informal
sector. Under such circumstances, the level of economic activities would
be compromised in comparison to when there is free entry into the formal
economy. However, the level of growth will be higher than that without the
informal sector given corruption.
Besides corruption, the size of the informal sector can equally be at-
tributed to distortionary tax regimes9 and voluntary choice by agents. Mal-
oney (2004) in a survey of empirical literature on the informal sector in Latin
America provides evidence of voluntary entrepreneurial entry into the infor-
mal sector. For example, resignation from the formal labour market may
be attributed to the need for higher incomes and greater independence that
is associated with informal entrepreneurship or self employment. Maloney
(2004) using a microsurvey data from Mexico shows that over 60% of the
respondents attributed their entry into informal entrepreneurship from the
formal labour market to the need for greater independence and higher in-
comes. Similarly, using survey data from Argentina and Brazil, Maloney
(2004) nds that 80% of the self-employed and over 62% of the self-employed
men respectively did not want to switch jobs. The Maloney (2004) argu-
ment for voluntary informality can be seen as a complement rather than a
substitute to the view that corruption exacerbates the size of the informal
sector.
4.1.2 Corruption, informal sector and income inequal-
ity
One of the avenues through which income inequality can be increased is
through corruption. For instance Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio (2007) using
a dynamic general equilibrium model, show that corruption has the poten-
tial to increase income inequality. This is through bureaucrats colluding with
tax payers to evade taxes thereby reducing the e¤ectiveness of the govern-
ments redistributive policy. In support of the preceding theoretical result,
9Loayza (1996), Johnson, Kaufmann and Shleifer (1997), Johnson, Kaufmann and
Zoido-Lobaton (1998) and Schneider and Enste (2000):
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empirical investigations by Gupta et al. (2002) and Gyimah-Brepong et al.
(2006) posit that there is a robust positive relationship between corruption
and income inequality. Specically, a standard deviation fall in the corrup-
tion index results in a 4.4 points increase in the Gini coe¢ cient (Gupta et al.
2002). Decreasing the level of corruption by one standard deviation is associ-
ated with a reduction in income inequality (as measured by Gini coe¢ cient)
by 0.05, 0.14, 0.25, and 0.33 among OECD, Asian, African and Latin Amer-
ican Economies respectively (Gyimah-Brepong et al. 2006). The positive
relationship between corruption and income inequality may be attributed to
corruption reducing the e¤ectiveness of social programmes through either
outright theft of funds or altering the composition of social programs to the
benet of the rich while at the same time being disadvantageous to the poor,
(Andres and Ramlogan-Dobson, 2011).
However, Chong and Calderon (2000) show evidence of an inverted-U re-
lationship between corruption and income inequality with an inection point
at the ICRG index of 4.34. Of the 62 countries in the sample, only 26
were above the inection point and these were mainly developed economies.
However, Latin American and Sub Saharan African economies were predomi-
nantly below the inection point, implying a positive link between corruption
and income inequality in these economies. In addition, the preceding empir-
ical result is suggestive of a potential trade-o¤ between institutional reform
and income inequality in developing countries (Chong and Calderon, 2000).
Consistent with Chong and Calderon (2000), Andres and Ramlogan-
Dobson (2011), Dobson and Ramlogan-Dobson (2010) and Dobson and Ramlogan-
Dobson (2012a) show evidence of a trade-o¤ between corruption and income
inequality in Latin America. Dobson and Ramlogan-Dobson (2012a) show
that in Latin America an increase in corruption10 (using the ICRG measure
of corruption) is associated with 1.714 reduction in the Gini coe¢ cient11.
The trade-o¤ between corruption and income inequality is attributed to the
increase in the cost of doing business as informal rms are cajoled to operate
10Or a reduction in institutional quality is associated with a reduction in income in-
equality.
11A reduction in institutional quality is associated with a reduction in income inequality
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formally as countries undertake institutional reforms. The informal economy
typically employs persons who by virtue of; personal attributes, corruption,
high tax burdens and bureaucratic rigidities can not partake in the formal
economy. Institutional reforms would imply agents being cajoled to pay taxes
and make social security contributions among others. However, agents in the
informal sector could potentially nd it di¢ cult to adjust to the new insti-
tutional framework leading to business closure, unemployment and increased
income inequality.
One of the arguments that has been put forward to account for the trade-
o¤between income inequality and corruption is the size of the informal sector
in a given economy. When the size of the informal sector is low (high) income
inequality is increasing (decreasing) in corruption. For example, Dobson and
Ramlogan-Dobson (2012a) show that where the informal economy is 12(45)
percent of GDP, the marginal impact of corruption on income inequality is
approximately 2.8 (-0.78). Similarly using a sample of South East Asian
countries, Kar and Saha (2012) show that when the informal economy as a
proportion of GDP is 10(70) percent, the e¤ect of corruption on income in-
equality is positive (negative). Dobson and Ramlogan-Dobson (2012b) using
a sample of developed and developing country data show that the coe¢ -
cient on the interaction term between corruption and the size of the informal
sector is negative. Implying that the size of the informal sector mitigates
the e¤ect of corruption on income inequality. Specically, using the ICRG
corruption index the marginal e¤ect of corruption on income inequality is
positive but declines as the size of the informal sector increases. However,
when the size of the informal sector is at least 20 to 22 percent of GDP, the
marginal impact of corruption on income inequality is negative and increas-
ing12. Among only developing countries, the marginal e¤ect of corruption
on income inequality is positive and decreasing up to the point when the
size of the informal economy is 37 percent of the GDP where the relation-
ship turns negative and increasing when the size of the informal economy is
12Similar results are attained using the TI corruption index although the threshold level
of informality beyond which the informal sector mitigates the extent to which corruption
negatively a¤ects income inequality is when the informal sector is 18 to 19 as a percentage
of GDP.
58
higher (Dobson and Ramlogan-Dobson, 2012a). Kar and Saha (2012) show
that among South East Asian countries, the threshold level beyond which
the informal economy mitigates the e¤ect of corruption on income inequality
is when the informal economy as a share of GDP is between 10 to 20 per-
cent. Hence, there is evidence that the existence of the informal sector may
mitigate the extent to which corruption a¤ects income inequality.
In the midst of bureaucratic rigidities negating entry into the formal sec-
tor, economic growth (income inequality) could potentially be low (high).
However, the entrepreneurial choice of entry into the informal sector poten-
tially mitigates the extent to which both income inequality and economic
growth are compromised. With regard to economic growth, Sarte (2000)
suggests that the crowding out of agents into the informal sector as a result
of bureaucratic entry barriers into the formal sector, implies that agents that
would have otherwise escaped the high costs of informality for the formal
sector in a free entry and exit institutional environment would instead be
caught up in informality. Under such circumstances, economic growth would
be compromised in comparison to when there is free entry and exit into the
formal economy. However, even though economic growth is lower, it is at
least greater than that without the informal sector given corruption.
While Sarte (2000) avails a theoretical account for the relevance of the
informal sector to economic growth in a corruption ridden environment, to
the best of our knowledge none has been done for income inequality. As such
this paper is a theoretical macroeconomic attempt to show how the informal
sector dampens the e¤ect of corruption on income inequality.
The following subsection positions the aforementioned research issue within
the existing related literature.
Related Literature
This paper falls in the same bracket as Sarte (2000), with the common ground
being that informality is not entirely bad particularly in an environment of
corruption. Sarte (2000) argues that the existence of the informal sector
reduces the impact of corruption on economic activities. Along the same
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line, this paper posits that the existence of the informal sector mitigates
the extent of income inequality attributed to corruption. Therefore, the two
papers conclude that informality allows for a second best in economies that
exhibit widespread corruption.
This paper is also related to Banerjee and Newman (1993). They show
that given inherited wealth, credit market rigidities account for household oc-
cupational decisions. In the end, household occupational decisions account
for an economys institutional structure thus a¤ecting its economic develop-
ment path. The analytical framework adopted shows that poor households
have a preference for employment in the formal labour market as opposed
to self-employment and entrepreneurship. Consequently, an economys long
term equilibrium can be characterised by either a high or low level of eco-
nomic development. The point of convergence is that household endowment
and credit market rigidities drive occupational decisions. We di¤er from
Banerjee and Newman (1993) in that we introduce corruption as a direct
xed cost in formal entrepreneurial decisions. The reduced protability of
formal entrepreneurship due to bribe payment compromises the preference
for formal entrepreneurship in favour of informal entrepreneurship. Further-
more, we proceed and analyse the income inequality dynamics of the economy
given corruption and available occupational choices.
The following section presents the model environment within which the
linkage between corruption, informality and income inequality is analysed.
4.2 The Model
4.2.1 The basic framework
Consider a small open economy characterised by a constant population of two
period lived overlapping generations of agents. Agents are divided between
households and bureaucrats. For simplicity the total population of house-
holds in each period is assumed to be equal to 1. All households are assumed
to be identical except for an initial inequality in endowements. We assume
that in t = 0 households are given an initial endowment that is uniformly
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distributed between 0 and
_
b with probability density function: f (b0) = 1_
b
.
Based on this intial endowment and subsequent bequests from parents in
the following periods, households make occupational choices between formal
entrepreneurship, informal entrepreneurship and subsistence livelihood. The
choice of occupation depends on the kind of technology a households be-
quest or endowment can a¤ord and the existing credit market constraints.
Formal entrepreneurship involves employing a high yielding but costly capi-
tal investment. Informal entrepreneurship involves employing a low yielding
rudimentary technology. The paper characterises the occupational choice
behaviour of households in an economy with and without corruption. The
paper attempts to explore the relevance of the informal sector in mitigating
the extent of income inequality. In the economy with corruption, the e¤ect of
corruption is to enhance credit market rigidities. Corruption-induced credit
market rigidities increases (decreases) household participation in informal
(formal) entrepreneurship. The households choice of entry into informal en-
trepreneurship as opposed to subsistence livelihood given corruption-induced
credit market rigidities mitigates the e¤ect of corruption on income inequal-
ity. Otherwise, the households occupational choice and the subsequent in-
vestment is made in period t yielding a net income yt+1 upon which claims
are settled, consumption ct+1 and bequests bt+1 are consequently e¤ected.
In the model, we do not explicitly explore the behaviour of bureaucrats
and the bribe determination process other than state that they exchange for-
mal investment licences for bribes. Emphasis is laid on the income dynamics
of households given their occupational choices in an environment with and
without corruption. In what follows we present a full characterisation of the
model environment.
A households occupational decision is undertaken in order to maximise
his lifetime utility Ut subject to period t + 1 net income which is spent on
consumption and bequests in period t+ 1 that is;
MaxUt = c

t+1b
(1 )
t+1 (4.1)
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s.t
yt+1 = ct+1 + bt+1 (4.2)
As in Galor and Zeira (1993) our specication of the households life-
time utility is to simplify the algebra and ensure focused tractability of the
households behaviour. Also, the households lifetime utility is increasing in
the size of the bequest extended to their o¤spring as opposed to the utility
their o¤spring receives from the bequest. The underlying assumption is that
even poor parents would desire to save more in an attempt to secure the
future livelihoods of their o¤springs implying that they actually care about
the utility of their o¤springs13.
The optimisation problem yields: ct+1 = yt+1; bt+1 = (1  ) yt+1; and
Ut = 
 (1  )(1 ) yt+1. The optimal solution, bt+1 = (1  ) yt+1 implies
that period t + 1 bequest to an o¤spring is increasing in the households
net income. While, the optimal solution, ct+1 = yt+1 implies that period
t+1 consumption is increasing in a households net income. Clearly Ut (yt+1)
implies that occupations with higher net incomes yield higher utility levels
and will be strictly preferred.
4.2.2 Occupational choice and inequality in the econ-
omy without both corruption and informality
As the benchmark model, this chapter rst explores an economy which is
composed of formal entrepreneurial and subsistence households. The moti-
vation is to explore the income dynamics of such an economy. Thereafter
informal entrepreneurs are introduced in order to study the e¤ect of infor-
mality on income dynamics.
13The key results of our analysis would not change even if we replace the size of bequests
with the actual utility that o¤springs attain from the bequest.
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Formal sector entrepreneurship
Recall that a household receives a bequest, bt upon which he makes an oc-
cupational choice. Entry into formal entrepreneurship involves acquisition of
an investment license from a bureaucrat at zero price. Also, a household re-
quires a non-divisible capital investment, K. Formal entrepreneurship yields
 gross return. To yield the gross return , a formal entrepreneur will bor-
row an amount equal to the di¤erence between the investment cost, K and
bequest received, bt. We assume that a formal entrepreneur accessa loan
from a nancial intermediary at a competitive market rate of interest r.
The nancial intermediarys claim on the formal entrepreneurs gross income
amounts to [K   bt] (1 + r). As such, the formal entrepreneurs net payo¤
is the di¤erence between the gross return and the nancial intermediarys
claim on an entrepreneurs gross income, [K   bt] (1 + r) that is14;
yFt+1 =   [K   bt] (1 + r) (4.3)
Following Banerjee and Newman (1993) and Blackburn and Wang (2009),
we allow for the possibility of an entrepreneur reneging loan repayment. We
assume that upon a borrower defaulting, the lender establishes an ine¢ cient
monitoring technology to recoup as much income as possible from the bor-
rower. Ine¢ ciency in the monitoring technology implies that a proportion
 of the defaulting borrowers gross income is recouped by the nancial in-
termediary. A borrower chooses to renege the loan contract if the net income
from loan default, [1  ]  is greater than the net income upon commitment
to the loan contract, equation (4.3). Implying that the formal entrepreneur
will choose to renege loan payment if the di¤erence between the investment
cost, K and the discounted nancial intermediarys return upon the formal
entrepreneur defaulting, 
(1+r)
is greater or equal to the formal entrepreneurs
bequest level, bt, that is;
K   
(1 + r)
 bt (4.4)
14Parameter restrictions imply that   [K   bt] (1 + r) > 0
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From the formal entrepreneurs default decision rule, equation (4.4) we
can derive the incentive compatible condition that rules out the possibility
of an entrepreneur defaulting, that is;
bt = K   
(1 + r)
= ! (4.5)
From equation (4.5), the incentive compatible condition is increasing in
the cost of capital investment, K and inversely related to the discounted
nancial intermediary return upon the formal entrepreneur defaulting. The
incentive compatible condition implies that only households with bequest
level bt > ! access formal entrepreneurial investment credit. Therefore credit
market rigidities restrict formal entrepreneurship to households with bequest
level bt > !.
Following our assumptions that in period t = 0 households are given
an initial bequest (endowment) that is uniformly distributed between 0 and
_
b with probability density function: f (b0) = 1_
b
and that in each period
there is a constant population normalised to 1, means that we can calculate
the proportion of the population that will participate in all the sectors of
the economy. For instance with reference to gure (4.1), the fraction of
households that engage in formal entrepreneurship is 1  1_
b
!.
Note that formal entrepreneurship yields a net payo¤ given by equation
(4.3). Substituting for the net payo¤ in the solution of the households max-
imisation problem, Ut =  (1  )(1 ) yt+1 the lifetime utility of a formal
entrepreneur is given by,
UFt = 
 (1  )(1 ) [  [K   bt] (1 + r)] (4.6)
Subsistence livelihood
The nancial intermediarys mitigation against credit default risk implies
that households with bequest level bt < ! are credit constrained and as such
can not engage in formal entrepreneurship. This is consistent with empiri-
cal evidence in which Paulson and Townsend (2004) using the socio-economic
and institutional survey data from the Central and Northeast regions of Thai-
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Figure 4.1: Distribution of initial bequest
land show that entrepreneurial activities depend on the existing nancial
constraints. In this case, households without access to the nancial market,
engage in subsistence livelihood. From gure (4.1), the fraction of subsistence
livelihood households is equal to 1_
b
!.
Subsistence livelihood is charaterised by zero capital investment, entirely
risk free and yields a gross revenue  > 0. We assume that the gross return
to subsistence livelihood is strictly less than the gross return to formal en-
trepreneurship that is,  < . Therefore, credit constrained households earn
a net income given by;
ySt+1 = (1 + r) bt +  (4.7)
From the subsistence households net income, equation (4.7) and the solution
of the households maximisation problem, Ut =  (1  )(1 ) yt+1 we can
express the lifetime utility of a subsistence household as;
USt = 
 (1  )(1 ) [(1 + r) bt + ] (4.8)
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Comparing equations (4.3) and (4.7), since formal entrepreneurship in-
volves the use of a high yielding technology as opposed to subsistence liveli-
hood such that  > , it follows that formal entrepreneurial income, yFt+1 is
greater than subsistence livelihood income, ySt+1 by a magnitude [ K (1 + r)] 
 > 0. This is consistent with empirical evidence in which Paulson and
Townsend (2004) show that the annual income of entrepreneurial households
is twice greater than that of non-entrepreneurial households besides being
wealthier.
Recall that from the optimal solution of a households utility optimisation
problem, the households utility is increasing in occupational income that is,
Ut
 
yit+1

where i = F; S; I representing formal entrepreneurship, subsistence
livelihood and informal entrepreneurship respectively. Therefore, for yFt+1 >
ySt+1 it follows that U
F
t > U
S
t .
Dynamics of income distribution in the economy without informal-
ity
Following the optimal solutions to the households lifetime utility maximisa-
tion problem, the evolution of lineage income across generations is given by,
bt+1 = (1  ) yt+1. Substituting for the households net income, we attain
the following lineage wealth transition equations
bt+1 =
(
(1  ) [(1 + r) bt + ] ... if 0  bt  !
(1  ) [  [K   bt] (1 + r)] ... if bt > !
(4.9)
From the lineage wealth transition equations above, we are able to estab-
lish the long run income patterns of households given their initial bequest
levels and subsequent occupational choices. To that end, we graphically char-
acterise the transition equations as seen in gure (4.2)15. The 45 degree line
is a locus of points corresponding to the steady state bequest levels such that
15For the economy without corruption and informality, the gure (4.2) is drawn under
the conditions that in the steady state, bS < !, and bF > !. These conditions are adopted
for their plausibility and intuition.
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Figure 4.2: Income distribution in the economy without both corruption and
informality
bt+1 = bt = b. Households in the bequest interval 0 < bt < ! are subsistence
households. Their transition equation is represented by the transition curve
 with a slope 0 < (1  ) (1 + r) < 1. The condition 0 < (1  ) (1 + r) < 1
is adopted to ensure stability of equilibrium bequest levels. Therefore, as-
suming steady state equilibrium such that bt+1 = bt = b, the steady state
level of bequest

bS

among workers is given as,
bS =

1  
(1  (1  ) (1 + r))

 (4.10)
Households with an initial bequest level bt > ! engage in formal entrepre-
neurship. The long run income of formal entrepreneurs evolve along the tran-
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sition curve  with the intercept and slope given by [1  ] [  (1 + r)K] >
0 and 0 < (1  ) (1 + r) < 1 respectively. Assuming a steady state equilib-
rium such that bt+1 = bt = b, the steady state level of bequest

bF

among
formal entrepreneurs is given as,
bF =

1  
(1  (1  ) (1 + r))

[  (1 + r)K] (4.11)
From equation (4.11), the steady state bequest, bF is a function of the
formal entrepreneurs steady state income that is, bF

yF

. Where bF
0 
yF

>
0 implying that an increase (decrease) in the formal entrepreneurial steady
income results in an outward (inward) shift of the steady state bequest, bF .
From gure (4.2), households who are characterised by bequests such that
bt < ! persistently engage in subsistence livelihood. While those that have
bequests such that bt > ! persistently engage in formal entrepreneurship.
Since the income that accrues to formal entrepreneurship is greater than
the income that accrues to subsistence livelihood, at any point in time the
economy is characterised by the relatively high income formal entrepreneurial
households and relatively low income working households. Such economy has
the potential to experience a high level of inequality.
4.2.3 Occupational choice and inequality in the econ-
omy with informality but without corruption
Informal entrepreneurship
The nancial intermediarys mitigation against credit default risk implies
that households with bequest level bt < ! are credit constrained. In the
economy without informal entrepreneurship, such households engage in sub-
sistence livelihood. We noted however, that under such a model environment
income inequality could be relatively high. Would introducing informal en-
trepreneurship reduces the extent of income inequality?
Assume that informal entrepreneurship involves employing low yielding
technology costing,  and yielding output, 
. Informal entrepreneurial out-
put, 
 is less than the level of output in formal entrepreneurship,  although
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greater the gross return to subsistence livelihood, . Households can only
undertake informal entrepreneurship if their bequest level bt  . Therefore
households with an initial wealth such that   bt  ! engage in informal
entrepreneurship. From gure (4.1), the fraction of informal entrepreneurial
households amounts to 1_
b
[!   ]. While the fraction of formal entrepreneur-
ial households remains unchanged, that of subsistence livelihood households
reduces from 1_
b
! to 1_
b
.
The net payo¤ to informal entrepreneurship is the di¤erence between
the sum of the gross return to investment and the cost of informal sector
investment, 
 + (1 + r) (bt   ), that is;
yIt+1 = 
 + (1 + r) (bt   ) (4.12)
Following the optimal solution Ut =  (1  )(1 ) yt+1, the informal entre-
preneurs lifetime utility is given by,
U It = 
 (1  )(1 ) [
 + (1 + r) (bt   )] (4.13)
Introduction of informal entrepreneurship implies that households with
an initial wealth such that  > bt engage in subsistence livelihood yielding
a net income given by equation (4.7) while households with a bequest such
that ! < bt engage in formal entrepreneurship yielding a net income given
by equation (4.3).
Comparing the income that accrues to both formal and informal entre-
preneurs, parameter restrictions16 imply that formal entrepreneurs earn more
than informal entrepreneurs by a magnitude    (
 + (1 + r) [K + ]) > 0.
Also parameter restrictions imply that informal entrepreneurial income is
greater than subsistence livelihood income by a magnitude
 [ + (1 + r)] >
0. From the optimal solution of a households optimisation problem, the
households lifetime utility is increasing in occupational income. Therefore,
for yFt+1 > y
I
t+1 > y
S
t+1 and given that a households lifetime utility is in-
16Since the formal entrepreneurship involves use of high yielding technology as opposed
to the low yielding rudimentary technology in the informal sector, it must be the case that
 > 
.
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creasing in the occupational income, it follows that the lifetime utility that
accrues to a formal entrepreneur, UFt is greater than the lifetime utility from
informal entrepreneurship, U It while U
I
t is greater than the lifetime utility
that accrues to subsistence livelihood, USt .
Dynamics of income distribution with informality but without cor-
ruption
Following the optimal solutions to the households lifetime utility maximisa-
tion problem, the evolution of lineage income across generations is given by,
bt+1 = (1  ) yt+1. Substituting for the households net income, we attain
the following lineage wealth transition equations
bt+1 =
8><>:
(1  ) [(1 + r) bt + ] ...if 0  bt < 
(1  ) [
 + (1 + r) (bt   )] ...if   bt  !
(1  ) [  [K   bt] (1 + r)] ...if bt > !
(4.14)
From the lineage wealth transition equations above, we are able to estab-
lish the long run income patterns of the households given their initial bequest
levels and subsequent occupational choices in the economy characterised by
no-corruption and with an informal sector. To that end, we graphically
characterise the transition equations as in gure (4.3)17. Households in the
bequest interval 0  bt <  engage in subsistence livelihood and their long
run wealth evolves along the transition curve  with a corresponding inter-
cept and slope given by (1  ) and 0 < (1  ) (1 + r) < 1 respectively.
The condition 0 < (1  ) (1 + r) < 1 is adopted to ensure stability of the
equilibrium bequest levels. The optimal solution, bt+1 = (1  ) yt+1 implies
that a households transition path of long run wealth shifts with changes
in net income. However, since the introduction of informal entrepreneurship
does not a¤ect the net income for subsistence households, the long run wealth
17For the economy without corruption but with informality, gure (4.3) is drawn under
the conditions that in the steady state, bS < ,  < bI < !, and bF > !. These conditions
are adopted for their plausibility and intuition.
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Figure 4.3: Income distribution in the economy with informality but without
corruption
of these households evolves along the same path as that of subsistence house-
holds in the economy without informal entrepreneurship. Correspondingly,
assuming steady state equilibrium such that bt+1 = bt = b, the steady state
bequest level of subsistence households remains unchanged and is given as,
bS =

1  
(1  (1  ) (1 + r))


For households with the initial bequest level in the interval   bt 
!, they engage in informal entrepreneurship. Their transition equation is
captured by the transition path  with the intercept and slope given by
[1  ] (
  (1 + r)) > 0 and 0 < (1  ) (1 + r) < 1 respectively. Since
the income that accrues to informal entrepreneurs, equation (4.12) is greater
than the income that accrues to subsistence households, equation (4.7) it fol-
lows that the transition path  is higher than the transition path . Recall
that households in the bequest interval   bt  ! were initially engaging
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in subsistence livelihood with a corresponding transition path . However,
their choice of entry into informal entrepreneurship enhances their income
from equation (4.7) to equation (4.12). Substituting for the informal entre-
preneurs net income in the optimal solution bt+1 = (1  ) yt+1, the long
run wealth of informal entrepreneurs evolves along the transition path .
The e¤ect of informal entrepreneurship is therefore to enhance the long run
evolution of income among households that opt out of subsistence livelihood
for informal entrepreneurship.
Assuming steady state equilibrium such that bt+1 = bt = b, the steady
state level of bequest among informal entrepreneurs

bI

is given as,
bI =

1  
(1  (1  ) (1 + r))

(
  (1 + r)) (4.15)
Households with an initial bequest level bt > ! engage in formal entre-
preneurship. The transition equation of these households is captured by
the transition curve  which is characterised by the intercept and slope
[1  ] (  (1 + r)K) > 0 and 0 < (1  ) (1 + r) < 1 respectively. Since in
our model informal entrepreneurship does not a¤ect formal entrepreneurship,
the income to formal entrepreneurship remains unchanged. Correspondingly,
from the optimal solution, bt+1 = (1  ) yt+1 and as seen in gure (4.3), the
long run wealth of formal entrepreneurial households still evolves along the
transition path . Assuming steady state equilibrium such that bt+1 = bt = b,
the steady state level of bequest

bF

among formal entrepreneurs given in-
formal entrepreneurship is,
bF =

1  
(1  (1  ) (1 + r))

(  (1 + r)K) (4.16)
Evidently, the economy with informal entrepreneurship has three income
brackets: relatively high income, middle income and relatively low income
households corresponding with formal entrepreneurs, informal entrepreneurs
and subsistence households respectively. As is evident from gure (4.3) and
in comparison to gure (4.2), the economy with an informal sector is seen
to exhibit a more varied distribution of income. Unlike the economy with-
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out an informal economy, the economy with an informal sector reduces the
divergence between the relatively high income group (formal entrepreneurs)
and households in the bequest interval   bt  ! that choose to engage
in informal entrepreneurship which yields a higher income than subsistence
livelihood. Most importantly though is that the introduction of informal en-
trepreneurship increases the income of the fraction of households that decide
to undertake informal entrepreneurship as opposed to engaging in subsistence
livelihood. As such the existence of the informal sector has the potential to
reduce the extent of income inequality in the economy without corruption.
4.2.4 Occupational choice and inequality in the econ-
omy with both corruption and informality
In this section, an attempt is made to accommodate a typical developing
country situation where entry into the formal sector involves bureaucratic
rigidities and consequently bribe payments (B). We also consider an en-
vironment where informal entrepreneurship is already in the economy. The
objective is to understand how corruption interacts with income distribution.
We also seek to explore whether the informal sector has a role to play in the
interaction between corruption and income inequality.
Formal sector entrepreneurship
With corruption, the total loan requirement for formal entrepreneurship in-
creases by the amount of the bribe, that is; B + K   bt. Regarding interest
rates on loans, there is a consensus that interest rates are positively related
with the quality of institutional framework in a country not to mention the
level of corruption. For instance, Ciocchini et al. (2003) shows that de-
creasing corruption from the level prevalent in China or Ukraine to that
in Jamaica leads to a reduction in spreads by about one-fth. Also, Qian
and Stahan (2007) show that stronger creditor protection is associated with
lower interest rates and longer credit maturities. For instance a loan to a
Mexican (British) rm where the credit rights are weak (stronger) attracts a
maturity which is 40% shorter than that of its British counterpart. There-
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fore, where collateral is relatively ine¤ective (for example in an environment
of increased risk of government expropriation), nancial institutions opt for
loans with a shorter maturity implying higher interest rates. Furthermore,
an improvement in the creditor rights by one standard deviation implies a
10% increase in loan maturity (which also implies lower interests rates). In a
theoretical investigation, Blackburn and Wang (2009) show that corruption
endogenously increases interest rates as a result of the uncertainty regarding
the protability of formal entrepreneurship which increases the likelihood of
entrepreneurs reporting bankruptcy. While the preceding arguments avail
empirical and theoretical accounts of a positive relationship between interest
rates and corruption as we shall see later, the objective of this paper can be
reasonably explored without necessarily tampering with interest rates.
Note that since bribe payment is captured as an additional xed cost,
therefore formal entrepreneurial income with corruption, yF=Ct+1 is given by,
18
y
F=C
t+1 =   (B +K   bt) (1 + r) (4.17)
Like in the corruption free economy, we assume that in the event an
entrepreneur declares bankruptcy, the nancial intermediary would seek to
wind-up the entrepreneur in an attempt to minimise its losses. However,
ine¢ ciency in the monitoring technology restricts the nancial intermediary
to recovering only a proportion  of an entrepreneurs gross income. An
entrepreneur will default if the loss in gross income from loan default is less
than the loan repayment upon commitment to the loan contract,   >
  (B +K   bt) (1 + r). From the preceding loan default rule, the incentive
compatible condition which mitigates loan default is given by,
bt = [B +K]  
(1 + r)
= !c (4.18)
From equation (4.18), !c denes the bequest threshold level above (below)
which a household is corruption-induced credit unconstrained (constrained).
Evidently, !c is increasing in bribe payment. Note however that corruption
18Simmilarly, parameter restrictions imply that   (B +K   bt) (1 + r) > 0 otherwise
formal entrepreneurship would not be feasible.
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has both direct and indirect e¤ects. The direct e¤ect is permeated through
bribe payments. While the indirect e¤ect is channelled through the positive
relationship between corruption and interest rates. In this paper, we capture
the direct e¤ect of corruption in the sense that the bequest threshold level
above (below) which a household is corruption-induced credit unconstrained
(constrained) increases by the amount of bribe payment.
Given corruption-induced credit market imperfection, formal entrepre-
neurship is restricted to households with bequest levels bt > !c: From g-
ure (4.1), the fraction of formal entrepreneurial households given corruption
amounts to 1  1_
b
!c. These credit unconstrained households have an income
level given by equation (4.17). From equation (4.17) and the households
lifetime utility maximisation solution, Ut =  (1  )(1 ) yt+1 the lifetime
utility of a household in formal entrepreneurship given corruption is,
U
F=C
t = 
 (1  )(1 ) [  [B +K   bt] (1 + r)] (4.19)
A comparison of the income between formal entrepreneurship without
corruption, yFt+1 and formal entrepreneurship with corruption, y
F=C
t+1 , y
F
t+1 is
greater than yF=Ct+1 . This is because while both sets of entrepreneurs use the
same quality of capital and thus incur the same capital cost, formal entrepre-
neurs in the economy with corruption incur an additional cost associated with
bribe payment. Therefore yFt+1 > y
F=C
t+1 by a proportion B (1 + r) > 0 which
captures that part of would be capital investment spent on bribe payment
and yet the entrepreneur has to pay it back to the nancial intermediary with
an interest (1 + r). Since the households lifetime utility is increasing in the
households income, it follows that the lifetime utility from formal entrepre-
neurship in the economy without corruption, UFt is greater than the lifetime
utility from formal entrepreneurship in the economy with corruption, UF=Ct .
UFt > U
F=C
t by a proportion 
 (1  )(1 ) [B (1 + r)].
Informal sector entrepreneurship
The choice of entry into the informal sector remains the same since none of
the households is required to purchase bureaucratic investment licences as
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such no bribe payments are involved. However, households in the bequest
interval !  bt  !c are now corruption-induced credit constrained and have
to choose between informal entrepreneurship and subsistence livelihood. Fol-
lowing our parameter restrictions, since the net income to informal entrepre-
neurship, yIt+1 is greater than the net income to subsistence livelihood y
S
t+1, it
follows that the lifetime utility from informal entrepreneurship, U It is greater
than the lifetime utility from subsistence livelihood, USt . Therefore, house-
holds in the bequest interval bt 2 [!; !c] strictly prefer informal entrepre-
neurship as opposed to subsistence livelihood. Thus, the ultimate e¤ect of
corruption induced-credit market rigidities is to increase the size of informal
entrepreneurship or the bequest interval within which households prefer to
undertake informal entrepreneurship from   bt  ! to   bt  !c. In
terms of gure (4.1), the fraction of informal entrepreneurial households in-
creases from 1_
b
[!   ] to 1_
b
[!c   ]. This result is supported by Johnson et
al. (1998) and Friedman et al. (2000) empirical investigations where they
established that the size of the informal economy has a signicantly robust
positive relationship with the level of corruption.
While entrepreneurs with bequest levels bt > !c might choose to go in-
formal as an escape route from bureaucratic corruption in the formal sector,
however the inability to fully exploit their entrepreneurial potential would
water down incentives to go informal. This is because: 1) The gross re-
turn from formal entrepreneurship,  is greater than the gross return from
informal entrepreneurship, 
; 2) From 1) the lifetime utility from formal en-
trepreneurship, UF=Ct is greater than the lifetime utility from informal entre-
preneurship, U It by a proportion 
 (1  )(1 )( 
+(1 + r) [B +K])>0.
3) If  < 
 then most likely the technology being employed by the informal
entrepreneur could be conspicuous hence increasing the likelihood of bureau-
cratic attention. Thus, households with bequest level bt > !c have a strict
preference for formal entrepreneurship as opposed to informal entrepreneur-
ship even in the midst of corruption.
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Subsistence livelihood
Since households in the subsistence sector do not interact with bureaucrats,
the net income and lifetime utility among subsistence households remains the
same us that in the economy without corruption that is ySt+1 = (1 + r) bt + 
and USt = 
 (1  )(1 ) [(1 + r) bt + ] respectively.
Dynamics of income distribution in the economy with corruption
and informality
Following the optimal solutions to the households lifetime utility maximisa-
tion problem, the evolution of lineage income across generations is given by
bt+1 = (1  ) yt+1. We can thus attain the following lineage wealth transi-
tion equations
bt+1 =
8><>:
(1  ) [(1 + r) bt + ] ... if bt < 
(1  ) [
 + (1 + r) (bt   )] ...if   bt  !c
(1  ) [  [B +K   bt] (1 + r)] ... if !c < bt
(4.20)
Using the transition equations, we can graphically characterise the income
dynamics of households given their initial incomes and subsequent occupa-
tional choices as is seen in gure (4.4)19. The lineage wealth of subsistence
households is represented by the transition curve with its steady state equi-
librium being established at bS =
h
1 
(1 (1 )(1+r))
i
. bS is left unchanged
because subsistence households do not interact with bureaucrats as opposed
to households in formal entrepreneurship as such their net income remains
unchanged.
The lineage wealth of informal entrepreneurs is represented by the tran-
sition path  with the intercept represented by [1  ] (
  (1 + r)) > 0.
This transition path however now includes households in the bequest interval
!  bt  !c. These households were initially formal entrepreneurs however
because of corruption-induced credit market rigidities they are crowded out
19For the economy with corruption and informality, the gure (4.4) is drawn under the
conditions that in the steady state, bS < ,  < bI < !c, and bF=C > !c. These conditions
are adopted for their plausibility and intuition.
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Figure 4.4: Income distribution in the economy with both corruption and
informality
of the formal sector for informal entrepreneurship. Following our parameter
restrictions, informal entrepreneurial income, equation (4.12) is less than for-
mal entrepreneurial income in the economy with corruption, equation (4.17).
Therefore, from the optimal solution, bt+1 = (1  ) yt+1, it follows that
households in the bequest interval ! < bt < !c experience a shift downwards
in the bequest schedule from  to . Where the bequest schedule  () is
associated with formal entrepreneurs in the economy without corruption (in-
formal entrepreneurs in the economy with or without corruption). Overall,
the steady state bequest bI < !c for households in the informal sector re-
mains the same as that in the economy with an informal sector but without
corruption, that is;
bI =

1  
(1  (1  ) (1 + r))


 (4.21)
With regard to households that remain in the formal sector, their bequest
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transition path is represented by 
C
with an intercept at
(1  ) [  [B +K] (1 + r)]. Note that corruption has two e¤ects in the
formal sector: 1) It increases the bequest threshold upon which one can ac-
cess credit from ! to !c. Implying that households in the wealth interval
! < bt < !
c who in the economy without corruption were engaged in formal
entrepreneurship are now credit constrained. These households inevitably
undertake informal entrepreneurship; 2) Bribe payment shifts the transition
path of formal entrepreneurs downwards from the transition path  to the
transition path c. Recall that the rst e¤ect arises from corruption increas-
ing the cost of investing which reduces the return to formal entrepreneurship.
The reduction in returns to formal entrepreneurship increases the likelihood
of credit default. Financial intermediaries react by increasing the threshold
level of collateral above which one can acquire credit. The high threshold
level of collateral constrains some households from formal entrepreneurship.
In our model, households in the bequest interval ! < bt < !c are frozen out
of formal entrepreneurship. With regard to the second e¤ect, recall that the
optimal solution, bt+1 = (1  ) yt+1 implies that a households transition
path of long run wealth shifts with changes in net income. Since corrup-
tion reduces the formal entrepreneurial net income from equation (4.3) to
equation (4.17) and as seen in gure (4.4), the transition path of formal en-
trepreneurs shifts downwards from  to transition path c. The downward
shift in the transition path of the long run wealth of formal entrepreneurs is
by the amount of bribe plus interest paid on the bribe20, (1 + r)B.
Assuming that in equilibrium bt+1 = bt = b, the corresponding steady
state bequest level of formal sector entrepreneurship shifts inwards from bF
to bF=C > !c, where;
bF=C =

1  
(1  (1  ) (1 + r))

(  (1 + r) [B +K]) (4.22)
and that bF > bF=C . Since the bequest level determines how much one can
borrow to nance private investment, the lower steady state bequest level
20This is because part of the money borrowed from nancial intermediaries is used to
pay bribes to bureaucrats
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bF=C as a result of corruption implies that the level of economic activities
in the economy is lower. This is because, the lower steady state bequest
level bF=C implies a lower level of collateral at the disposal of households.
Therefore the credit accessible to entrepreneurs in the steady state is equally
lower as compared to when the economy is at steady state bequest level bF .
Thus, the level of economic activities is lower with corruption than without
corruption.
Like the economy without corruption but with informal entrepreneur-
ship, the economy with corruption-induced credit market rigidities has three
income brackets; relatively high income, middle income and relatively low in-
come households corresponding with; formal entrepreneurial, informal entre-
preneurial, and subsisting households respectively. However with corruption,
the occupational choice of households and their subsequent long run wealth
dynamics are hinged on both the initial wealth distribution and the extent of
corruption-induced credit market rigidities. Furthermore, the e¤ect of cor-
ruption is to increase (decrease) in the fraction of middle income informal
(relatively high income formal) entrepreneurial households while leaving the
fraction of subsistence households unchanged. Under such circumstances, an
increase in corruption could potentially be associated with a reduction in
inequality.
4.2.5 Occupational choice and inequality in the econ-
omy with corruption but without informality
Formal entrepreneurship
Like in the economy with both formal and informal entrepreneurship, the
e¤ect of corruption in the economy without informal entrepreneurship is to
increase the cost of credit. With corruption, formal entrepreneurs pay an
amountB as a bribe to bureaucrats to have their businessregistered or access
public services. Therefore the cost of formal entrepreneurship increases by
the amount of the Bribe that is, B + K   bt. Implying that the net return
to formal entrepreneurship is given by;
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y
FNI=C
t+1 =   (B +K   bt) (1 + r) (4.23)
In terms of credit access, like in the economy with formal and informal
entrepreneurship given corruption, the e¤ect of corruption in the economy
without informal entrepreneurship is to increase the bequest threshold level
above which a household can access credit from ! to !c. Implying that only
households with the bequest level such that bt > !c can undertake formal
entrepreneurship. While households in the bequest interval !  bt  !c
are deemed to be corruption-induced credit constrained and as such can not
engage in formal entrepreneurship. Consequent from gure (4.1), the fraction
of formal entrepreneurial households decreases from 1  !_
b
to 1  !c_
b
.
Unlike the economy with both formal and informal entrepreneurship where
households that were corruption-induced credit constrained undertake infor-
mal entrepreneurship, in the economy without informal entrepreneurship,
households that are corruption-induced credit constrained undertake subsis-
tence livelihood.
Subsistence livelihood
The nancial intermediarys mitigation against credit default risk ensures
that households with a bequest level bt < !c are crowded out of the nancial
market and engage in subsistence livelihood. Compared to the economy with
both corruption and informality, the e¤ect of corruption in the economy with-
out informality is that the bequest interval within which households engage
in subsistence livelihood increases by !  bt  !c. Implying that unlike in
the economy with both corruption and informality where corruption-induced
credit constrained households engage in informal entrepreneurship, in the
economy with corruption and without informality corruption-induced credit
constrained households engage in subsistence livelihood. From gure (4.1),
the fraction of subsistence livelihood households increases from !_
b
to !
c
_
b
.
Like in the economy with or without both corruption and informality,
since subsistence households do not require investment licenses from bureau-
crats, they do not pay any bribes. Therefore the net income and lifetime util-
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ity among subsistence households remains the same us that in the economy
with or without both corruption and informality that is ySt+1 = (1 + r) bt + 
and USt = 
 (1  )(1 ) [(1 + r) bt + ] respectively.
The corresponding lifetime utility of subsistence households is USt =
 (1  )(1 ) [(1 + r) bt + ]. Comparing the income that accrues to formal
entrepreneurship and subsistence livelihood in the economy with corruption
but without informality, the parameter restrictions imply that households are
strictly better o¤engaging formal entrepreneurship as opposed to subsistence
livelihood by a magnitude ( ) (B +K) (1 + r) > 0. Correspondingly in
the economy with corruption, the lifetime utility from formal entrepreneur-
ship is strictly greater than the lifetime utility from subsistence livelihood
since the households lifetime utility is increasing in their occupational in-
come that is UFINCt > U
S
t .
Dynamics of income distribution in the economy with corruption
but without informality
Following the optimal solutions, the lineage wealth transition equation for
households that engage in formal entrepreneurship can be derived from bt+1 =
(1 )yFNI=Ct+1 . While that of households that engage in subsistence livelihood
it can be derived from bt+1 = (1  )ySt+1. Substituting for both yFNI=Ct+1 and
ySt+1 yields the following transition equations;
bt+1 =
(
(1  ) [ + (1 + r) bt] ... if bt  !c
(1  ) [  [B +K   bt] (1 + r)] ... if !c < bt
(4.24)
Using the lineage wealth transition equations, we can establish the long
run income patterns of households given their occupational choices and initial
bequests. With regard to households in the subsistence sector, assuming that
in the steady state bt+1 = bt = b their steady state bequest level is given as;
bS =

1  
(1  (1  ) (1 + r))

 (4.25)
To ensure the stability of bS < !c, we assume that 0 < (1  ) (1 + r) < 1.
82
Figure 4.5: Income distribution in the economy with corruption but without
informality
In light of households that engage in formal entrepreneurship, these house-
holds evolve along the transition path c with the intercept given by 1  
 [  [B +K] (1 + r)]. Assuming that in the steady state bt+1 = bt = b
their steady state bequest level is given as;
bFINC =

1  
(1  (1  ) (1 + r))

[  [B +K] (1 + r)] (4.26)
Clearly, in both economies with or without informal entrepreneurship,
the e¤ect of corruption is to reduce to formal entrepreneurship by a fraction
B (1 + r). As such the steady state bequest levels in both economies are such
that bFINC = bF=C > !c as is shown in gure (4.5)21.
In terms of income distribution, corruption introduces credit market rigidi-
21For the economy with corruption and without informality, the gure (4.5) is drawn
under the conditions that in the steady state, bS < !c, and bF > !c. These conditions are
adopted for their plausibility and intuition.
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ties leading to contraction in formal entrepreneurship. In the absence of in-
formal entrepreneurs the corruption-induced credit constrained households
engage in subsistence livelihood. As such the long run income distribution
is such that there exists relatively high income households and relatively
low income households who engage in formal entrepreneurship and subsis-
tence livelihood respectively. Entry into the subsistence sector of corruption-
induced credit constrained households suggests that inequality could poten-
tially increase. This is because more households are engaging in the relatively
low income subsistence occupation with a reducing fraction of the relatively
high income formal entrepreneurial households.
In comparison to the economy with informality, entry into the informal en-
trepreneurship of corruption-induced credit constrained households reduces
the extent of income inequality attributed to corruption. This is because
informal entrepreneurship yields a relatively higher level of income than sub-
sistence livelihood. As such the economy is characterised by an increase in
the fraction of middle income informal entrepreneurial households, a decrease
in the fraction of relatively high income formal entrepreneurial households
while the fraction of subsistence households remains unchanged in an envi-
ronment of corruption. Under such circumstances, corruption may not result
in an increase in inequality.
In the following subsection, we undertake a numerical analysis to highlight
the role that the informal sector plays in mitigating the impact of corruption
on income inequality.
4.2.6 Numerical analysis
In this numerical analysis we seek to emphasise the role of the informal sector
in mitigating the e¤ect of corruption on income inequality. We explore di¤er-
ent combinations of an economy with formal entrepreneurs, informal entre-
preneurs and subsistence livelihood households, in an environment with and
without corruption. We also explore an economy with formal entrepreneur-
ial and subsistence livelihood households in an environment with or without
corruption. The benchmark scenario looks at an economy with a uniform
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Parameter Value
r 0:05
 0:7
K 140; 000

 30; 000
 190; 000
 1; 500
 3; 687:5
Table 4.1: Parameter Values
distribution of initial wealth from 0 to 20,000. As a robustness check we vary
the distributions of household initial wealth and compare the ndings with
those in the benchmark scenario. We also account for the e¤ect of di¤erence
in net income between formal and informal entrepreneurial households by
varying the net income that accrues to informal entrepreneurial households.
We equally compare the results to the ndings in the benchmark scenario.
Otherwise the numerical analysis assumes a population of 100 households.
Regarding the model parameter values, Wojciech and Lupton (2007) show
that households with a bequest motive on average spend 25% less on con-
sumption expenditure. The numerical exercise therefore assumes that house-
holds spend  = 25% of their net income on bequest motive. With regard to
the amount of bribe payable, we allude to a study by Rand and Tarp (2007)
in which they show that on average rms in Vietnam spend 0.55 percent of
rm revenue on bribe payment, B = 0:0055 . Otherwise, the other para-
meter values as seen in table (4.1) are chosen so as to ensure that: 1) the net
income that accrues to formal entrepreneurship is always greater than the
net income that accrues to informal entrepreneurship; 2) the net income that
accrues to informal entrepreneurship is always greater than the net income
that accrues to subsistence livelihood; and 3) credit market constraints with
or without corruption hold. Table (4.1) below is a list of parameter values
used;
Substituting for the parameter values in equations (4.3), (4.17), and (4.23)
we get yFt+1 = 58; 305:08, y
F=C
t+1 = 56; 817, and y
FNI=C
t+1 = 56; 817 respec-
tively. Substituting for the parameter values in equations (4.12) and (4.7)
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we get yIt+1 = 38; 542:4 and y
S
t+1 = 5; 000 respectively. Substituting for the
parameter values in equations (4.5) and (4.18) we get ! = 13; 333:33 and
!c = 14; 378 respectively. Substituting for the parameter values in equations
(4.11), (4.22), (4.15), and (4.10) we get bF = 14; 576:27, bF=C = 14; 204:32,
bI = 9; 635:6, and bS = 1; 250 respectively.
The distribution of income among households is measured using the Gini
coe¢ cient. The Gini coe¢ cient ranges from 0 to 1. Where 0 represents an
economy with perfect equality that is all households have the same level of
income or wealth. While 1 represents an economy with perfect inequality
that is one person owns all the economys wealth while others have zero
wealth. Therefore as the Gini coe¢ cient approaches 1 the higher is the level
of inequality in an economy. While as the Gini coe¢ cient approaches 0 the
lower is the level of inequality in an economy. In this numerical exercise, we
use Matlab to calculate the Gini coe¢ cient22.
Benchmark scenario Consider an economy characterised by a uniform
distribution of initial wealth from 0 to 20,000 such that in an environment
without both corruption and informality, credit market rigidities imply that
67% and 33% of the household population engages in subsistence livelihood
and formal entrepreneurship respectively in t = 0. These proportions remain
the same in the long run were bequests converge to single values for formal
and subsistence livelihood. In light of gure (4.2), subsistence livelihood (for-
mal entrepreneurial) households are households who have an initial bequest
level such that bt  ! (bt > !). Given the net income of 5,000 and 58,305.08
to subsistence livelihood and formal entrepreneurial households respectively,
the Gini coe¢ cient for such an economy is 0.3853. Such a Gini coe¢ cient
implies a relatively low level of income inequality.
Introducing corruption, corruption-induced credit market rigidities imply
that the fraction of subsistence livelihood households increases to 72% of the
household population while that of formal entrepreneurial households reduces
to 28% of the household population. This is consistent with gure (4.5) where
22We make use of the Matlab codes developed by Lengwiler (2010) to calculate the Gini
coe¢ cient. See Appendix A
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we show that the e¤ect of corruption is to increase (decrease) the bequest
interval within which households participate in subsistence livelihood (formal
entrepreneurship) by !  bt  !c. Besides corruption leads to a reduction in
formal entrepreneurial income from 58,305.08 to 56,817. The corresponding
Gini coe¢ cient for such an economy is 0.4332 which also signals a relatively
low level of income inequality. In comparison to the economy without both
corruption and informality, the Gini coe¢ cient is higher in the economy with
corruption but without informality by 0.0479. This implies that corruption
leads to an increase in income inequality in an economy without informality.
The higher level of inequality in the economy with corruption but without
informality is because corruption leads to an increase (decrease) in household
participation in the low income subsistence livelihood (high income formal
entrepreneurship). Consequently, the economy has more relatively low in-
come households and less relatively high income households hence a higher
level of inequality.
In the economy without corruption but with informality, credit market
rigidities imply that 33% of the household population engages in formal en-
trepreneurship. With regard to gure (4.3) formal entrepreneurial households
encompasses households with an initial bequest level bt > !. Given the entry
cost into informal entrepreneurship, the fraction of informal entrepreneur-
ial and subsistence livelihood households is 59% and 8% of the household
population respectively. In light of gure (4.3) informal entrepreneurial and
subsistence livelihood households includes households whose initial bequest
is such that   bt  ! and bt <  respectively. Formal entrepreneurial, in-
formal entrepreneurial and subsistence livelihood households earn 58,305.08,
38,542.4 and 5,000 respectively. Note that informal entrepreneurial house-
holds were initially earning 5,000 in an economy without informality; how-
ever, their entry into informal entrepreneurship as opposed to subsistence
livelihood yields a net income 38,542.4. Given the household occupational
choices and their corresponding income, the corresponding Gini coe¢ cient is
0.1044. This Gini coe¢ cient implies a relatively low level of income inequal-
ity.
In an environment with both corruption and informality however, the
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e¤ect of corruption is to increase the fraction of households that engage in
informality to 64% of the household population. At the same time, cor-
ruption reduces the fraction of formal entrepreneurial households to 28% of
the household population. In light of gure (4.4) the increase (decrease) in
household participation in informality (formal entrepreneurship) is equiva-
lent to the households in the bequest interval !  bt  !c. Otherwise the
fraction of subsistence livelihood households remains unchanged at 8% of the
household population. In an economy with both corruption and informality,
formal entrepreneurial, informal entrepreneurial and subsistence livelihood
households earn 56; 817, 38; 542:4 and ySt+1 = 5; 000 respectively. The corre-
sponding Gini coe¢ cient of this economy is 0.1019 which signals a relatively
low level of income inequality.
Comparing the economy with both corruption and informality to the
economy with informality but without corruption, the Gini coe¢ cient in
the economy with both corruption and informality is lower than that of the
economy with informality but without corruption by 0.0025. This implies
that as more households engage in informality due to corruption-induced
credit market rigidities, income inequality reduces.
It is worth noting that in the economy without informality introduc-
ing corruption leads to an increase in income inequality. However, in the
economy with informality, introducing corruption is associated with a re-
duction in income inequality. Specically, in comparison to the economy
with corruption but without informality the Gini coe¢ cient in the econ-
omy with both corruption and informality is lower than that of the econ-
omy with corruption but without informality by a magnitude 0.3313. This
is because in the economy with corruption and without informality house-
holds who are corruption-induced credit constrained choose relatively low
income subsistence livelihood. Therefore as more corruption-induced credit
constrained households engage in subsistence income inequality is likely to
increase. While in the economy with both corruption and informality, house-
holds who are corruption-induced credit constrained choose middle income
informal entrepreneurship over relatively income subsistence livelihood. As
such as more corruption-induced credit constrained households choose mid-
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dle income informal entrepreneurship as opposed to the relatively low income
subsistence livelihood income inequality is likely to reduced. Thus the infor-
mal sector has the potential to mitigate the e¤ect of corruption on income
inequality.
Robustness checks
Case 1 Consider a uniform distribution of initial wealth from 0 to 40,000
such that in the economy without both corruption and informality the frac-
tion of formal entrepreneurial and subsistence livelihood households is 67%
and 33% of the population of households respectively. With regard to gure
(4.2) formal entrepreneurial (subsistence livelihood) households encompasses
all households whose initial wealth level is such that bt > ! (bt  !). Given
the household occupational choices and their corresponding net incomes, the
economys Gini coe¢ cient is 0.1005 which implies a relatively low level of
income inequality.
If we introduce corruption in the economy without informality, corruption-
induced credit market rigidities imply that the fraction of formal entrepre-
neurial households reduces to 64% of the household population. While the
fraction of subsistence livelihood households increases to 36% of the house-
hold population. Indeed, as is shown in gure (4.5) corruption leads to an
increase (decrease) in the bequest interval within which households partic-
ipate in subsistence livelihood (formal entrepreneurship) by !  bt  !c.
Correspondingly, the Gini coe¢ cient in this economy is 0.1187 which also
implies a relatively low level of income inequality.
Comparing the economy with corruption but without informality to the
economy without both corruption and informality, the Gini coe¢ cient in for-
mer is higher than that of the latter by a magnitude 0.0182. This implies that
corruption leads to an increase in income inequality in an economy without
informality. The increase in income inequality is because corruption leads to
an increase (decrease) in household participation in the relatively low income
subsistence livelihood (relatively high income formal entrepreneurship).
In an economy with informal entrepreneurship but without corruption,
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credit market rigidities imply that the fraction of formal entrepreneurial
households is 67% of the household population. This corresponds to house-
holds with an initial bequest level such that bt > ! in gure (4.3). Entry
costs into informal entrepreneurship imply that the fraction of informal en-
trepreneurial and subsistence livelihood households is 29% and 4% of the
household population respectively. As is seen in gure (4.3), informal entre-
preneurial and subsistence livelihood households correspond to households
with the initial bequest level such that   bt  ! and bt <  respectively.
Given the household occupational choices and their corresponding income,
the Gini coe¢ cient in the economy without corruption but with informality
is 0.0360 which signals a relatively low level of income inequality.
Introducing corruption in the economy with informal entrepreneurship,
corruption-induced credit market rigidities imply that the fraction of formal
entrepreneurial households reduces to 64% of the household population while
that of informal entrepreneurial households increases to 32% of the house-
hold population. In terms of gure (4.4), the increase (decrease) in household
participation in informal (formal) entrepreneurship is given by the fraction of
households in the bequest interval !  bt  !c. The fraction of subsistence
households remains unchanged at 4% of the household population. From the
household occupational choices and their corresponding income, the Gini co-
e¢ cient in the economy with both corruption and informal entrepreneurship
is 0.0397 which implies a low level of income inequality. However, the Gini
coe¢ cient is greater than that of the economy without corruption but with
informality by magnitude 0.0037.
Compared to the economy with a uniform distribution of initial wealth
from 0 to 20,000, both economies have relatively low income inequality levels
in an environment characterised by both corruption and informality. How-
ever, in the economy characterised by a uniform distribution of initial wealth
from 0 to 40,000 the Gini coe¢ cient is higher where there is both corrup-
tion and informality than where there is informality but without corruption.
While in the economy characterised by a uniform distribution of initial wealth
from 0 to 20,000, the Gini coe¢ cient is lower where there is both corruption
and informality than where there is informality but without corruption. This
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inconsistence in income inequality implications perhaps suggests that the size
of the informal sector may have to be signicantly large so as to guarantee
informality reducing the e¤ect of corruption on income inequality.
Even then, the level of inequality is lower where there is both corrup-
tion and informality than where there is corruption but without informality
in both the economy with a uniform distribution of initial wealth from 0
to 20,000 and that with a uniform distribution of initial wealth from 0 to
40,000. Indeed, the Gini coe¢ cient in the economy with both corruption
and informality is less than that of the economy with corruption but without
informality by a magnitude 0.0790 in the economy characterised by a uni-
form distribution of initial wealth from 0 to 40,000. While in the economy
characterised by the uniform distribution of initial wealth from 0 to 20,000
in an environment of both corruption and informality, the Gini coe¢ cient is
less than that of the economy scenario with corruption but without informal-
ity by a magnitude 0.3313. Thus, in both distributions of initial wealth the
informal sector has the ability to mitigate the e¤ect of corruption on income
inequality.
Furthermore, in the economy with a uniform distribution of initial wealth
from 0 to 20,000 and the economy with a uniform distribution of initial
wealth from 0 to 40,000, corruption is seen to increase income inequality in
the absence of informality.
Case 2 Consider a uniform distribution of initial bequests from 0 to 15,000.
In an economy without both corruption and informality, the fraction of for-
mal entrepreneurial and subsistence livelihood households is 11% and 89%
of the household population respectively. As is seen in gure (4.2) formal
entrepreneurial (subsistence livelihood) households includes all households
whose initial wealth level is such that bt > ! (bt  !). Given the household
occupational choices and their corresponding income, the Gini coe¢ cient in
the economy without both corruption and informality is 0.5457 which implies
a relatively high level of income inequality.
In an environment with corruption but without informality, the fraction of
households engaging in subsistence livelihood increases to 96% of the house-
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hold population. However, the fraction of formal entrepreneurial households
decreases to 4% of the household population. With respect to gure (4.5),
the increase (decrease) in subsistence livelihood (formal entrepreneurship) as
a result of corruption-induced credit market rigidities corresponds to house-
holds in the bequest interval !  bt  !c. From the household occupational
choices and their corresponding income, the Gini coe¢ cient in the economy
with corruption but without informality is 0.4122. This Gini coe¢ cient cor-
responds to a relatively low level of income inequality.
In comparison to the economy without both corruption and informality,
the Gini coe¢ cient in the economy with corruption but without informality
is higher by a magnitude -0.1335 implying that corruption leads to a reduc-
tion in income inequality. The reduction in the Gini coe¢ cient and therefore
income inequality could be attributed to the fact close to the entire household
population (specically 96% of the household population) engages in subsis-
tence livelihood. Note that while income inequality is still relatively high
given corruption it still reduces as the proportion of subsistence households
approaches 100%.
In an economy without corruption but with informality, the fraction of
formal entrepreneurial, informal entrepreneurial and subsistence livelihood
households is 11%, 79% and 10% of the population of households respec-
tively. With regard to gure (4.3), formal entrepreneurial, informal entrepre-
neurial and subsistence livelihood households correspond to households with
the initial bequest level such that bt > !,   bt  ! and bt <  respectively.
Given the household occupational choices and their corresponding income
the Gini coe¢ cient for the economy without corruption but with informal
entrepreneurship is 0.0851 which implies a low level of income inequality.
In an environment with both corruption and informality however, the
e¤ect of corruption is to increase informal entrepreneurship to 86% of the
household population while reducing the fraction of formal entrepreneurship
to 4% of the household population. From gure (4.4), the decrease (increase)
in household participation in formal (informal) entrepreneurship is given by
the fraction of households in the bequest interval !  bt  !c. Otherwise
the fraction of subsistence households remains unchanged and is 10% of the
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household population. The Gini coe¢ cient in this economy is 0.0423 which
signals a low level of income inequality. In comparison to the economy with-
out corruption but with informality, the Gini coe¢ cient is lower by 0.0428
implying that as more households engage in informality as a result of cor-
ruption, income inequality reduces.
Furthermore, the Gini coe¢ cient in the economy with both corruption
and informality is lower than that of the economy with corruption but with-
out informality by a magnitude 0.3699. Such a relatively high discrepancy in
the Gini coe¢ cient suggests that the informal sector may have the potential
to mitigate the e¤ect of corruption on income inequality.
It is note worth that in both the economy with a uniform distribution of
initial wealth from 0 to 15,000 and the economy with a uniform distribution of
initial wealth from 0 to 20,000, we can conclude that the informal sector has
the potential to mitigate the e¤ect of corruption on income inequality. Recall
that in the economy with a uniform distribution of initial wealth from 0 to
15,000, the Gini coe¢ cient when the economy is characterised by corruption
but without informality is greater than the Gini coe¢ cient when economy
is characterised by both corruption and informality by a magnitude 0.3699.
While in the economy characterised a uniform distribution of initial wealth
from 0 to 20,000, the Gini coe¢ cient is greater where there is corruption but
without informality than where there is both corruption and informality by
a magnitude 0.3313. In both economies therefore, informal sector mitigates
the e¤ect of corruption on income inequality.
Case 3 In this robustness check, consider an economy where the discrep-
ancy between formal and informal entrepreneurial net income is relatively
large by letting the revenue to informal entrepreneurship equal 9,000. The
corresponding net income to informal entrepreneurship is 6,864.4. Otherwise,
we assume a uniform distribution of initial wealth from 0 to 20,000 such that
in the economy without both corruption and informal entrepreneurship the
fraction of formal entrepreneurial and subsistence livelihood households is
33% and 67% of the household population respectively. With regard to gure
(4.2) formal entrepreneurial (subsistence livelihood) households corresponds
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to households whose initial wealth level is such that bt > ! (bt  !). From
the household occupational choices and their corresponding income, the Gini
coe¢ cient for the economy without both corruption and informality is 0.3853
which implies a relatively low level of income inequality.
Introducing corruption but without informality, the economy is charac-
terised by a reduction in formal entrepreneurship to 28% of the household
population. While the fraction of subsistence households increases to 72% of
the household population. In relation to gure (4.5), the decrease (increase)
in formal entrepreneurship (subsistence livelihood) as a result of corruption-
induced credit market rigidities corresponds to households in the bequest
interval !  bt  !c. In terms of income inequality, the economy with
corruption but without informality is associated with a Gini coe¢ cient of
0.4332 which implies a relatively low level of income inequality. When com-
pared to the economy without corruption, the Gini coe¢ cient in this economy
is higher than that of the economy without corruption by a magnitude 0.05.
Thus corruption leads to an increase in income inequality.
With regard to the economy without corruption but with informality, the
size of formal, informal and subsistence sectors is 33%, 59% and 8% of the
household population respectively. In terms of gure (4.3), formal entre-
preneurial, informal entrepreneurial and subsistence livelihood households
correspond to households with the initial bequest level such that bt > !,
  bt  ! and bt <  respectively. Correspondingly, the economys Gini
coe¢ cient is 0.3634 which signals a relatively low level of income inequality.
Introducing corruption, the size of formal, informal and subsistence sectors
is 28%, 64% and 8% of the household population respectively. Clearly, cor-
ruption leads to an increase (decrease) in informal (formal) entrepreneurship.
With regard to gure (4.4), the increase (decrease) in household participation
in informal (formal) entrepreneurship is given by the fraction of households
in the bequest interval !  bt  !c. Correspondingly, the economys Gini
coe¢ cient is 0.4051 which implies a relatively low level of income inequality.
Note that the Gini coe¢ cient in the economy with both corruption and in-
formality is greater than that of the economy without corruption but with
informality by a magnitude 0.04. This implies that entry into the informal
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sector of corruption-induced credit constrained households may not neces-
sarily result in a reduction in income inequality.
Recall that in the benchmark scenario informal entrepreneurs earn a net
income 38,542.4 and that the Gini coe¢ cient in the economy with both cor-
ruption and informality is less than that of the economy with informality but
without corruption by a magnitude 0.0025. Suggesting therefore that as more
households engage in informal entrepreneurship as a result of corruption-
induced credit market rigidities, income inequality reduces. The preceding
conclusion is however inconsistent with the economy where the net income
to informal entrepreneurship is 6,864.4. Recall that in economy where the
net income to informal entrepreneurship is 6,864.4, the Gini coe¢ cient in an
environment of both corruption and informality is greater than that where
there is informality but without corruption by a magnitude 0.04. This ro-
bustness check perhaps suggests that the ability for the informal sector to
mitigate the impact of corruption on income inequality also depends on the
discrepancy between formal and informal entrepreneurial net incomes. The
higher is the discrepancy, the lower is the likelihood that the informal sector
would mitigate the e¤ect of corruption on income inequality.
However, in both the economy where informal entrepreneurs earn a net
income 38,542.4 and that where informal entrepreneurs earn a net income
6,864.4, a comparison of an environment with both corruption and informal-
ity to that with corruption but without informality shows that informality
has the potential to mitigate the e¤ect of corruption on income inequal-
ity. Specically, in the economy where informal entrepreneurs earn a net
income 38,542.4, the Gini coe¢ cient when the economy is characterised by
both corruption and informality is less than the Gini coe¢ cient when econ-
omy is characterised by corruption but without informality by a magnitude
0.3313. While in the economy where informal entrepreneurs earn a net in-
come 6,864.4, the Gini coe¢ cient in an environment with both corruption
and informality is less that where there is corruption but without informality
by a magnitude 0.0281. Therefore notwithstanding the size of discrepancy
between formal and informal entrepreneurial income, entry into informal en-
trepreneurship as opposed to subsistence livelihood of corruption-induced
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credit constrained households is seen to mitigate the e¤ect of corruption on
income inequality.
4.2.7 Discussion
In the economy without an informal sector, corruption may lead to an in-
crease in income inequality. However, in an economy with informality whether
income inequality increases or not in the presence of corruption depends on:
1) the size of the discrepancy between the net income of formal and informal
entrepreneurs; and 2) the size of the informal sector.
Recall that in the benchmark numerical example we noted that entry
into the informal entrepreneurship as opposed to subsistence livelihood of
corruption-induced credit constrained households results in a reduction in
income inequality. However, in Case 3 we allowed for a larger discrepancy
between formal and informal entrepreneurial incomes. As a consequence in
Case 3, income inequality was higher in the economy with both corruption
and informality as compared to the economy with corruption but without
informality. Therefore, when there is a larger discrepancy between formal
and informal entrepreneurial income, entry into the informal sector as a result
of corruption may not guarantee a reduction in income inequality.
Note that Gupta et al. (2002) and Gyimah-Brepong et al. (2006) avail
empirical support for corruption leading to an increase in income inequality.
Gyimah-Brepong et al. (2006) argue that if corruption is reduced by one
standard deviation, income inequality could reduce by 0.05, 0.14, 0.25, and
0.33 among OECD, Asian, African and Latin American Economies respec-
tively. In light of our model, the Gupta et al. (2002) and Gyimah-Brepong et
al. (2006) empirical investigations seem to relate with the economy scenario
where households engage in subsistence livelihood as a result of corruption-
induced credit market rigidities leading to low incomes compared to house-
holds that remain in formal entrepreneurship and earn high incomes. Also
the Gupta et al. (2002) and Gyimah-Brepong et al. (2006) empirical inves-
tigation relates with our model in as far as there is a signicant discrepancy
between formal and informal occupational income. Indeed, in Case 3 of our
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numerical exercise, as more households engage in informal entrepreneurship
as a result of corruption, income inequality is shown to increase irrespective
of the size of the informal sector.
From the numerical analysis apart from Case 3, the e¤ect of corruption is
to increase household participation in informal entrepreneurship and that in-
come inequality is lower in an economy with both corruption and informality
than the economy without informality but with corruption. Since the e¤ect
of corruption in the economy with informality is to increase household par-
ticipation in informal entrepreneurship while leaving subsistence livelihood
unchanged in doing so income inequality is also reduced. Note that Dob-
son and Ramlogan-Dobson (2012a), Dobson and Ramlogan-Dobson (2012b),
and Kar and Saha (2012) avail empirical evidence in which they show that
as the size of the informal sector increases, the e¤ect of corruption on income
inequality is mitigated. This empirical evidence relates with our numerical
analysis in particular with respect to the benchmark scenario and Cases 1 and
2. Note that in the benchmark scenario and Cases 1 and 2, the discrepancy
between formal and informal income is relatively small as compared to Case
3. Hence in these cases, it follows that given corruption, income inequality
decreases as the size of the informal sector increases.
It has been argued that income inequality retard economic development
in developing countries. Specically, Barro (2000) argues that income in-
equality is seen to negatively (positively) interact with economic growth in
economies with per capita GDP below US$ 2,07023 (GDP above US$ 2,070).
Also, Easterly (2007) shows evidence of a causal relationship between income
inequality and development outcomes. Inequality as measured by both the
Gini Coe¢ cient and the share of income accruing to the top quintile is as-
sociated with a lower level of per capita income, inadequate and improper
institutional structures, and low levels of educational attainment. A stan-
dard deviation increase in income inequality would lead to 1.1, 1.0, and 1.3
standard deviation reduction in per capita income, institutional quality and
schooling attainment respectively. Introducing an IV24 in the model, the re-
231985 U.S. Dollars
24Agriculture endowments (that is the relative abundance of land suitable for wheat
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lationship is even more robust perhaps suggesting the OLS understates the
interaction between income inequality and development outcomes. Further-
more, even after controlling for ethnic fractionalisation, tropical location or
better still regional dummies and legal origin the negative e¤ect of income
inequality on development outcomes is still robust25.
In light of the theoretical literature, under imperfect credit market con-
ditions and xed costs related to individual investments poor households are
crowded out of high yielding capital investments thereby leading to lower
productivity in the economy (Galor and Zeira 1993; Banerjee and Newman
1993; Galor and Moav 2006; and Galor, Moav and Vollrath 2006). Fur-
thermore, political economy models argue that in the midst of high income
inequality levels26 there is a likelihood of the income poor (median voter)
agitating for income distributive policies such as public education, progres-
sive tax systems, and direct income transfers among others. However, such
policies are distortionary to economic growth as they compromise the invest-
ment potential in physical and human capital. This is because such private
investments are hinged on the ability of individuals to rightly recoup the
returns to their investments. As such, redistributive policies are argued to
deter the process of economic growth (Person and Tabellini 1994; and Alesina
and Rodrik 1994). The models on social-political unrest argue that income
inequality is a catalyst for social and political instability. That as opposed to
engaging in productive activities the poor might waste time in planning for
criminal activities. Furthermore, the income and asset rich might as well re-
direct investable resources into building defence mechanisms at the expense
of productivity enhancing investment. Also, because of the potential of po-
litical upheavals income inequality thus increases property rights insecurity
hence deterring private investment (Alesina and Perotti 1996; Bourguignon
and Verdier 2000; and Gradstein 2007).
as opposed to sugarcane) as an instrument for income inequality. This has an added
advantage of reducing the potential of measurement error in inequality Easterly (2007).
25This is in contrast to what Forbes (2000) argues that . . .many estimates of a signif-
icant negative e¤ect of inequality are not robust. When any sort of sensitivity analysis is
performed, such as additional explanatory variables or regional dummies are included, the
coe¢ cient on inequality becomes insignicant (although it remains negative).
26Particularly in democracies
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The preceding empirical and theoretical investigations show that income
inequality retards economic development. Consistent with empirical evi-
dence, this paper o¤ers a theoretical macroeconomic explanation for the po-
tential existence of low income inequality in an environment of corruption
with the informal sector playing a mitigating role. Therefore, the informal
sector can be argued to mitigate the distortionary e¤ect of income inequality
on economic growth and economic development in an economy with wide-
spread corruption. Hence the informal sector o¤ers a window of hope.
4.3 Conclusions
This paper sought to characterise the relevance of the informal sector in re-
ducing the extent of income inequality in a corruption riddled economy. In
our model, the e¤ect of corruption was shown to increase the cost of borrow-
ing to the extent that a certain proportion of households are crowded out
of formal entrepreneurship. However, a households entry into the informal
sector as opposed to subsistence livelihood reduces the potential of income
inequality increasing. Following Barro (2000) and Easterly (2007), this re-
sult potentially implies that the extent of decrease in economic growth, per
capital income and educational attainment are mitigated.
While this paper highlights that the informal sector reduces the extent
of income inequality in a corruption riddled economy, however, it is possible
that poverty levels could increase. This is because the informal sector involves
the use of low income yielding technology, therefore the larger its size, the
more likely household incomes are bound to low hence perpetuating poverty.
However, without the informal sector households would be condemned to a
lower income occupation for instance subsistence livelihood which potentially
worsens an economys inequality and poverty levels. Therefore, while the
informal sector is not ideal, it at least reduces the extent of income reduction
and thus poverty increase in an environment of corruption.
Furthermore, because activities in the informal economy are underground,
they compromise the ability of governments to collect tax revenue and con-
sequently nance public service provision. As Friedman et al. (2000) point
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out, the inability to provide e¢ cient public services reduces incentives to
pay taxes thereby propagating a corruption-informality trap. Since formal
entrepreneurial rms typically pay taxes unlike informal rms, the govern-
ments inability to mobilise revenue would be exacerbated. Thus, policy
makers would have an incentive to reduce the size of the informal economy.
In an environment of corruption which typically depicts many developing
economies the trade-o¤ from such a policy initiative would be an increase
in income inequality as households will end up receiving a potentially infe-
rior wage income or being idle. Since income inequality retards economic
development, policy measures to decrease the size of the informal economy
should ensure that safety nets are in place to facilitate a smooth transition
of informal entrepreneurs into the formal economy .
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Chapter 5
Corruption, Fiscal
Consolidation, and Economic
Development in a model with
Public Sector Ine¢ ciency
5.1 Introduction
The public sector in any economy provides services that are deemed socially
benecial to its citizens and yet privately expensive to deliver. Such public
services include infrastructure, education, health, and the rule of law. The
delivery of public services typically involves the interaction between gov-
ernment (politicians), bureaucrats and citizens. The government mobilises
citizens to pay taxes in return for public services. Using tax collections,
the government hires bureaucrats to deliver public services. Delegation of
authority and imperfect monitoring generates the principle-agent problem
between government (principal) and bureaucrats (agent). This potentially
breeds corruption tendencies among bureaucrats. Corruption could involve
bureaucrats using less e¤ort (shirking) or siphoning o¤ public funds leading
to the delivery poor quality public services.
The 2004 World Bank Development Report shows that in many develop-
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ing countries where public services are accessible, they are characterised by
low technical quality, dysfunctionality and inability to match the needs of the
largely diverse public. Such features of public services could be attributed
to corruption. For instance, Holmberg and Rothstein (2010) nd that the
existence of high corruption negatively impinges the quality of water delivery
in developing economies.
Since tax payers perceive taxes as the price for quality public services,
the provision of poor quality public services could be perceived as vitiation
of the social contract between government and tax payers. Vitiation of the
social contract could incentivise tax payers to engage in tax evasion. Indeed,
Hanousek and Palda (2004), Torgler (2005), Frey and Torgler (2007) and Alm
and McClellan (2012) avail empirical observations in which they show that
the tax payers willingness to pay tax is inversely related with the quality of
public services.
The development of incentives to evade tax breeds uncertainty in the
governments revenue stream which potentially increases the likelihood of
scal decits. Fiscal decits are among others associated with: 1) rising
debt to GDP ratio which potentially compromises future scal sustainabil-
ity and thus the welfare of future generations; and 2) the potential raise in
inationary pressure and volatility especially in economies with less indepen-
dent central banks (Agnello and Sousa 2009). Under prudent macroeconomic
management, a government would seek to overcome the potential occurrence
of a scal decit through undertaking scal policy adjustments.
In an attempt to undertake scal policy adjustments, this paper shows
that the existence of corruption-induced tax evasion reduces the governments
ability to increase revenue collection through increasing the tax payable. An
increase in tax payable becomes counterproductive as it increases tax evasion
which further reduces the governments revenue stream potentially aggravat-
ing the scal decit. Consequently, the government inevitably has to cut
back the quantity of public services delivered to attain a balanced budget.
The preceding intuition is consistent with empirical evidence. For instance,
with reference to the Greek economy, Katsios (2006) and Matsaganis and
Leventi (2013) show that the lack of success in the governments stabilisa-
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tion and management of the economy could potentially be explained by tax
evasion. The low income tax collections is partly attributed to tax evasion
o¤sets the benets attained from other scal policies such as pension cuts
and public sector pay cuts among others, Matsaganis and Leventi (2013).
Indeed, Greeces scal decit could have been dealt with by 2007 had it been
able to improve its direct tax revenue collection from 7.9% as a percentage of
GDP to the average European Union average of 13.4%, Mehir et al. (2010).
Furthermore, empirical evidence highlights that corruption through con-
straining the maintenance of public infrastructure reduces the quality of pub-
lic services leading to low economic development (Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997).
Consistent with the preceding empirical evidence, this paper theoretically
highlights that bureaucratic corruption through reducing the quality of pub-
lic services compromises the economic development potential of an economy.
The preceding analytical result is consistent with the analytical implication
in Blackburn et al. (2011). However, we propose an extension to Blackburn
et al. (2011) by introducing within their framework corruption-induced tax
evasion.
Under conditions of corruption-induced tax evasion, we show that: 1) the
governments revenue stream is compromised; and 2) raising tax payable so
as to increase tax revenue collections to nance public services and ensure a
scal balance is counterproductive. Hence, the government is forced to cut
back the quantity of public services so as to attain a balanced budget. A re-
duction in the quantity of public services reduces factor productivity which
compromises the growth and economic development potential of the econ-
omy. Furthermore, where the reduction in the quantity of public services
and thus the loot available to bureaucrats is associated with an increased
incidence of corruption then the quality of public services is further compro-
mised as bureaucrats would under such circumstances increasingly prefer to
be dishonest. The reduced quality of public services further compromises
factor productivity leading to low growth and economic development of po-
tential of the economy. We therefore highlight the double-tragedy e¤ect of
corruption since it potentially leads to a reduction in the quality and quan-
tity of public services both combining to reduce an economys growth and
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economic development potential and perhaps perpetuating a poverty trap.
However, where cutting back the quantity of public services is associated
with a reduced incidence of corruption then bureaucrats increasingly prefer
to behave honestly. Under such conditions, there is a likelihood that factor
productivity could increase potentially o¤setting the factor productivity re-
ducing e¤ect of cutting back the quantity of public services. The increased
factor productivity could propagate an increase in the growth and economic
development potential of an economy.
In the next section we explore the literature in an attempt to position
the research issue(s) within the context of the existing literature, section 2
presents the model and the subsequent analysis upon which one can draw
intuition about the interaction between corruption and tax evasion and nally
section 3 captures the conclusions from the study.
5.1.1 Review of literature
Public service delivery
Public service provision is important in an economy because it justies the
existence of the public sector. Public service delivery may involve nancing,
regulation and information dissemination. Financing may involve facilitating
infrastructure investments such as construction of schools, roads, railways,
courts of law, airports, bridges, and hospitals. At the same time infrastruc-
ture has to be serviced with teaching materials and teachers in schools; doc-
tors, drugs, nurses and ambulances in hospitals; and also roads have to be
maintained to ensure durability and less risks to lives of road users. Regu-
lation may involve streamlining the behaviour of actors in an economy for
instance environmental regulation may guide industrialists on how to deal
with industrial waste, a Land Act may guide individuals on ownership and
the use of land, a Bankruptcy Act may guide individuals on the rights of
a debtor and a lender and so many more. Information dissemination may
involve sharing information with the public about the benets of say having
every child immunised and attending school. Otherwise, the country could
be at a risk of non-scientic distortionary information about immunisation
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and education which could be costly to livelihoods.
The delivery of public services involves government (politicians), bureau-
crats and citizens. Government has monopoly over the collection of taxes
from citizens with the promise that public services will be delivered. Citi-
zens in a way perceive tax as the price for public services. Implicitly there is
a social contract between government and citizens in which the latter pays
taxes while the former ensures the delivery of public services. Using tax
revenue, government hires bureaucrats to deliver public services to citizens.
Bureaucrats are persons engaged in the day to day running of government,
hospitals, schools and other public services.
Typically high quality public services are associated with high educational
attainment, low mortality rates, high sustained levels of economic growth,
access to safe water, and increased network of paved roads. Such indica-
tors imply that where public services are of high quality, a country should
be on the path to a higher level of economic development. However, inher-
ent in the public service delivery mechanism is the principle-agent problem
which implies that the government cannot fully monitor the actions of bu-
reaucrats. As such the actions of bureaucrats might not necessarily result in
high quality public service delivery. One of the implications is that high pub-
lic spending might not necessarily guarantee that a country would enhance
its economic development potential. For instance Devarajan et al. (1996)
in a cross-country empirical study highlight that the level of public expen-
diture in capital, education, transport and communication, and health are
inversely related to economic growth in developing economies as compared
to developed economies. They argue that this could be because of existing
distortions in developing economies which are attributed to actual physical
public expenditure being greater than the desired level. However given a
general lack of adequate education, health, and transport and telecommuni-
cations infrastructure in developing countries, it is inconceivable that public
spending on such items is inversely related to economic growth.
Given that Devarajan et al. (1996) consider the levels of public expen-
diture as the amount the government allocates to education, health, capital,
transport and telecommunications sectors, public sector spending leakages
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imply that actual spending could be less than the budgetary allocations.
For example Ablo and Reinnikka (1998) undertook an empirical study in
Uganda which involved tracking public expenditure from the centre to pri-
mary schools. The study revealed that save for salary and wage allocations,
more than 70 percent of the budgetary allocations was never received by the
schools but rather spent on activities unrelated to primary education. Fur-
thermore the 2004 World Banks Development Report reports that at least
30 percent of the drugs allocated to public health facilities were diverted to
private use in Cameroon, Tanzania and Uganda. Under such circumstances it
is not surprising that public spending is inversely related to economic growth.
Furthermore, bureaucratic corruption may lead to an increase in the quan-
tity of public services while compromising the quality of public services. This
is because delivering new public services increases the likelihood of a higher
bureaucratic loot as compared to say maintaining existing public services. In
a cross-country empirical study, Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) argue that bureau-
cratic corruption compromises incentives to maintain public infrastructure or
services while increasing the quantity of public services. In addition, Holm-
berg and Rothstein (2010) highlight that high public investment only acts as
one of the ingredients to enhance the quality of public services. Where the
quality of institutions is low (where corruption levels are high) high levels
of public investment could potentially result in low quality public services.
Using quality of water as a measure of the quality of public services, Holm-
berg and Rothstein (2010) argue that high corruption levels or low levels
of institutional quality o¤set the potential increase in the quality of public
services resulting from increased public investment especially in developing
economies.
The preceding discussion unambiguously shows that corruption a¤ects
the quality of public services available to citizens. The existence of poor
quality public services may drive individuals to seek for services from among
others the private sector by-passing the nearest public service point. Akin
and Hutchison (1999) show evidence of both rich and poor individuals in Sri
Lanka by-passing public facilities where user fees for health care is zero for
private care which is costly both in terms of healthcare and transport. By-
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passing free health care at public facilities signals that individuals perceive
the public health care to be of inferior quality as compared to the private
health care. The chosen facilities are among others well stocked with drugs
and in good condition which are signals of high quality health care. In
addition Leonard et al. (2003) show that households in Iringa region of
Tanzania are revealed to be aware of the degree of their illness and the relative
qualities of the respective health facilities implying that they choose to by-
pass a health facility when the quality of health services is low irrespective of
distance. Specically patients choose health centres where: 1) consultations
and prescriptions are of high quality; and 2) physicians are of a reasonable
number besides being knowledgeable.
The by-passing behaviour by citizens of public services o¤ers evidence
that they are aware of the expected quality of public services. Since the so-
cial contract between government and citizens involves the promise to deliver
public services by the latter and payment of taxes by the former, inadequa-
cies in the quality of public services might not only lead to by-passing of
public facilities but also incentivise tax evasion tendencies. Hanousek and
Palda (2004) in an empirical study of Eastern European transition countries
argue that the willingness to evade taxes increases the more citizens are very
unsatised with public services. On a ve point scale of the quality of public
services, movement from the second lowest to the lowest belief about the
quality of public services leads to a 13 percent increase in tax evasion. Tor-
gler (2005) and Frey and Torgler (2007) show that the tax payers willingness
to pay tax is increasing in the trust they have for their public o¢ cials. This
result is premised on the notion that the tax payers willingness to pay tax is
high if they believe that the government can ably and credibly deliver positive
returns on taxes. For instance a unit increase in the tax payers condence
about the judicial system increases the willingness to pay tax by 3 percent
(Frey and Torgler 2007). Also Alm and McClellan (2012) show that a poorly
functional legal system is associated with less willingness to pay taxes or low
tax morale among rms
As such this paper characterises tax evasion as an outcome of the collapse
of the social contract between tax payers and government. The failure of
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government to avail quality public services due to bureaucratic corruption
acts as an incentive for tax payers to evade tax.
The following subsection captures a review of literature regarding incen-
tives to evade tax in an attempt to position this study in the context of the
existing literature on incentives to evade tax.
Understanding the incentive to evade tax
Pioneering work on tax evasion is attributed to Allingham and Sandmo
(1972) who perceived tax evasion as a portfolio decision undertaken by a
tax payer. They argue that tax evasion is inversely related with the penalty
and detection rates. Furthermore, a potential reduction in tax revenue as a
result of a decrease in the detection rate could be mitigated by an increase
in the penalty rate. Hence both the penalty and detection rates are policy
substitutes. Thus to enhance tax compliance a policy maker could consider
adjusting penalty and detection rates.
Motivated by empirical ndings that: 1) some citizens prefer to be honest
even when tax evasion is protable; 2) tax evasion increases with tax rate;
and 3) the degree of evasion depends on an individuals perception of the level
of evasion in a society, Gordon (1989) argues that such predictions are not
easily reected in the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Yitzhaki (1974)
portfolio choice models of tax evasion. Rather Gordon (1989) augments
the portfolio choice model with individual morality such that the agents
utility incorporates both his degree of honesty and consumption. Gordon
(1989) thus shows that even when it is economically viable to evade, some
agents might decide to be honest because of both private and social stigma.
Like in the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model both detection and penalty
rates are policy tools that government could use in the Gordon (1989) model
to minimise tax evasion. The only di¤erence is that both the detection
and penalty rates as policy tools are relevant to agents whose moral costs
are low such that they nd tax evasion attractive. Ultimately with moral
costs, the extent of tax evasion given detection and penalty rules should
be lower in the Gordon (1989) model as compared to the Allingham and
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Sandmo (1972) model. Furthermore, Gordon (1989) incorporates endogenous
reputation costs implying that individuals are more likely to engage in tax
evasion the more they are aware that others are evading.
The likelihood of being audited and detected upon one evading income
tax are the key drivers of tax compliance in the portfolio choice model of tax
evasion. This approach to understanding tax evasion has been criticised on
the grounds that the proportion of the income tax returns subjected to tax
audit is quite often less than one percent of all the tax returns in a number
of countries. Also penalties upon detection are hardly imposed besides the
nes being less than the actual amount of tax evaded. Furthermore the
civil penalties upon detection are even smaller. Under such circumstances
tax payers would be rationally justied to evade tax. Such criticism to the
portfolio choice model of tax evasion have led to the growth of the behavioural
model of tax evasion.
With regard to the behavioural model of tax evasion, Feld and Frey (2002)
argue that the existence of the morale to pay tax under such circumstances is
attributed to the implicit contract between the tax payer and tax authorities
(government). The sustainability of the implicit contract is contingent upon
tax authorities respecting the citizens besides putting in place mechanisms
that deter evasion. Besides, Frey (1997) argues that deeply rooted citizenry
participation in national decision making through popular referendum and
initiative accounts for the variation in the levels of tax evasion across dis-
tricts in Switzerland. As such Switzerland can be characterised by at least
two socially stable equilibriums. One of the equilibrium is characterised by
high tax morale and thus high tax payments due to greater civic virtue while
the other is associated with low tax morale and high tax evasion. The latter
equilibrium is associated with greater direct popular participation in consti-
tutional matters and thus citizen trust in the government unlike the former
hence variations in the tax morale.
Following the developments in the tax evasion literature, on the one hand
tax evasion is a portfolio choice implying that public policy should be aimed
at enhancing detection and penalty rates to curb tax evasion. On the other
hand tax evasion is a result of the loss of civic virtue implying that tax payers
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do not trust the government. In this paper an attempt is made to bridge
both the portfolio and behavioural choice models implying that tax evasion
becomes a portfolio choice when tax payers are unsatised with the quality
of public services as a result of bureaucratic corruption.
Tax payers perceive tax as the price paid for quality public goods. How-
ever upon vitiating the social contract by way of bureaucrats siphoning o¤
public funds and thus delivering poor quality public services, tax payers de-
velop incentives to evade taxes. Unambiguously, empirical evidence shows
that the lower is the perception of tax payers about the quality of public
services the higher is their incentive to engage in tax evasion, (Hanousek and
Palda 2004; Torgler 2005; Frey and Torgler 2007; Alm and McClellan 2012).
This paper therefore augments the portfolio choice to evade tax with a
breach in the social contract between the government and tax payers where
the former delivers poor quality goods and the latter develops incentives to
equally negate the social contract through evading tax.
Corruption, quality of public services, tax evasion and public -
nance
Macroeconomic interest in scal decits is relevant because scal decits
are associated with: 1) rising debt to GDP ratio which potentially compro-
mises future scal sustainability and thus the welfare of future generations;
and 2) the potential raise in inationary pressure and volatility especially
in economies with less independent central banks (Agnello and Sousa 2009).
Prudent macroeconomic management would therefore expect a government
to undertake scal consolidation so as to deal with scal decits. However,
scal consolidation is not straight forward because of: 1) the existence of
strategic interaction among leaders implying that the current government
may accumulate debt while limiting the scal options of their successor,
(Persson and Svensson, 1989; Tabellini and Alesina, 1990); and 2) as ar-
gued by Alesina and Drazen (1991) disagreements on the mechanisms to be
adopted on how to spread the costs of reducing the decit causes delays in
decit reduction as each political group attempts to outmuscle the other.
116
Specically, Persson and Svensson (1989) using a microeconomic ap-
proach show that the current leadership has inuence over the policy choice
of its successor if it has control over a state variable that is pertinent in its
successors objective function. Using debt as a state variable the current
government could accumulate debt (implying large decits) with the objec-
tive of constraining the spending options of its potentially more expansionary
successor as opposed to when it would remain in power. Also, Tabellini and
Alesina (1990) using a microeconomic approach show that the persistence
of scal decits could be accounted for by the inability of the current vot-
ers to bind the choice of future voters. This is because the future majority
voter could have di¤erent preferences from the current majority voter. As a
result, the current majority voter has an incentive to choose a debt policy
that could potentially be suboptimal ex ante for the economy. Consequently
the economy could experience either scal surplus or scal decit. However,
Tabellini and Alesina (1990) argue that the social choice of scal decits is
increasingly likely over a reasonable number of individual utility functions
even though it is generally known to be socially suboptimal. Hence the ex-
istence of strategic interaction among leaders accounts for the di¢ culty in
attaining scal consolidation.
Furthermore, Alesina and Drazen (1991) in a game theoretic approach
attribute delayed scal consolidation to the war of attrition. That a political
disagreement among di¤erent socio-economic groups on the mechanisms to
be adopted on how to spread the costs of reducing the decit causes delays
in decit reduction as each socio-economic group attempts to outmuscle the
other. That scal consolidation is attained only after some of the socio-
economic groups withdraw their demands and thus allow the victorious socio-
economic group(s) to allocate the burden of scal consolidation.
This paper however makes a contribution to the macroeconomic litera-
ture on scal consolidation using the Dynamic General Equilibrium approach
to characterise corruption as a potential cause of cumbersomeness in scal
consolidation. The study shows that by bureaucratic corruption reducing the
quality of public services, it incentivises tax payers to evade tax payment.
Corruption-induced tax evasion propagates scal decit. The existence of
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corruption-induced tax evasion implies that e¤orts by government to alle-
viate the potential scal decit by raising more revenue through increasing
the tax payable might be counterproductive. This is because attempts to
raise the tax payable could potentially incentivise more taxable households
to evade. Therefore the existence of corruption-induced tax evasion incapaci-
tates the ability of government to use tax policy to eliminate the scal decit.
Consistent with the preceding intuition and with reference to Greece, Katsios
(2006) shows that the lack of success in the governments stabilisation and
management of the economy can potentially be explained by tax evasion as
it cannot tap into the underground economy. Also, Matsaganis and Leventi
(2013) show that the Greek governments e¤ort to restructure the personal
income tax and at the same time introducing solidarity contributions and
emergency taxes in order to cure the scal instability was partly weakened
by tax evasion. The lower income tax collections partly o¤set the benets
attained from other scal policies such as pension cuts and public sector pay
cuts among others (Matsaganis and Leventi, 2013). Bravely, Mehir et al.
(2010) argue that if Greece was able to improve its direct tax revenue col-
lection from 7.9% as a percentage of GDP to the average European Union
average of 13.4% as a percentage of GDP, the scal decit would have been
history by 2007. To therefore attain the primary surplus eliminating tax
evasion is of paramount importance (Mehir et al. 2010).
In conclusion, this paper theoretically attempts to use bureaucratic cor-
ruption to explain the existence of scal decits through corruption-induced
tax evasion and to highlight the ine¤ectiveness of tax policy to address a
potential scal decit given corruption-induced tax evasion.
Corruption, quality of public services, tax evasion and economic
development
One of the implications of poor quality public services is that productivity
in such an economy is compromised hindering economic development. Tanzi
and Davoodi (1997) in a cross-country empirical study show that corrup-
tion while increasing the quantity of public investment, it however decreases
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the quality of public investment. Using the total paved roads that are in
good condition, losses in electricity supply as a proportion of total electricity
supply, losses in water supply, faults in the telecommunication network and
the proportion of railway diesel engines that are in good working condition
as proxies for quality of public services, Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) argue
that the maintenance of existing public services is decreasing in the level of
corruption. Holmberg and Rothstein (2010) in an empirical study of the in-
teraction between the quality of government and quality of water show that
the amount of money and quality of government are instrumental in explain-
ing the quality of water accessible to households. In their analysis, Holmberg
and Rothstein (2010) show that the interaction term between the quality of
government and GDP per capita among developing economies is negative
and signicant. Thus while money is important in service delivery however
the quality of government is equally necessary. Note that since the control of
corruption index is implicitly a measure of quality of government we can thus
infer that the existence of high corruption negatively impinges the quality
of water delivery in developing economies. Therefore as government expen-
diture is bound to increase as a result of increased public investment the
economys growth rate is compromised since corruption does not allow for
maintenance of public infrastructure hence reducing productivity (Tanzi and
Davoodi, 1997).
Consistent with the preceding empirical evidence, Rajkumar and Swaroop
(2008) in a cross sectional empirical study show that where the levels of cor-
ruption are low, a percentage increase in the ratio of public health spending
to GDP is associated with 0.32 percent decrease in the child mortality rate.
The decrease in child mortality ensures that an economys ow of labourforce
is maintained or increased. Also given low levels of corruption, a percentage
increase in education spending as a proportion of GDP is associated with 0.70
percent drop in primary school failure rate (Rajkumar and Swaroop, 2008).
The reduction in the school failure rate potentially increases an economys
quality of labourforce. Since both the quality and size of labourforce are a
key ingredient of an economys productivity, therefore high public spending
on public services in an environment of low corruption could translate into
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higher levels of economic growth and economic development.
In light of the aforementioned empirical ndings, this study attempts to
avail a theoretical macroeconomic explanation that accounts for the e¤ect
of bureaucratic corruption on public service delivery and economic develop-
ment. The analytical framework is similar to Blackburn et al. (2011) who
highlight that bureaucratic corruption through reducing the quality of public
services compromises the economic development of an economy. This paper
however augments the Blackburn et al. (2011) analysis with corruption-
induced tax evasion the e¤ect of which is to worsen the ability of government
to nance and supply public services. Therefore while corruption directly
a¤ects the quality of public services thus inhibiting economic development (a
result consistent with Blackburn et al. 2011) the introduction of corruption-
induced tax evasion and its contraction of public revenue ow reduces the
quantity of public services delivered. The reduction in the quantity of public
services further reduces factor productivity and an economys economic de-
velopment potential. Therefore this paper avails a theoretical macroeconomic
explanation for the deleterious e¤ect of corruption on economic development
by combining the e¤ect of corruption on the quality and quantity of public
services respectively.
5.2 Model
Consider an economy characterised by a constant population of overlapping
generations of two-period lived agents belonging to dynastic families. Agents
work in the rst period (when they are young) and save all the proceeds for
consumption in the second period (when they are old). In each period the
economy is composed of M number of households and N < M number of
bureaucrats. Households have heterogenous skills and inelastically supply
their labour in the production of a nal consumption good. In return, house-
holds earn a competitive wage wt. Bureaucrats are endowed with one unit
of labour which they supply inelastically to government in return for a com-
petitive wage wt. Bureaucrats engage in the procurement of public services
and collection of taxes. There is a proportion  and 1    of corrupt and
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non-corrupt bureaucrats respectively. Corruption means that a bureaucrat
delivers poor quality public services while quoting prices for high quality
public services. Taxable households perceive tax as the price for quality
public services. As such, they observe the quality of public services and de-
cide whether or not to pay taxes. Poor quality public services propagate
corruption-induced tax evasion which compromises the government revenue
stream. The government inevitably undertakes scal policy adjustments to
sustain a balanced budget. The model shows that corruption-induced tax
evasion weakens the use of tax policy as scal adjustment tool. Rather the
government cuts back the quantity of public services to attain a balanced
budget. Cutting back the quantity of public services results in two conict-
ing outcomes. On one hand, it is deleterious to factor productivity and thus
retards an economys development potential. On the other hand, it reduces
the loot available to corrupt bureaucrats and thus disincentivises potentially
corrupt bureaucrats to engage in corruption hence propagating an economys
transition to a higher level of economic development.
The following is a full description of the model.
5.2.1 Firms
Firms choose capital kt and labour xt given the rental rate of capital and
wages respectively to produce a single consumption good Yt. The single
consumption good is assumed to be the numeraire. It is produced using the
constant returns to scale production technology1
Yt = A [xtKt]
 k1 t G
 (5.1)
Where Kt which is the aggregate capital stock captures the externality
associated with technology embodied. G is the aggregate quality of public
services. Like in other growth models such as Barro (1990) and Blackburn
et al. (2011), G is a cooperant factor that enhances the productivity of
both labour and capital. The production level of the consumption good is
1The production function is assumed to be; twice di¤erentiatable, characterised by
positive marginal products and diminishing marginal rate of subsititution.
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increasing in the quality of the public services, capital, and labour employed.
The rms prot maximisation decision ensures that the rental rate of cap-
ital, rt = [1  ]A [xtKt] k t G and the wage, wt = Ax 1t Kt k1 t G. In
equilibrium Kt = kt which combined with a constant population implies that
the rate of return on capital is constant and is given as; r = [1  ]AxG.
Equally, wages are given by; wt = Ax 1ktG implying that the return
to labour is increasing in both capital employed and the quality of public
services.
5.2.2 Household
Households are identied by their labour endowments. There is a proportion
l (0; 1) of low (l) endowed households in terms of labour, that is; l. 1 l is
the proportion of highly (h) endowed households in terms of labour, that is;
h > l. The total labour supply to rms is thus; x = [(1  l)h + ll]M .
Note that the di¤erences in household labour endowment imply di¤erences in
income. Specically, a household [H] with a labour endowment level j (= l; h)
earns jwt wage income. Consider an economy where households with labour
endowment l are exempted from tax payment. However, households with
labour endowment h are obliged to pay a lump sum tax [ t]. Assume that
each household receives a bequest bt from their parents when young. There-
fore for non-taxable households their income

I lt

is a sum of wage income
and bequest, I lt = lwt + bt. However, for taxable households their income
Iht

is a sum of wage income and bequest less the lump sum tax payable [ t],
Iht = hwt+bt  t. As shall be seen in subsection (5.2.5), taxable households
have a choice to make whether or not to evade tax payment. The incentive
to evade will be driven by the quality of public goods and individual specic
cost of shame i that the household incurs when detected upon evading tax.
The shame cost i is uniformly distributed across taxable households. Oth-
erwise the households disposable income is saved and rented out to rms at
a rate of return r.
The households income is spent on consumption at old age and bequest
to the young bt+1. Therefore his expected lifetime utility function is of the
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form uHt = [1 + r] I
j
t   bt+1 +  [bt+1]. The di¤erence between the house-
holds saving and bequest to his o¤spring reects the utility attained from
consumption at old age. The assumption of consumption at old age implies
that the households consumption at a young age is implied by that of his
parents. Incorporation of bequests in the households lifetime utility func-
tion is aimed at ensuring a non-degenerate steady state equilibrium that is
typical of a linear capital accumulation path. The term  [bt+1] is the utility
which accrues to the household upon bequeathing to their o¤spring. The un-
derlying assumptions about  [bt+1] is that: 1) 
0
[bt+1] > 0 and 
00
[bt+1] < 0
implying the strict concavity of  [bt+1]; and 2) limbt+1!1 
0
[bt+1] = 0 and
limbt+1!0 
0
[bt+1] = 1 implying that  [bt+1] is bound by the inada condi-
tions. Optimisation of the households utility function yields 
0
[bt+1] = 1.
Thus the bequest level b is the same across households and constant across
generations. From the rms optimisation problem, the constant rental rate
of capital implies that the households expected lifetime utility is fully deter-
mined ounce his income is established.
5.2.3 Government
The government hires N number of bureaucrats to implement public policy
through the purchase of public services and tax collection2. Bureaucrats
are tasked to provide

g
N

N amount of public services. Specically each
bureaucrat delivers g=N quantity of public services. A bureaucrat [B] is
endowed with one unit of labour which he supplies inelastically to earn a
competitive wage3 wt. For simplicity, the bureaucrats wage is not subjected
to tax. Depending on whether a bureaucrat is corrupt or not, his/her income
is saved and consumed at old age4. The bureaucrats expected lifetime utility
is uBt = [1 + r] I
B
t . The bureaucrats lifetime utility assumes no bequest to
2Tax collection could equally be subjected to bureaucratic corruption; however, for
purposes of our analysis we restrict corruption to only the procurement of public services.
3As in Blackburn et al., (2011), the assumption of bureaucrats earning a competitive
wage is aimed at making the public sector an equally attractive source of employment.
4As shall be shown later, detected corrupt bureaucrats loose their wage income and
thus have no savings. As shall be shown later, illegal income is kept out of the capital
market to avoid detection by government.
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his o¤-spring. From the rms optimisation problem, the constant rental
rate of capital implies that the bureaucrats expected lifetime utility is fully
determined ounce his income is established.
Public services are either of good or bad quality. Bureaucrats have dis-
cretion on the choice of public service quality. The government employs an
ine¢ cient monitoring technology to follow up on the behaviour of bureau-
crats. There is a probability s and 1 s of detecting and not detecting corrupt
bureaucrats respectively. Note that the cost of a high quality public service
is an identically and independently distributed random variable taking 1 unit
of output with a probability q and  > 1 units of output with a probability
1   q. High quality public services yield 1 unit of productive service such
that the value of public service is given by f1=; 1g. Poor quality goods cost
 < 1 units of output with certainty and yield  < 1 units of productive
service. The value of a poor quality public good is assumed to be strictly
less than that of the costly high quality public good that is f= < 1=g.
Furthermore, the government is assumed to be unaware of the price of the
respective qualities of public services. However, it has strict preference for
high quality public services and
 
g
N

N quantity of public services. The strict
preference for high quality public services and the lack of information about
the cost (quality) of the specic public services creates an information gap
which propagates grounds for corruption. Bureaucrats could potentially have
an incentive to procure poor quality public services while quoting the price
that accrues to high quality public services. The e¤ect of bureaucratic cor-
ruption is to increase the cost of public service delivery while at the sametime
compromising the aggregate quality of public services.
Consider an economy in which there is a proportion  and 1    of cor-
rupt and non-corrupt bureaucrats respectively. A non-corrupt bureaucrat
procures g
N
units of high quality public goods at their true cost of g
N
with
a probability q or 
 
g
N

with a probability 1   q. These bureaucrats de-
liver [1  ]   g
N

N quality of public services. Corrupt bureaucrats engage in
the procurement of poor quality public services while quoting the price for
high quality public services. With probability 1  s, a non-detected corrupt
bureaucrat procures g
N
units of low quality public goods at a cost of 
 
g
N

124
however he falsely reports the cost as 
 
g
N

. An undetected corrupt bu-
reaucrat walks away with an amount (  )   g
N

of corrupt income besides
his wage. Undetected corrupt bureaucrats deliver  [1  s]    g
N

N quality
of public services. With probability s, a corrupt bureaucrat is detected and
while forfeiting their wages, the government is equally able to redeem g
N
units
of high quality public goods at their true cost of g
N
or 
 
g
N

. As such the
quality of public goods from unsuccessful corrupt bureaucrats is s
 
g
N

N .
Following the preceding description of the procurement of public services,
the expected aggregate quality of public services in a corrupt economy is given
by
[1  +  [1  s]  + s] g = G (5.2)
Without corruption, the quality of public services would be such that
g = G. With corruption however, 1    +  [1  s]  + s < 1. Since
[1  +  [1  s]  + s] g < g implies that the aggregate quality of public
services is lower with corruption than without corruption. In support of our
intuition that corruption compromises the quality of public goods, Tanzi and
Davoodi (1997) empirically show that countries with high levels of corrup-
tion are associated with lower quality public infrastructure. Specically, an
increase in corruption leads to a reduction in the quality of paved roads and
an increase in electricity outages. In the same respect, Holmberg and Roth-
stein (2010) in an empirical study of the interaction between the quality of
government and quality of water show that the amount of money and quality
of government are instrumental in explaining the quality of water accessible
to households. Since the control of corruption is one of the measures of qual-
ity of government we can thus infer that the existence of high corruption
negatively impinges the quality of water delivery in developing economies.
Thus corruption a¤ects the quality of public services.
5.2.4 Bureaucratic incentive to be corrupt
The presence of bureaucratic corruption and the likelihood of being caught
introduce uncertainty in bureaucratic income. With certainty a non-corrupt
bureaucrat earns a wage wt and his nal wealth is (1 + r)wt. However, a
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corrupt bureaucrats income shall depend on whether he is caught engaging
in corruption or not. A corrupt bureaucrat earns wt + [  ] gN with a prob-
ability [1  s] of not being detected. Otherwise if caught with a probability
s, a corrupt bureaucrats income is 05. Correspondingly, the expected nal
wealth of a corrupt bureaucrat is [1  s] (1 + r)wt + [  ] gN .
The penalty of zero income when caught in corrupt activities implies that
a bureaucrat will have an incentive to engage in corruption if his expected
nal wealth with corruption [1  s] (1 + r)wt + [  ] gN  is greater than
his nal wealth without engaging in corruption, that is,
[1  s]
s
[  ] g
N
> (1 + r)wt  h (kt) (5.3)
Like in Blackburn (2011), the individual bureaucrats incentive to engage
in corruption depends on the features of the economy that is interest rate and
wage rate. Implying that at lower wages or interest rate, bureaucrats would
increasingly prefer to engage in corruption. Indeed, Besley and McLaren
(1993) in a theoretical attempt to understand wage incentives argue that low
wages incentivise dishonest individuals to seek for employment in the public
sector. Empirical investigations by Goel and Nelson (1998), Di Tella and
Schargrodsky (2003) and Van Rijckegem and Weder (2001) generally agree
that corruption and wages are inversely related. From equation (5.3), there
is a threshold level of wage ! below and above which corruption is feasible
and infeasible respectively to a bureaucrat, that is,
[1  s]
s (1 + r)
[  ] g
N
= ! (5.4)
From equation (5.3), we can substitute for wage rate, wt = Ax 1ktG
so as to be able to relate an individual bureaucrats decision to engage in
corruption with the level of capital (economic development) in the economy,
that is;
5Being caught in a corrupt activity implies that not only does the bureaucrat loose his
wage as a penalty but he is forced to hand in his illegal income.
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[1  s]
h
(1 + r)Ax 1Gkt + [  ] g
N
i
> (1 + r)Ax 1Gkt (5.5)
From equation (5.5), we can dene the critical level of capital, kc1
kc1 =
1
Ax 1
[1  s]
s (1 + r)

(  ) g
1 
N

(5.6)
Equation (5.6) implies that for kt < kc1, each corruptible bureaucrat
prefers to engage in corruption regardless of whether other corruptible bu-
reaucrats engage in corruption or not. This implies that there is a unique
equilibrium in which all corruptible bureaucrats are corrupt.
Note that the e¤ect of bureaucratic corruption is to reduce the quality
of public services. The decrease in the quality of public services reduces
factor productivity implying a decrease in wages from wt = Ax 1ktG
to bwt = Ax 1kt [[1  +  [1  s]  + s] g] and interest rate from r =
[1  ]AxG to br = [1  ]Ax [[1  +  [1  s]  + s] g]. Therefore,
the decision to engage in corruption given that other corruptible bureaucrats
are corrupt is given by,
[1  s]
s
[  ] g
N
> (1 + br) bwt  bh (kt) (5.7)
Substituting for bwt and br in equation (5.7) we can dene a critical level
of capital kc2 given by
6,
kc2 =
1
Ax 1 
[1  s]
s (1 + br)
"
(  ) [ g]
1 
N
#
(5.8)
Note that since wages in the economy with corruption are lower than
those in the economy without corruption, it follows that the function h (kt)
has a steeper slope than the function bh (kt). It also follows that the critical
level of capital kc1 is lower than the critical level of capital k
c
2. Therefore,
kc2 denes a critical level of capital such that for kt > k
c
2, each corruptible
bureaucrat prefers not to engage in corruption regardless of how other cor-
6Where   is equal to 1  +  [1  s]  + s
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ruptible bureaucrats behave. This implies that there is a unique equilibrium
in which all corruptible bureaucrats prefer not to engage in corruption.
From the critical levels of capital kc1 and k
c
2, it follows that for k
c
1 < kt < k
c
2,
each corruptible bureaucrat prefers to engage in corruption or be honest. The
decision to engage in corruption or behave honestly depends on the incidence
of corruption. That is whether other corruptible bureaucrats are corrupt
or honest. Where all corruptible bureaucrats are corrupt is an equilibrium
since none of them has an incentive to behave otherwise. While where all
corruptible bureaucrats are honest is an equilibrium since none of them has
an incentive to behave otherwise. Hence for kc1 < kt < k
c
2, there are multiple
equilibria in which all corruptible bureaucrats prefer to engage in corruption
or behave honestly.
5.2.5 Household incentive to evade tax
In this paper, taxable households have the ability to observe the quality of
public services7. When the quality of the public service is good a taxable
household voluntarily complies with tax payment. Otherwise bad quality
public services incentivise a taxable household to consider evading tax pay-
ment. Figure (5.1) represents a taxable households decision path following
his observation of the quality of public services. In stage one the taxable
household observes the quality of public services. The public service is ei-
ther of good quality or bad quality. The taxable household fullls his tax
obligation in the event that the public service is of good quality. This is con-
sistent with the behavioural choice argument in which a taxable household
feels morally obliged to fulll his tax obligation when he is satised with the
quality of public services (Feld and Frey, 2002). Unambiguously, empirical
evidence shows that a taxable households fulllment of his tax obligation is
increasing the higher is the quality of public services (Alm and McClellan,
7This assumption is supported by Akin and Hutchison (1999) and Leonard et al. (2003)
who show empirical evidence of individuals irrespective of their income and potential user-
fees by-passing the nearest public health care service point in Sri Lanka and Tanzania
respectively. The individuals sought after health service points that were perceived to
o¤er high quality health care.
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Figure 5.1: Taxable households decision tree
2012; Frey and Torgler, 2007; Hanousek and Palda, 2004; and Torgler, 2005).
Therefore, given high quality public services and that a taxable household
fullls his tax obligation, the payo¤ to the taxable household is hwt   t + b
while that to the government is  t.
When the public service is of bad quality we proceed to stage two. At
this point, the taxable households decision to fulll his tax obligation is
both a portfolio and behavioural choice. It is a portfolio choice in the sense
that the decision will depend on the probability p of being detected8 and
the shame cost9 i. It is a behavioural choice because his decision to engage
in tax evasion is driven by the poor quality of public services10. Note that
8Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Yitzhaki (1974)
9Gordon (1989)
10In essence the taxable household feels like he has no moral obligation to full his tax
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the taxable household will either behave honestly or will evade and then
we proceed to stage three. When the taxable household behaves honestly11
given that the quality of public services is bad his payo¤ is h bwt    t + b
while that of the government is  t. Otherwise we proceed to stage three,
where the government using its imperfect monitoring technology can detect
a tax evading taxable household with a probability p or fail to detect with a
probability 1 p. When the tax evading taxable household is caught, he meets
his tax liability and also incurs a cost i of shame. The taxable households
payo¤ when caught is h bwt    t + b  i while that of the government is  t.
When the taxable household is not detected however, his payo¤ is h bwt + b
while that of the government is zero12.
Correspondingly, the taxable households expected utility if he engages
in tax evasion given poor quality public services as a result of corruption
is, (1 + r) [h bwt    tp+ b]   ip   b +  [b]. While his expected utility if
he voluntarily fullls his tax obligation given poor quality public services
as a result of corruption is, (1 + r) [h bwt    tp+ b]   b +  [b]. The taxable
household will choose to evade tax if his expected utility from engaging in tax
evasion is greater than the expected utility from fullling his tax obligation
given corruption that is,
(1 + r) [h bwt    tp+ b]  ip  b+  [b] > (1 + r) [h bwt    tp+ b]  b+  [b]
(5.9)
Collecting like terms, the taxable household will evade if his expected tax
obligation given that the government has failed to provide high quality public services,
Feld and Frey (2002)
11We can think of this non-tax evading taxable household as having a higher social cost
i since he chooses to full his tax obligation even when the quality of public services is
bad. Gordon (1989) argues that even when its reasonable to evade some agents might
still behave honestly because of private and social stigma.
12Note that it is possible for the decision tree to continue to stage four where caught tax
evading taxable households could engage in a bribe bargaining process with bureaucrats
to avoid being reprimanded. Adding stage four would however only serve to complicate
the analysis yet without it we can ably show that corruption-induced tax evasion negates
the use of tax policy to attain scal stability besides potentially worsening the economic
development potential of an economy.
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saving is greater or equal to the cost of shame when caught that is
(1 + r) (1  p)  t
p
 i (5.10)
From equation (5.10), one can derive a threshold shame cost  = (1+r)(1 p) t
p
.
As such taxable households with a shame cost less than  will prefer to evade
tax. However, taxable households with a shame cost greater than  will pre-
fer to be tax honest. Since i v [0; ] implies that 


=  is the fraction of
taxable households that prefer to evade tax given the poor quality of pub-
lic services13. From gure (5.2) below, the fraction of tax evading taxable
households is the area of the rectangle 0a 1

. Because the threshold shame
cost,  = (1 p)(1+r) t
p
therefore the proportion of taxable households that
evade tax is a function of the lump sum tax, the incidence of corruption14,
and the probability of detection that is  [ t; p; r]. Clearly, an increase in the
lump sum tax  t leads to an outward shift of the threshold shame cost from
 to . The increase in proportion of tax evading taxable households is
 

. Thus, the proportion of tax evading taxable households is increasing
in the lump sum tax  t.
5.2.6 Distribution of household saving
The distribution of household savings will depend on whether or not house-
holds: 1) engage in tax evasion given the quality of public services; and 2)
are detected upon engaging in tax evasion. Without corruption, the econ-
omy is said to be charaterised by high quality public services and that taxable
households have no incentive to evade taxes. As such the aggregate saving of
taxable households is (1  l)M [hwt    t + b]. While the aggregate savings
of non-taxable households is lM [lwt + b]. Therefore, the aggregate house-
hold saving in the non-corrupt economy is the sum of the aggregate saving
of taxable and non-taxable households, that is, xwt   (1  l)M t +Mb
13Conversely the proportion of households that prefer not to evade taxes, 1   =  
14This is because the interest rate depends on quality of public services, G which in turn
depend on the incidence of corruption in the economy.
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Figure 5.2: Distribution of the social cost borne out of tax evasion
With corruption however, the quality of public services is compromised
such that taxable households are incentivised to engage in tax evasion. There
is a proportion [1  ] of tax honest taxable households whose aggregate sav-
ing is [1  ] (1  l)M [h bwt    t + b]. There is a proportion  of tax evad-
ing households who successfully evade tax without detection with a probabil-
ity [1  p]. Correspondingly their aggregate income is
 (1  l)M [h bwt + b] [1  p]. There is a proportion  of tax evading house-
holds who are detected with a probability p and are forced to meet their
tax obligation. Their aggregate saving is  (1  l)M [h bwt    t + b] p. The
aggregate savings of non-taxable households will amount to lM [l bwt + b].
Therefore, the aggregating savings of all households with corruption-induced
tax evasion amounts to x bwt +Mb  (1  l) [(1  ) + p]M t.
If however taxable households choose not to evade taxes ( = 0) given bu-
reaucratic corruption, their aggregate saving would be given as
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(1  l)M [h bwt    t + b]. While the savings of non-taxable households would
be lM [l bwt + b]. The aggregate household saving in this economy will
amount to x bwt   (1  l)M t +Mb.
5.2.7 Distribution of the bureaucratic saving
In a corruption free economy, the aggregate saving of bureaucrats is the to-
tal wage income earned by bureaucrats, Nwt. With corruption however,
the saving that accrues to bureaucrats depends on whether: 1) they engage
in corruption or not? 2) if they engage in corruption are they detected or
not? The aggregate income of non-corrupt bureaucrats in a corrupt econ-
omy is (1  )N bwt. The aggregate income that accrues to undetected cor-
rupt bureaucrats is (1  s)N bwt + (1  s) (  ) g. Detected corrupt bu-
reaucrats incur a loss in aggregate saving of magnitude sN bwt. Therefore,
N bwt [1  2s] +  [1  s] [  ] g is the aggregate saving of bureaucrats in
the corrupt economy.
Recall that each bureaucrat has 1 unit of labour therefore his saving
should amount to his wage income. Therefore, any income greater than his
wage income could attract suspicion and perhaps detection by government.
In that regard, like in Blackburn et al. (2011) we assume that bureaucrats
keep their illegal income away from the capital market so as to avoid being
detected. N bwt [1  2s] is therefore the aggregate saving from bureaucrats
available to rms for borrowing from the capital market.
5.2.8 Equilibrium
Following the assumption that consumption is undertaken in period two, the
net period one income that accrues to households and bureaucrats is the
supply side of the credit market or aggregate saving in the economy. From
the characterisation of period one net income that accrues to households and
bureaucrats, the aggregate saving in the economy is given by the sum of all
period one net income across households and bureaucrats. The demand for
capital is from entrepreneurs and it is equal to capital stock in period t+ 1.
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Capital market equilibrium will be such that the capital stock in period t+ 1
is equal to period t aggregate savings of households and bureaucrats.
In an economy without corruption, the existence of high quality public
services ensures that households have no incentive to tax evade. Subsequently
the economys capital accumulation path is,
kt+1 = xwt   (1  l)M t +Mb+Nwt (5.11)
With bureaucratic corruption and corruption-induced tax evasion however,
the capital market equilibrium implies that the economys capital accumula-
tion equation can be represented as,
kTt+1 = x bwt +Mb   +N bwt [1  2s] (5.12)
Where,  = (1  l) [(1  ) + p]M t is the expected tax payment, and
N bwt [1  2s] is the expected saving from bureaucrats. From equation (5.12),
tax payment reduces the size of capital stock in period t+ 1. Note that with
tax evasion, households are able to retain a proportion (1  p) (1  l)M t
which is transformed into capital investment next period. One could argue
that the act of evasion deters would be capital ending in the hands of cor-
rupt bureaucrats. The downside with the act of tax evasion is that it further
compromises productivity by constraining the ow of revenue necessary to
nance productivity enhancing public services. Furthermore, since corrupt
bureaucrats attempt to avoid detection, the amount of bureaucratic theft
 [1  s] [  ] g is withheld from the capital market. Implying a loss to
private capital accumulation. Also, because corruption dwarfs productivity,
wages are such that bwt < wt therefore x bwt + N bwt [1  2s] < xwt + Nwt.
Thus, the loss in labour productivity and the deadweight loss in capital
 [1  s] [  ] g imply that the economy without corruption is strictly su-
perior when compared to the one characterised by corruption-induced tax
evasion.
Without tax evasion however, with the economy still characterised by
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theft of public funds the capital accumulation equation is given by
kNTt+1 = x bwt   (1  l)M +Mb+N bwt [1  2s] (5.13)
Similarly, the loss in productivity and the deadweight loss in capital imply
that the economy without corruption is strictly superior to the one chara-
terised with corruption but without corruption-induced tax evasion.
The capital market equilibrium equations (5.11), (5.12), and (5.13) en-
ables us understand how corruption impacts the development process of an
economy. However, we have to incorporate how corruption and tax evasion
interact to a¤ect public nance in order to understand the develop process
implications of corruption-induced tax evasion.
5.2.9 Public nance
The government seeks to provide public services nanced by taxes collected
from taxable households while maintaining a balanced budget. Recall that
bureaucrats are tasked to procure public services while taxable households are
expected to voluntarily remit their tax obligations. In the economy without
corruption, revenue collection amounts to the lump sum tax payable by all
taxable households, (1  l)  tM .
With corruption however, non-tax evading taxable households voluntar-
ily remit [1  ] (1  l)  tM amount of tax revenue. The government is also
able to collect p (1  l)  tM from detected tax evading taxable households.
There is a tax revenue loss of  (1  l) (1  p)  tM attributed to tax evading
households that are not detected. There is a proportion sN of corrupt bu-
reaucrats caught plundering government resources. These bureaucrats forfeit
their wages amounting to sN bwt. Therefore the total revenue collected by
government given corruption-induced tax evasion amounts to
(1  l) [(1  ) + p]  tM + sN bwt (5.14)
Where the rst term in equation (5.14) is the revenue collection from
non-tax evading households and detected tax evading households while the
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second term captures nes collected from detected corrupt bureaucrats.
With regard to government expenditure, it includes both purchases of
public services by bureaucrats and the wage bill for bureaucrats. In the
economy without corruption the total government expenditure amounts to;
[q + (1  q)] g +Nwt (5.15)
The rst term in equation (5.15) captures the government spending on
public services while the second is the government spending on wages to
bureaucrats.
In light of the economy characterised by corruption, spending by non-
corrupt bureaucrats is (1  ) [q + (1  q)] g. Spending by detected corrupt
bureaucrats amounts to s [q + (1  q)] g. Spending by undetected corrupt
bureaucrats amounts to  (1  s)g. Wage payments amount to the sum of
wages paid to non-corrupt and undetected corrupt bureaucrats less withheld
wages from detected corrupt bureaucrats that is N bwt   sN bwt. Therefore
the total government spending is given by;
[(q + (1  q)) ((1  ) + s) +  (1  s)] g +N bwt   sN bwt (5.16)
5.3 Corruption, tax evasion, and government
scal position
5.3.1 Economy without corruption
Since the government seeks to run a balanced budget, total tax collection
should equal total government expenditure. Since taxes are assumed to be
lump sum in nature, the total revenue collection without corruption would
amount to the lump sum tax payable by all taxable households, that is;
(1  l)  tM . Government expenditure would amount to what government
pays towards wages and procurement of public services, that is;
[(q + (1  q))] g +Nwt. Therefore, a balanced budget would require that,
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(1  l)  tM = [(q + (1  q))] g +Nwt (5.17)
Proposition 1 In a non-corrupt economy, a lump sum tax increase, im-
proves the governments revenue collection
Proof. Given a positive shock  in government expenditure, such that
at the lump sum tax  t; revenue is less than public expenditure, that is;
(1  l)  tM < [(q + (1  q))] g +Nwt + , the government can re-stablise
its scal position by increasing the tax payable  t. For  t < 
0
t < hwt
then we can have (1  l)  0tM = [(q + (1  q))] g +Nwt + . Besides, the
derivative of tax revenue (1  l)  tM with respect to  t = (1  l)M > 0
hwt    0t > 0 implies that at the new tax payable,  0t >  t, the taxable
household still maintains a positive disposable income. The positive dis-
posable income ensures positive taxable household savings and thus capital
available to rms for investment in period t+ 1. Besides, hwt    0t > 0 also
ensures positive consumption in period t + 1. Therefore, in a non-corrupt
economy, for as long as a taxable household can maintain a positive dispos-
able income, the government can adjust the tax payable to re-stabilise the
budget given a positive shock in expenditure.
Otherwise from equation (5.17), we can establish the amount of tax col-
lected by the government in a non-corrupt economy, that is;
 tM =
[(q + (1  q))] g +Nwt
(1  l) (5.18)
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5.3.2 Economy with corruption
Economy with corruption-induced tax evasion
Corruption results in the cost of public services being inated by
[q (  1) (1  s)] g15and a reduction in the wage bill16. It is possible that
total government expenditure with corruption is higher or lower than that of
the economy without corruption. Of interest to this paper is however, when
government expenditure is higher and the corresponding tax policy implica-
tions. Given that the amount of revenue (1  l)  tM 17(government revenue
without corruption-induced tax evasion) is unattainable due to corruption-
induced tax evasion, for the government to supply
 
g
N

N quantity of public
services would attract a scal decit. The di¤erence between the tax revenue
of the corruption free economy, (1  l)  tM and the revenue collection in the
economy with corruption-induced tax evasion, (1  l) [(1  ) + p]  tM +
sN bwt enables us to arrive at the revenue shortfall,
(1  l)  tM [ (1  p)]  sN bwt (5.19)
Recall that [ (1  p)] is the fraction of undetected tax evaders; therefore,
the rst term in the scal decit equation captures the amount of tax the
government looses as a result of corruption-induced tax evasion. The second
term captures withheld wages from detected corrupt bureaucrats. The scal
decit is therefore the di¤erence between taxes lost due to corruption-induced
tax evasion and withheld wages from detected corrupt bureaucrats.
The characterisation of the scal decit implies that the size of the s-
cal decit is increasing in corruption-induced tax evasion. The e¤ect of
15The proportion of government spending on public services that is inated is attained
as the di¤erence between spending on public services in the economy without corruption
with that of the economy with corruption. The e¤ect of corruption inating the cost of
public services while compromising the quality of public services is empirically accounted
for by Tanzi and Davoodi (1997).
16The reduction in the wage bill is because of the withheld wages from detected corrupt
bureaucrats and also because corruption leads to a reduction in the competitive wage
payable to bureaucrats.
17The government could ideally be perceived to budget for (1  l)  tM amount of
revenue
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corruption-induced tax evasion is to compromise the government revenue
stream. Implying that at the given level of government expenditure the s-
cal decit is apparent. In a cross-country empirical study, Tanzi and Davoodi
(1997) reveal that corruption through increasing the likelihood of tax eva-
sion and improper tax exemptions is inversely related to government revenue.
They argue that a reduction in government revenue is associated with unsat-
isfactory public service delivery which would further propagate incentives to
evade taxes.
The fall in tax revenue collection and the inevitability of public expen-
diture on public services implies that the government must undertake scal
policy adjustment not only to legitimise its existence by maintaining the
supply of public services but also to ensure a balanced budget. As alluded
to by Agnello and Sousa (2009), a scal decit has the potential of increas-
ing: 1) the debt to GDP ratio which compromises future welfare because of
the possibility of future scal unsustainability; and 2) inationary pressure
and volatility especially in economies with less independent central banks.
Prudent macroeconomic management would thus call for the government to
undertake scal consolidation. The government might consider: 1) imposing
a higher lump sum tax; 2) debt nancing or 3) the government could re-
duce the quantity of public services supplied so as to re-establish a balanced
budget.
In this paper the concern is on how increasing the lump sum tax payable
by households fails to stabilise the scal position of the government besides
worsening the governments ability to provide public services.
From our specication about tax evasion, the fraction of taxable house-
holds that seek to evade taxes is a function of the lump sum tax payable and
the probability of the tax evader being detected,  ( t; p; r). Assuming a xed
probability of detection we have  ( t) =
(1 p)(1+r) t
p
. It is straightforward
to see that the fraction of taxable households that engage in tax evasion is
increasing in the lump sum tax. The interesting question is, "what is the
impact of an increase in the tax rate on tax revenue?".
The characterisation of the fraction of taxable households that choose
to evade tax implies that increasing the lump sum tax incentivises more
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taxable households to engage in tax evasion. From gure (5.2), we can see
that the e¤ect of a tax increase is to shift the threshold level below which
tax evasion is deemed socially acceptable outwards from  to . Implying
an increase in taxable household tax evaders by a proportion 
 

. The
positive relationship between corruption-induced tax evasion and lump sum
tax leads us to the following proposition.
Proposition 2 In an economy with corruption-induced tax evasion, a lump
sum tax increase, worsens the governments revenue collection.
Proof. Government revenue collection in the corrupt economy is,
(1  l) [(1  ) + p]  tM + sN bwt. Which can also be expressed as
(1  l) [(1   ( t)) +  ( t) p]  tM+sN bwt. Di¤erentiating government rev-
enue with respect to lump sum tax,  t results in
(1  l)M

 t
  0 t ( t) + p0 t ( t)+ ((1   ( t)) + p ( t)) < 0. Equat-
ing this result to zero we can derive an optimal lump sum tax
  = ((1 ( t))+p( t)) ( 0t ( t)+p
0
t
( t))
and twice di¤erentiating revenue with respect to
the lump sum tax yields  2 (1  l)M

(1  p) 0 t ( t)

< 0.
From the proof, one can infer that if the lump sum tax is   = p
2(1 p)2(1+r)
18,
and that the government is experiencing a revenue shortage attributed to
corruption-induced tax evasion, it cannot increase the lump sum tax payable
to raise more revenue. Recall that  = (1 p)(1+r)

p
such that for any  >  
implies an outward shift of the threshold level below which tax evasion is
morally feasible. An outward shift of  implies an increase in the propor-
tion of tax evaders,  ( ) hence a reduction in tax revenue collection. In
essence, corruption-induced tax evasion is characterised with a La¤er curve
feature.
In a non-corrupt economy however, for as long as the taxable households
wage income less taxes is positive, hwt    0t > 0 such that kt+1 > 0 then
an increase in government expenditure can be nanced by an increase in
the lump sum tax payable by the taxable households so as to maintain a
18Where the explicit value of  is attained by substituting for  ( t) and 
0
t ( t) in the
equation  = ((1 (t))+p(t)) ( 0t (t)+p
0
t
(t))
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balanced budget. This paper therefore argues that, while the government
in a non-corrupt economy can increase taxes to accommodate expenditure
shocks, a tax rate increase in an economy with corruption-induced tax evasion
is counterproductive. As increasing the tax rate leads to an increase in
tax evasion hence incapacitating the ability of the government to use tax
policy to eliminate the scal decit. The preceding analysis is consistent
with empirical evidence; for instance, with reference to Greece, the inability
of its government to alleviate scal instability is partly attributed to tax
evasion which is one of the residuals of corruption (Katsios 2006; Mehir et
al. 2010; and Matsaganis and Leventi, 2013).
Since the government cannot increase revenue collections through raising
the lump sum tax payable in an environment of corruption-induced tax eva-
sion, therefore the expenditure given by equation (5.16) is associated with the
decit, (1  l)  tM [ (1  p)] sN bwt. Because of the reduction in revenue
collection due to corruption-induced tax evasion and the government inabil-
ity to raise the lump sum tax per taxable household implies that the quantity
of public services will have to be reduced. Thus as opposed to supplying g
quantity of public services, bg < g is the quantity of public services supplied
as to attain a balanced budget,
(1  l) [(1  ) + p]  tM + sN bwt = [ +  (1  s)] bg +N bwt   sN bwt
(5.20)
Where,  = [(q + (1  q)) ((1  ) + s)]. Following the reduction in
the quantity of public services delivered, the re-established balanced budget
can be used to attain  tM , that is,
 tM =
[ +  (1  s)] bg + (1  2s)N bwt
(1  l) [(1  ) + p] (5.21)
Economy without corruption-induced tax evasion
Ounce again the government is assumed to run a balanced budget. Recall
that government expenditure in the corrupt economy is given by equation
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(5.16). Tax revenue is a sum of tax collections from taxable households,
(1  l)  tM and withheld wages from detected corrupt bureaucrats, sN bwt,
that is, (1  l)  tM + sN bwt. Equating the total revenue to government
expenditure implies,
(1  l)  tM = [ +  (1  s)] g + (1  2s)N bwt (5.22)
Proposition 3 In a corrupt economy without corruption-induced tax eva-
sion, a lump sum tax increase, improves the governments revenue collection.
Proof. Like in the economy without corruption, given a positive shock 
in government expenditure such that at the lump sum tax  t, revenue is
less than public expenditure, that is; (1  l)  tM < [ +  (1  s)] g +
(1  2s)N bwt + , the government can re-stabilise its scal position by
increasing the tax payable  t. For  t < 
0
t < h bwt then we can have
(1  l)  0tM = [ +  (1  s)] g + (1  2s)N bwt + . Besides, the deriva-
tive of tax revenue (1  l)  tM with respect to  t = (1  l)M > 0
h bwt    0t > 0 implies that at the new tax payable,  0t >  t, the tax-
able household still maintains a positive disposable income. The positive
disposable income ensures positive taxable household savings and thus capi-
tal available to rms for investment in period t + 1. Besides, h bwt    0t > 0
also ensures positive consumption in period t + 1. Therefore, in a corrupt
economy but without tax evasion, for as long as the taxable household can
maintain a positive disposable income, the government can adjust the lump
sum tax payable to re-stabilise the budget given a positive shock in expendi-
ture. Though not explicitly highlighted, this kind of adjustment of the lump
sum tax payable  t is what ensures the maintenance of a balanced budget in
the corrupt economy presented in Blackburn et al. (2011).
In conclusion, corruption-induced tax evasion leads to a public revenue
shortfall. The revenue shortfall creates a scal decit. However, because
increasing the lump sum tax payable is counterproductive given corruption-
induced tax evasion, the government inevitably has to cut back the quantity
of public services so as to re-establish a balanced budget. Note that while
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cutting back the quantity of public services and therefore government expen-
diture could restore the budget balance, such e¤orts could be easily wasted
for as long as bureaucratic corruption is still existent. As alluded to earlier,
bureaucratic corruption could ounce again induce tax evasion implying fur-
ther budget cuts a situation that is quite precarious given the importance of
public services in enabling productivity in the economy. Hence while scal
adjustments such as cutting back government expenditure could restore a
balanced budget, the biggest scal gain would be attained if bureaucratic
corruption is mitigated.
5.4 Corruption, tax evasion, and development
This section accounts for how corruption and tax evasion interact to a¤ect
the development process with the aide of the gure (5.3). We show that
through compromising the quality and quantity of public services, corruption
propagates low labour productivity and savings in the economy. Since savings
translate into capital and thus a¤ecting the growth of an economy, therefore
the low savings under a corrupt regime compromises an economys economic
development potential.
5.4.1 Economy without corruption
From equation (5.8) which explains a bureaucrats incentive to be corrupt,
one can distinguish between a corrupt and non-corrupt economy. Specically,
an economy with the capital stock kc2 < kt is said to be a corruption free
economy. The capital accumulation path for such an economy corresponds
to equation (5.11). Using equation (5.18) to substitute for  tM in equation
(5.11) implies that,
kt+1 = xwt +Mb  [(q + (1  q))] g (5.23)
Where xwt is the aggregate wage income for households,Mb is the aggregate
bequests for households, while [(q + (1  q))] g captures aggregate govern-
ment spending. Substituting for wt in equation (5.23), results in a linear
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transition path for capital, T1 (kt),
kt+1 = Mb  [(q + (1  q))] g +  kt = T1 (kt) (5.24)
The transition path for capital, T1 (kt) is characterised by a positive slope,
 = Axg and an intercept, ' = Mb   [(q + (1  q))] g. Assuming a
steady state such that kt+1 = kt = k, and collecting like terms the steady
state level of capital k for the corruption free economy is,
k =
Mb  [(q + (1  q))] g
1  Axg (5.25)
The transition path of the high capital economy T1 (kt) has a steady state
at k where k > kc2. To guarantee k > 0, parameter values are such that
1  Axg > 0 besides Mb  [(q + (1  q))] g > 0.
5.4.2 Economy with corruption
Economy without corruption-induced tax evasion
For kc1 > kt, such an economy is characterised by corruption. Regarding the
economy without corruption-induced tax evasion, its capital accumulation
path is given by equation (5.13). Using equation (5.22) to substitute for
(1  l)  tM in equation (5.13), the corresponding capital accumulation path
of the economy without corruption-induced tax evasion is,
kNTt+1 = x bwt +Mb  [ +  [1  s] ] g (5.26)
Substituting for bwt = Ax 1 [[1  +  [1  s]  + s] g] bkt, results in a
transition equation for the corrupt economy without corruption-induced tax
evasion given by equation (5.27). Where,  = [(q + (1  q)) ((1  ) + s)]
and  = Ax [[1  +  [1  s]  + s] g].
kNTt+1 = 
bkt +Mb  [ +  [1  s] ] g = T2 (kt) (5.27)
The slope of the transition equation T2 (kt) is  while its intercept is 
 =
Mb  [ +  [1  s] ] g. Since the index of quality [1  +  [1  s]  + s]
144
is less than one, it follows that Ax [[1  +  [1  s]  + s] g] < Axg
and that the transition path T2 (kt) is atter than the transition path T1 (kt)
as is represented in gure (5.3). Assuming a steady state such that kNTt+1 =bkt = k, and collecting like terms the resulting steady state level of capital
kNT of the corrupt economy without corruption-induced tax evasion as seen
below,
kNT =
Mb  [ +  [1  s] ] g
1  (5.28)
To guarantee kNT > 0, parameter values are such that 1  > 0 besides
Mb  [ +  [1  s] ] g > 0.
Economy with corruption-induced tax evasion
Regarding the corrupt economy with corruption-induced tax evasion, its cap-
ital accumulation path is represented by equation (5.12). Note however that
because stabilisation of the government budget in this economy inevitably
involves cutting back the quantity of public services from g to bg, this im-
plies that both poor quality and fewer quantity of public services combine
to reduce productivity. Therefore the level of wages in the corrupt econ-
omy but without tax evasion, bwt = Ax 1 [[1  +  [1  s]  + s] g] bkt
is greater than that of the corrupt economy with corruption-induced tax eva-
sion, ~wt = Ax 1 [[1  +  [1  s]  + s] bg] ~kt. Using equation (5.21) to
substitute for  tM in equation (5.12), the corresponding capital accumula-
tion path of the economy with corruption-induced tax evasion is given by
equation (5.29);
kTt+1 = x ~wt +Mb  [ +  [1  s] ] bg (5.29)
Substituting for ~wt = Ax 1 [[1  +  [1  s]  + s] bg] ~kt in equation
(5.29), results in an explicit linear capital accumulation path T3 (kt) for the
economy characterised by corruption-induced tax evasion, that is;
kTt+1 =  + b~kt = T3 (kt) (5.30)
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Figure 5.3: Economic Development
Where b = Ax [[1  +  [1  s]  + s] bg] is the slope of T3 (kt) while
its intercept is  = Mb   [ +  [1  s] ] bg. Since the index of quality
[1  +  [1  s]  + s] < 1, it follows that b < Axg , implying that as
seen from gure (5.3) the slope of the capital transition path of the economy
with corruption-induced tax evasion, T3 (kt) is atter than that of the transi-
tion path of the economy without corruption T1 (kt). However, since both g
and bg are levels and that g > bg, it follows that both T2 (kt) and T3 (kt) have
similar slopes.
With regard to whether T2 (kt) > T3 (kt) or T2 (kt) < T3 (kt), scal
adjustment in the corrupt economy without corruption-induced tax eva-
sion leaves the quantity of public services unchanged at g, while in the
corrupt economy with corruption-induced tax evasion g is reduced to bg.
Therefore, while the aggregate quality of public services is compromised
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in both economies due to corruption, however labour productivity bwt =
Ax 1 [[1  +  [1  s]  + s] g] bkt in the corrupt economy without corruption-
induced tax evasion is greater than that in the corrupt economy with corruption-
induced tax evasion, ~wt = Ax 1 [[1  +  [1  s]  + s] bg] ~kt since g >bg. Furthermore, corruption-induced tax evasion implies that the loss in pri-
vate capital attributed to tax payments by taxable households to nance
government expenditure [ +  [1  s] ] bg is lower than that in the corrupt
economy without corruption-induced tax evasion, [ +  [1  s] ] g. How-
ever, since both the quantity and quality of public services drive productiv-
ity, the e¤ect of corruption-induced tax evasion facilitates a double tragedy
as the economy ends up with both compromised quality and lower quantity
of public services. Thus, the aggregate loss in productivity potentially over-
shadows savings from tax evasion. The transition path of the economy with
corruption-induced tax evasion is thus lower than that of the economy with
corruption but without corruption-induced tax evasion, T3 (kt) < T2 (kt) as
represented in gure (5.3).
Assuming that in the steady state kt+1 = kt = k, the resulting state
steady state capital accumulation with corruption-induced tax evasion is,
kT =
Mb  [ +  [1  s] ] bg
1  b (5.31)
To guarantee kT > 0, parameter values are such that 1   b > 0 besides
Mb  [ +  [1  s] ] bg > 0.
5.4.3 Discussion
kc1 is the threshold level of capital below which an economy is characterised as
having a low level of economic development. Since for k < kc1, irrespective of
whether a corrupt economy is associated with corruption-induced tax evasion
or not such an economy is characterised by a low level of economic develop-
ment. While an economy such that k > kc2 is associated with a high level of
economic development. Since kc1 is also the threshold level below which cor-
ruptible bureaucrats prefer to engage in corruption regardless of how other
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such bureaucrats behave, this implies that both bureaucratic malfeasance
and low levels of economic development are self-reinforcing. Similarly, for
k > kc2 corruptible bureaucrats are sensitive to engaging in bureaucratic cor-
ruption and thus prefer to be honest. Hence for k > kc2 implies that both
high levels of economic development and low levels of bureaucratic malfea-
sance are self-reinforcing. For kc1 < k < k
c
2 such an economy can be either
on the high economic development path or low economic development path.
A high incidence of corruption implies that corruptible bureaucrats could
increasingly prefer to engage to in corruption and as such the economy could
potentially be on the lower economic development path. However, a lower
incidence of corruption implies that corruptible bureaucrats could increas-
ingly prefer to be honest and as such the economy could potentially be on
the higher economic development path.
In this paper, the e¤ect of bureaucratic corruption is to reduce the quality
of public services. Lower quality public services reduce both capital and
labour productivity. The reduction in labour productivity implies a lower
level of both savings and supply of capital to the capital market. Thus a lower
level of capital stock in a corrupt economy than in a non-corrupt economy.
As seen in the preceding analysis, T2 (kt) < T1 (kt) that is the transition path
of capital in the economy without corruption is strictly higher than that of
the economy with corruption. This intuition is similar to that in Blackburn
et al. (2011). This paper builds on Blackburn et al. (2011) by arguing that
the lower quality of public services as a result of bureaucratic corruption
incentivises taxable households to evade taxes. The e¤ect of corruption-
induced tax evasion is to reduce the governments revenue stream. Since
the analysis is based on a government running a balanced budget coupled
with the inability of government to raise the lump sum tax payable, the
reduction in government revenue inevitably implies a fall in the quantity of
public services (austerity measure). The reduction in the quantity of public
services further reduces labour and capital productivity. Hence the level of
savings and thus capital stock is further compromised thus T3 (kt) < T2 (kt) <
T1 (kt). Correspondingly in equilibrium, kT < kNT < k. Therefore, by
capturing the e¤ects of corruption-induced tax evasion this paper attempts to
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proportionately account for the deleterious e¤ect of bureaucratic corruption
on economic development.
With regard to enabling a countrys transition from underdevelopment
to a higher level of economic development, this paper re-echoes the argu-
ment that reducing the size of government could potentially be one of reme-
dies to adopt. Di¤erentiating equation (5.6) with respect to g results in
[1 ]
Ax 1
[1 s]
s(1+r)
h
(  ) g 
N
i
> 0, that is kc1 is positively related to the changes
in g. Implying that the critical level of capital below which engaging in
bureaucratic corruption is a unique equilibria decreases upon cutting back
g. Depending on the size of decrease in g, if g is reduced such that kc1 de-
creases to kc3, then it is no longer optimal for a corruptible bureaucrat to
engage in corruption irrespective of how other bureaucrats behave in the
capital stock interval kc3 < kt < k
c
2. Rather the decision to engage in cor-
ruption depends on the incidence of corruption in the capital stock interval
kc3 < kt < k
c
2. Lowering g other factors held constant reduces the loot
available to corrupt bureaucrats and thus disincentivising bureaucrats from
engaging in corruption. If the reduction in g is followed by a signicant
proportion of corruptible bureaucrats preferring to be honest then the level
of corruption in the economy will be lower since behaving honestly will be
the optimal choice. The increased preference for corruptible bureaucrats to
behave honestly could lead to an increase in factor productivity. Increased
factor productivity could potentially result in increased economic growth and
thus potentially propagating an economys transition to a higher economic
development path. For instance in light of gure (5.3), since kc3 < k
NT , under
conditions of less incidence of corruption, the economy with corruption but
without corruption-induced tax evasion could potentially transit to a higher
economic development path, T1 (kt) and thus a higher steady state level of
capital k. This result supports the typical argument that reducing the size
of government is one of the ways to alleviate corruption, (Tanzi, 1998); how-
ever, it equally depends on the incidence of corruption following the cutting
back of government expenditure. However, if cutting back g leaves the in-
cidence of corruption still high, then bureaucrats could increasingly prefer
to remain corrupt. This could result in lower factor productivity leading
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to compromised economic growth and the possibility of perpetuating the
economytransition along a low economic development path. Under such
circumstances, the steady state of the economy with corruption but without
corruption-induced tax evasion could potentially lie in the region kc3 > k
NT
thus the economy could potentially be trapped in poverty.
From the preceding analysis, cutting back government expenditure has
two conicting outcomes: on one hand, through reducing the quantity of
public services it reduces productivity and growth thereby perpetuating un-
derdevelopment; and on the other hand it could reduce bureaucratic incen-
tive to engage in corruption especially when the incidence of corruption is
low which could potentially propagate an economys transition from a lower
economic development path to a higher economic development path. Which
e¤ect is dorminant depends on the incidence of corruption and therefore how
bureaucrats respond to cutting back government expenditure. If cutting back
government expenditure induces more bureaucrats to behave honestly this
implies that the productivity enhancement from high quality public services
could o¤set the productivity reduction from the lower quantity of public ser-
vices leading to enhanced growth. As such, the economy could potentially
transit from a lower economic development path to a higher economic de-
velopment path. In essence, high quality public service delivery leads to
enhanced factor productivity which acts as the link between scal policy and
economic development. Baldacci et al. (2004) show empirical evidence of
expansionary scal contractions (through reducing government spending) in
developing economies resulting in increased factor productivity and growth.
Therefore, the increase in productivity from the reduction in the bureaucratic
incentive to engage in corruption dominates the productivity reducing e¤ect
of the decrease in government expenditure only if the incidence of corruption
is lower. However, where the incidence of corruption is high, the economy
could potentially experience a double tragedy as both poor quality and lower
quantity of public services compromise the economys growth and thus in-
crease the economys potential to transit on a lower economic development
path increasing the likelihood of a poverty trap.
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5.5 Conclusion
The contribution of this study is to theoretically highlight how corruption dis-
torts the choice of scal policy and economic development process through
the tax evasion channel. Through reducing the quality of public services
bureaucratic corruption incentivises agents to evade taxes. As such the gov-
ernments revenue basket is compromised such that public decit becomes
inevitable. Since the analytical environment is based on a balanced budget,
the government has to either increase taxes as to cover the revenue gap or
reduce the quantity of public services. In the analysis, increasing the lump
sum tax is not optimal as it further propagates tax evasion hence inhibiting
the governments ability to raise more revenue. The government is left with
the di¢ cult decision of cutting back the quantity of public services. This
analysis is consistent with empirical evidence which shows that the inabil-
ity of the Greek government to tap into direct income tax as a result of
corruption-induced tax evasion has compromised its ability to stabilise the
economys scal position (Dreher et al. 2009; Katsios 2006; Matsaganis and
Leventi, 2013; and Mehir et al. 2010).
The paper highlights the importance of enhancing public sector e¢ ciency
with regard to ensuring the delivery of quality public services. Improving
institutional quality and governance is instrumental in enhancing the tax
payers willingness to fulll his tax obligation (Togler and Schneider, 2007
and 2009). Therefore while enhancing detection and penalty rates will deter
evasion, for as long as households perceive the quality of public services
to be poor then tax evasion will persist. As noted earlier, public service
delivery is associated with agency problems to the extent that the government
(principle) cannot fully monitor the behaviour of bureaucrats. Under such
circumstances corrupt bureaucrats seize the opportunity to siphon o¤ public
funds while delivering poor quality public services. Therefore, the onus is on
governments in developing economies to ensure an institutional environment
that commits bureaucrats to quality public service delivery.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
This thesis sought to explain how the size of the economy and corruption
interact to a¤ect innovation and growth, the trade-o¤ between corruption
and income inequality using the informal sector as a driver of the relation-
ship and how poor quality public service delivery as a result of corruption
induces tax evasion may lead to tax policy impotency and perpetuity of
underdevelopment. The analyses that we presented are based on microeco-
nomic foundations within a dynamic general equilibrium framework resulting
in three distinct but related essays.
The rst essay which is captured in chapter two discusses the interaction
between corruption and economic growth given an economys size. The es-
say was designed to try to answer the following questions. Does the size of
the economy matter in the interaction between corruption, innovation and
growth? Does the existence of multiple bribe payments a¤ect the impact of
the size of the economy on corruption? In the model corruption involves bu-
reaucrats seeking for bribes from owners of Research and Development rms
in return for permits to innovate. Without a permit to innovate, an entrepre-
neur cannot undertake Research and Development implying that he cannot
innovate and produce an intermediate good necessary for the production in
the nal goods sector. The bribe is determined through a Nash bargaining
mechanism. Corruption is associated with multiple bribe payments when
for a given public service an entrepreneur engages in multiple bribe negotia-
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tions with corrupt bureaucrats leading to bribes being paid more than ounce.
Consistent with empirical evidence, the essay shows that indeed the size of
the economy mitigates the e¤ect of corruption on innovation and growth.
However, when corruption is characterised by multiple bribe payments, both
innovation and growth are compromised irrespective of the economys size.
The essay implies that: 1) a large sized economy in which corruption is
characterised by a one-o¤ bribe payment (multiple bribe payments) could
experience a high (low) level of innovation and growth; 2) a large (small)
sized corrupt economy is bound to experience a high (low) level of innova-
tion and growth; 3) Innovation and growth are higher in a non-corrupt than
in a corrupt economy.
The second essay which is captured in chapter three analyses the inter-
action between corruption, income inequality and the informal sector. The
essay sought to answer the following questions. Is there a trade-o¤ between
corruption and income inequality? What role does the informal sector play
in the interaction between corruption and income inequality? The analysis
involves a household making an occupational choice between formal entrepre-
neurship, informal entrepreneurship and subsistence livelihood. The formal
entrepreneurship involves a bribe payment to a bureaucrat in return for an
investment permit. The e¤ect of bribe payment is to increase credit mar-
ket rigidities in such a way that the threshold level of wealth above which a
household can access credit is increased. Implying that there exists a wealth
interval associated with households who are legible to access credit in an en-
vironment of no corruption but become credit constrained given corruption.
Consistent with empirical evidence, the essay shows that corruption-induced
credit constrained households choose informal entrepreneurship as opposed
subsistence livelihood. As a result, the e¤ect of corruption-induced credit
market constraints is to increase (decrease) the size of informal (formal)
entrepreneurship while leaving the size of subsistence livelihood households
unchanged. The choice of entry into informal entrepreneurship by credit
constrained households reduces the extent of income inequality increase as
compared to a situation where households have no option but engage in sub-
sistence livelihood. Thus, our results may suggest that the existence of the
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informal sector accounts for the trade-o¤ between corruption and income
inequality.
The third essay which is captured in chapter four of the thesis explains
the interaction between corruption, scal consolidation and economic devel-
opment. The essay sought to answer the following questions. What is the
link between corruption, tax evasion and scal consolidation? Is there a link
between corruption, tax evasion and economic development? Corruption in
this essay involves bureaucrats delivering poor quality public services while
quoting prices for high quality public services. Taxable households are as-
sumed to able to observe the quality of public services and perceive taxes as
the price for quality public services. Poor quality public services as a result of
corruption create incentives to evade taxes. The e¤ect of corruption-induced
tax evasion is to reduce the ow of revenue to public co¤ers. The govern-
ment in this framework seeks to run a balanced budget, with corruption-
induced tax evasion however, a scal decit is apparent. The analysis shows
that corruption-induced tax evasion: 1) makes increasing the tax payable to
eliminate the scal decit counterproductive; 2) restricts the government to
cutting back the quantity of public services hence reducing public expendi-
ture so as to ensure scal stability; and 3) through inducing the government
to cut back the quantity of public services, it worsens productivity and in-
creases bureaucratic incentives to engage in corruption. The essay shows
that under conditions of low corruption incidence following the cutting of
back of government expenditure, there is a likelihood of an economy break-
ing the poverty trap and transiting to a higher economic development path.
The essay also shows the presence of multiple equilibrium where high (low)
institutional quality is associated with high (low) economic development.
The essays emphasise the deleterious e¤ect of bureaucratic corruption
on economic development. More importantly though is that bureaucratic
corruption and economic development are self-reinforcing implying the like-
lihood of poverty traps. Unless institutional mechanisms are put in place
to alleviate bureaucratic corruption, an economy is bound to be trapped
in underdevelopment. The second essay however implies that institutional
mechanisms to ght corruption while well-intentioned, they might increase
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income inequality as they could be at the expense of informal sector activi-
ties. Therefore mechanisms to enhance an economys institutional framework
should equally ensure that safety nets are in place to facilitate the smooth
transition of households to the formal economy.
Across the three essays, the incentive to engage in bureaucratic corruption
depends on the propability of a bureaucrat being caught and the subsequent
penalty. The probality of being caught reects: 1) the norms and values
of a society since corruption is likely to ourish (frowned upon) in a more
(less) corrupt society; 2) degree of press freedom since it signals the ability
of the media to investigate and report bureaucratic behavior; and 3) judi-
cial freedom as it allows for commissions of inquiry and police to undertake
investigations without undue inuence from public o¢ cials. In an economy
characterised by high norms and values, press freedom and judicial freedom,
the likelihood of a corrupt bureaucrat being detected is likely to be high.
This implies that a bureaucrat could potentially be hesitant to engage in
corruption and the reverse is true. However, the decision to engage in cor-
ruption also depends on the wages bureaucrats earn. Lower wages imply an
increased incentive to engage in corruption. This is because even if the prob-
ability of being detected is high, for as long as bureaucratic wages are low,
it implies that the expected benet from a corrupt act could easily outweigh
the expected penalty (which in this thesis is the loss in wages). Therefore,
strengthening a countrys institutions and paying fair and legitimate wages
should simulteneously be employed if bureaucratic corruption is to be allevi-
ated.
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Appendix A
Appendix
Matlab code
Below is the code that I employed in calculating the Gini coe¢ cients.
% pop is a vector of population sizes of the di¤erent households given
their occupational choices.
% val is a vector of net income that accrues to households given their
occupational choices
%The vectors pop and val equal dimensions with strictly positive out-
comes.
% g is the Gini coe¢ cient.
% check arguments
assert(nargin >= 2, gini expects at least two arguments.)
if nargin < 3
makeplot = false;
end
assert(numel(pop) == numel(val), ...
gini expects two equally long vectors (%d ~= %d)., ...
size(pop,1),size(val,1))
pop = [0;pop(:)]; val = [0;val(:)]; % pre-append a zero
isok = all(~isnan([pop,val])); % lter out NaNs
if sum(isok) < 2
warning(gini:lacking_data,not enough data);
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g = NaN; l = NaN(1,4);
return;
end
pop = pop(isok); val = val(isok);
assert(all(pop>=0) && all(val>=0), ...
gini expects nonnegative vectors (neg elements in pop = %d, in val =
%d)., ...
sum(pop<0),sum(val<0))
% process input
z = val .* pop;
[~,ord] = sort(val);
pop = pop(ord); z = z(ord);
pop = cumsum(pop); z = cumsum(z);
relpop = pop/pop(end); relz = z/z(end);
% Gini coe¢ cient
% We compute the area below the Lorentz curve. We do this by
% computing the average of the left and right Riemann-like sums.
% (I say Riemann-likebecause we evaluate not on a uniform grid, but
% on the points given by the pop data).
%
% These are the two Rieman-like sums:
% leftsum = sum(relz(1:end-1) .* di¤(relpop));
% rightsum = sum(relz(2:end) .* di¤(relpop));
% The Gini coe¢ cient is one minus twice the average of leftsum and
% rightsum. We can put all of this into one line.
g = 1 - sum((relz(1:end-1)+relz(2:end)) .* di¤(relpop));
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